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3. The appellant, who claims to be the daughter of Sri Suruli Andavar through his wife, one Muniammal, resisted the suit and contended that her mother and she had been conducting the Gurupuja at the samadhi all along and after the death of her mother, she was alone arranging for the performance of the annual Gurupuja. It was her further case that the properties of her father. Palaniandia Pillai, who later became the Swamiji, including the samadhi and its adjuncts, had Been inherited by her as the sole surviving member of the family and therefore, she alone was entitled to manage the affairs of the samadhi and conduct the Gurupuja. The claim of the respondent that it had been conducting the Gurupuja for over thirty-five years was categorically denied by the appellant. Even so, she refused the claim that the members of the public were contributing for, and were participating in, the conduct of the Gurupuja. On the other hand, she took the specific stand that the Gurupuja could be done only by the heirs of the Swamiji, and not by a third party or any member of the public. The appellant further stated that the suit by the respondent was a motivated one and her own sister's husband, one Rangaswami Pillai and a third party by name Balamuthu Servai who styled himself as the President of the respondent Sangham, were at the bottom of the mischief and their intention was nothing more than to snatch away from her the right of management of the samadhi and the control over the properties left behind by Sri Suruli Andavar. On a former occasion, Rangaswami Pillai and one Narayanaswami Naidu had filed a similar suit, O.S. No. 7 of 1955 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Pudukkottai and claimed to be the trustees of the samadhi. That suit ended in failure and the present suit was nothing but a covert move by those persons to once again lay hands on the samadhi and its properties. Lastly, the appellant stated that, in the Gurupujas arranged by her, she had always permitted the members of the public to come and pay homage at the samadhi of her father, but such permission ought not to be construed to mean that the members of the public were entitled to offer worship at the samadhi as of right.

9. Taking the first and second questions for consideration, it is not in dispute that Sri Suruliandavar is a place where the samadhi of the Swamiar bearing that name was built after he attained mukthi about forty years ago. What is the status given in Hindu Law for a tomb or a samadhi of an ordinary Hindu, is by now well settled. This Court has pronounced in Kunhamutti v. Ahmed Musaliar I.L.R. 58 Mad. 204 at 211 : 68 M.L.J. 107 : A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 29. J. Draviasundaram Pillai v. Subramania Pillai I.L.R. (1945) Mad. 854 : (1945) 1 M.L.J. 328 : A.I.R. 1945 Mad. 212. and Veluswami Goundan v. Dkandapani I.L.R. (1947) Mad. 47 : (1946) 1 M.L.J. 354 : A.I.R. 1946-Mad. 485. that the performance of Gurupuja at the samadhi of a person, however pious was not a charitable object recognised by the Hindu Law and as such, any dedication of property for the performance of Gurupuja and public charities at the samadhi would not be valid. The ratio in these cases was approved by the Supreme Court in Saraswathi Ammal v. Rajagopala Ammal 1953 S.C.J. 714 : (1953) 2 M.L.J. 803 : 1954 S.C.R. 277 : A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 492. The same view was taken in yet another case, viz., Ramanasramam v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Madras and it was held that a samadhi by itself and not treated as a fitting object of public Hindu religious worship for over a long period, does not evolve into a temple At first sight, therefore, it appears that the appellant is on a form ground when she contends that Sri Suruliandavar is only a samadhi and not a temple in the known sense of the word. For the respondent two features were pointedout to contend that these rulings would not apply to the facts of the instant case, viz. : (1) that the samadhi was not of an ordinary individual but of a saint; and (2) in any event, the samadhi had, by subsequent treatment, evolved into a temple. The evidence discloses that Sri Suruliandavar had divine powers and a large number of people had devout faith in him and used to go to him to get relief, succour and peace of mind. There is therefore some force in the contention of the respondent that the samadhi we are concerned with is not that of an ordinary human being, but of a saintly person and therefore, the deification of such a person in a tomb would stand on a higher footing than building a samadhi for an ordinary individual. Some support for this argument is to be found in the observation of the Supreme Court in Saraswathi Ammal v. Rajagopala Ammal 1953 S.C.J. 714 : (1953) 2 M.L.J. 803 : 1954 S.C.R. 277 : A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 492. The observation of the Supreme Court is contained in the following words:

10. The second argument of Mr. Krishnamurthi, learned Counsel for the respondent, was that, in any event, the institution was no longer a mere tomb or samadhi, but had become a temple because a Vinavakar temple on one side and a Vel of Lord Subramania on another side had been consecrated by the devotees. The further argument is that the samadhi as well as the temple and Vel had been put up with the aid of funds donated by the devotees of Sri Suruliandavar and therefore the institution had become a temple and was no longer a samadhi. Even this contention, I am afraid, cannot merit acceptance From the evidence it is seen that the main or major attraction still continues to be the samadhi of Sri Suruliandavar and not the Vinayakar temple or the Vel of Lord Subramania subsequently added thereto. As such, the Vinayakar temple and the Vel can only be considered as adjuncts to the samadhi, and not as features, which have transformed the place from a tomb or a samadhi into a temple. A somewhat similar question as the one on hand had to be considered by a Division bench of this Court which decided Veluswami Goundan v. Dhandapani. (1946) 1 M.L.J. 354 : A.I.R. 1946 Mack 485. The Bench held that a temple built at or around the site of a samadhi can only be considered an adjunct of the samadhi and not an independent object of bounty. In. yet another case, vide B.M. Committee v. H.P.E. Board . a situation very similar to the one on hand arose for consideration. The institution that required consideration in that case had its origin in the tomb or samadhi of one Bodendra Swamigal, a holy man and a saint. To commemorate his memory, as is not unusual, a matam was constructed round the samadhi in which pujas and religious observances were being done. Several big vigrahams or idols of Sri Gopalakrishna, Sri Rama, Lakshmana, Venugopala and Anjaneya were installed in the matam and pictures of Sri Radhakrishna, Sri Panduranga and Ors. were also hung and puja was done, not to the samadhi, but to the idols and pictures. On account of these features, the contention in that case was that the institution-was a temple. The contention was rejected by Mack, J., and the learned Judge held as follows:

The difficulty in applying/the ratio of this observation to the facts of the instant case is that there is not adequate evidence here to show that the members of the public have been offering worship at the samadhi with a belief in the religious efficacy of the institution and they are making themselves the object of the bounty of some superhuman power. Only five witnesses have been examined on the side of the respondent and all of them, happen to be either office-bearers or members of the respondent Sangham, Since the Sangham was laying claim to exclusive right to conduct the Gurupuja' and other festivals at the samadhi, the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 5 become sinterested testimony. No explanation has been offered by the respondent as to why no independent witness was examined to prove the religious efficacy of the place even though it is claimed that thousands of devotees congregate at the samadhi during the Gurupuja festival. Turning now, to Rathnavelu v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments I.L.R. . it was. held therein that where, for a long period, an institution had been regarded as a place of religious worship, which the public were entitled to use as a matter of right, it fell within the definition of a 'temple' and the mere fact that the institution had its origin in a samadhi and continued to have traces of its origin would not make any difference to the Situation. I am afraid, the pronouncement of the Division Bench in that case cannot be invoked by the respondent to its aid in the instant case, for, the facts there were totally different. Though the institution started with the construction of a samadhi for one Apparswami, it was always considered a pagoda and not a samadhi. A grant was made in favour of Chidambaraswami who constructed the samadhi, as early as in 1860 by Government, and in the deed of grant, Chidambaraswami was described as the founder of the pagoda and not the samadhi. Various pujas, utsavams and other celebrations according to Vedanta Sastra were being performed at the institution from its inception. A will left by Chidambaraswami made reference only to the performance of the pujas and charities and did not contain even a vague reference to the samadhi. Thus, in effect, the origin of the institution as a samadhi and the existence of a samadhi had almost become blurred. It was in those special circumstances, the Bench gave its opinion in the terms-extracted above. That hardly is the picture here. The samadhi of Sri Suruli-andavar is still very much in the picture, and in fact, it continues to be the major attraction of the place, The main festival is only the performance of his Gurupuja on the day he attained mukthi. Hence this decision too cannot advance the case of the respondent in any manner.