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3. The facts of the case insofar as they are relevant for addressing the aforementioned questions, are capsulated hereunder :-

In 1982, the late husband of respondent no.1, while posted as Custom Inspector at Jalore, was accused of committing the murder of one Abu Khan, the truck driver by firing a shot from his revolver. He was tried under Section 302 IPC and was convicted by the Sessions Court vide judgment dated 22.12.1983 under Section 304 Part II IPC and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs.200/-. This conviction and sentence of late husband of respondent no.1 became final upto the Apex Court as his appeal was dismissed by this Court vide its judgment dated 29.8.1997 and the SLP also came to be dismissed by Supreme Court vide order dated 9.10.1998. Because of his conviction, the competent authority passed an order of his removal from service under Rule 19(1) of Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (herein-after for short referred to as 'the Rules of 1965') vide communication dated 6.10.1998. This order of removal passed by the competent authority against the late husband of respondent no.1 was not assailed by him in any proceeding before any authority. However, the late husband of respondent no.1, after his conviction and sentence for offence under Section 304 Part II had become final upto the Supreme Court, filed a mercy petition before the Governor of Rajasthan, who, in exercise of his powers under Article 161 of the Constitution of India and on the recommendation of the then Commissioner of Customs, allowed the mercy petition and vide communication dated 3.12.1999 informed that the late husband of respondent no.1 has been granted pardon. It may be mentioned here that the husband of respondent no.1, who was a convict and was granted pardon, had died on 3.10.1999 i.e. two months before communication of order of pardon was received by his widow. Thereafter the respondent made a representation to the petitioners for grant of pensionary benefits of her husband and also to provide her appointment on compassionate ground. The said representation of respondent no.1 was rejected by the petitioners vide order dated 28.11.2000 (Annexure 3 at page 24 of writ petition). Being aggrieved by the rejection of the representation, she filed an application before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur and prayed for recall of order dated 28.11.2000 and to grant the pensionary benefits of her late husband and also for directions to the petitioners to appoint her on compassionate ground. The foundation of the application filed by respondent no.1 before Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, was based on her plea that after her late husband was granted pardon by the Governor of State of Rajasthan in exercise of his powers under Article 161 of the Constitution of India, the same has the effect of blotting out the consequences flowing from his conviction. The application in this regard made by respondent no.1 was opposed tooth and nail by the petitioners, inter alia, on the ground that the pardon was granted to the late husband of respondent no.1 by the Governor under mistake of fact. It was pleaded that the husband of respondent no.1 had expired before passing of pardon order and therefore, according to the petitioner, the mercy petition pending before the Governor on the date of his death stood abated. It was stated that the fact of death of late husband of respondent no.1 was not brought to the notice of Governor at the time of passing of pardon order. It was further pleaded that the late husband of respondent no.1 had never worked under Mr. S.P. Singh, the then Commissioner, Customs, who had recommended his case to the Governor for grant of pardon and according to the petitioner, he had no occasion to write that the service record of late husband of respondent no.1 was outstanding or that he had an unblemished record. It was stated that the rating of the late husband of respondent no.1 in the ACR of the previous years was poor and that number of disciplinary inquiries were pending against him which were to be prematurely dropped in view of his conviction by the Court for offences under Section 304 Part II IPC, which was admittedly a misconduct under Rule 19(1) of the Rules of 1965.

13. Para 21 of the judgment in K.M. Nanavati's case (supra), is relevant and is reproduced hereunder:-

In the case, the question is limited to the exercise by the Governor of his powers under Article 161 of the Constitution suspending the sentence during the pendency of the special leave petition and the appeal to this Court; and the controversy has narrowed down to whether for the period when this Court is in seizin of the case the Governor could pass the impugned order, having the effect of suspending the sentence during that period. There can be no doubt that it is open to the Governor to grant a full pardon at any time even during the pendency of the case in this Court in exercise of what is ordinarily called mercy jurisdiction. Such a pardon after the accused person has been convicted by the Court has the effect of completely absolving him from all punishment or disqualification attaching to a conviction for a criminal offence. That power is essentially vested in the head of the Executive, because the judiciary has no such 'mercy jurisdiction'. But the suspension of the sentence for the period when this Court is in seizin of the case could have been granted by this Court itself. If in respect of the same period the Governor also has power to suspend the sentence, it would mean that both the judiciary and the executive would be functioning in the same field at the same time leading to the possibility of conflict of jurisdiction. Such a conflict was not and could not have been intended by the makers of the Constitution. But it was contended by Mr. Seervai that the words of the Constitution, namely, Art. 161 do not warrant the conclusion that the power was in any way limited to fettered. In our opinion there is a fallacy in the argument in so far as it postulates what has to be established, namely that the Governor's power was absolute and not fettered in any way. So long as the judiciary has the power to pass a particular order in a pending case to that extent the power of the Executive is limited in view of the words either of Sections 401 and 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Articles 142 and 161 of the Constitution. If that is the correct interpretation to be put on these provisions in order to harmonise them it would follow that what is covered in Article 142 is not covered by Article 161 and similarly what is covered by Section 426 is not covered by Section 401. On that interpretation Mr. Seervai would be right in his contention that there is no conflict between the prerogative power of the sovereign State to grant pardon and the power of the courts to deal with a pending case judicially.

16. In Kehar Singh's case (supra), the Supreme Court had emphasised for reasons to be given by the President and the Governors while exercising powers under Articles 72 and 161 of the Constitution of India. It was observed in the judgment that the reasoning to be given by the President and the Governors may be brief but there must be some reasoning in the order to appreciate the same in judicial review.

17. The challenge in Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P., (2006) 8 SCC 161, was to an order passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh represented by its Principal Secretary, whereby the convict Gowru Venkata Reddy was granted remission of unexpired period of about seven years' imprisonment. The facts in that case were that the convict was the husband of a sitting MLA of party in power in the State. The clemency petition was filed by the wife of the convict which was allowed by the Governor on the basis of report of the District Level Officer and the Superintendent of Police. Epuru Sudhakar's case was a case of judicial review of the order passed by the Governor under Article 161 of the Constitution of India and the Hon'ble Apex Court, while deciding the limits of judicial review of such an order, held that the function of determining whether the act of a Constitutional or Statutory functionary falls within the Constitutional or legislative conferment of power or is vitiated by self denial on an erroneous appreciation of the full amplitude of the power, is the matter for the Court to examine. It was further held that the exercise or non exercise of pardon power by the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is not immune from judicial review. Limited judicial review is available in certain cases. Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.H. Kapadia (as his Lordship then was), while concurring with the view in the matter taken by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat (as his Lordship then was), had observed that the granting of pardon is in no sense an overturing of a judgment of conviction, but rather it is an executive action that mitigates or sets aside the punishment for a crime.

28. Nevertheless, we may point out that the power of the sovereign to grant remission is within its exclusive domain and it is for this reason that our Constitution makers went on to incorporate the provisions of Article 72 and Article 161 of the Constitution of India. This responsibility was cast upon the executive through a constitutional mandate to ensure that some public purpose may require fulfilment by grant of remission in appropriate cases. This power was never intended to be used or utilised by the executive as an unbridled power of reprieve. Power of clemency is to be exercised cautiously and in appropriate cases, which in effect, mitigates the sentence of punishment awarded and which does not, in any way, wipe out the conviction. It is a power which the Sovereign exercises against its own judicial mandate. The act of remission of the State does not undo what has been done judicially. The punishment awarded through a judgment is not overruled but the convict gets benefit of a liberalised policy of State pardon. However, the exercise of such powe under Article 161 of the Constitution or under Section 433-A CrPC may have a different flavour in the statutory provisions, as short-sentencing policy brings about a mere reduction in the period of imprisonment whereas an act of clemency under Article 161 of the Constitution commutes the sentence itself.