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19. It is quite clear that there is change in the language between these two enactments. The question to be decided is whether the change is deliberate and intentional or whether it is just a case, to use Halsbury's expression, of slovenly draftsmanship. If one turns again to section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, under clause (i) to earn the exemption, income is required to have been derived from property under trust wholly or in part held for religious or charitable purposes. If it was wholly held on trust for religious or charitable purposes, the whole of the income is exempt, and in case of property held in part only for such purposes the income applied or finally set apart for application thereto is exempt. This is of course subject to other requirements mentioned in the sub-section and in the provision. Now, in the case of the Wealth-tax Act, where a property is held on trust for objects which are partly charitable and partly non-charitable, there cannot be any apportionment as is to be found under the Indian Income-tax Act. Such apportionment is possible only in case of income and is not possible with respect to be corpus or assets which yield income. In my view, the omission of the word "wholly" in the above section of the Wealth-tax Act and the omission of a similar provision as is to be found in the-later part of the sub-section in the Indian Income-tax Act was deliberate and international and the legislature advisely avoided or omitted the said word. The reason for this also is not far to seek. In the case of income, as stated earlier, arising from property held partly on trust for a public charitable purpose and partly for other objects, apportionment was possible and so section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act provided for exempting a portion of the income. As indicated earlier, this was not possible in respect of the corpus. The question then was for the legislature to consider whether in the case where the corpus is held on trust for various objects, some of which are of a public charitable nature and others not, is any exemption to be granted ? The view contended for by the learned counsel for the revenue is that unless all the objects of the trust are of a public charitable nature, the corpus would not qualify for exemption. The other view is that if it can be said that primarily or predominantly the objects of the trust are of a public charitable nature, the corpus would qualify for exemption under section 5(1)(i) of the Wealth-tax Act. In my view, the latter view is the better view. According to me, this was the intention of the legislature when in enacting the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, it omitted the use of the word "wholly" as a qualifying word as regards the requirements concerning the objects of the trust when a similar word was to be found in section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.

21. Now, it may be mentioned that the assessee carried the matter to the Supreme Court and the decision of the Supreme Court is to be found reported in Trusted of Govindram Family Charity Trust v. Commissioner of Income-tax to which decision reference has already been made in connection with the first question in this reference. In the view of the Supreme Court also the trust in question was created primarily for the benefit of the members of the family of Gordhandas Govindram Seksaria. The Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of the High Court agreed with the conclusion of the High Court earlier set out (page out 52 of the report). Now, in my opinion, these decisions bear out the view which I have indicated earlier as the better view, viz., that it is not necessary in considering the claim of an assessee to exemption under section 5(1)(i) of the Wealth-tax Act to require that all the objects of the trust should fall within the expression, " public purpose of a charitable or religious nature in India"; it would be sufficient if, to use the approach of Kotval C.J. and V. S. Desai J. in the judgment in Trustees of Gordhandas Govindram Family Charity Trust v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1968] 70 ITR 600 (Bom), the objects of the trust considered as a whole could be regarded to be within the expression, viz., for a public purpose of a charitable nature.

24. Here, one aspect may be emphasized, and that is that these objects are not disjunctive but conjunctive. The position might have been different if disjunctive word or words had been used to demarcate the different objects of the trust and the trustees had been given a discretion to utilise the whole income of the trust on any of the objects. If there was such a provision it would have been possible to urge that the trustees to the deed of trust could utilise the entire income for an object which was not an object of public charitable nature, and by reason of such provision the trust cannot be said to be one with an object primary and predominantly of a public charitable nature and would accordingly fail to qualify for exemption.