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d. Pass such other orders and further orders as may be deemed necessary on the facts and in the circumstances of the case.”

2. We have heard Mr. Partha Sil learned counsel who has been appointed to assist this Court and learned senior counsel Mr. Kailash Vasdev for Respondent No.2 and learned senior counsel Ms. Nisha Bagchi for Respondent-Union of India and perused the material on record.

3. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties, we find that the concerns expressed by the petitioner in this writ petition have been assuaged to a certain extent inasmuch as the Parliament has amended Section 80DD of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act” for the sake of brevity). The said provision deals with payment of annuity of a lump sum amount for the benefit of a dependant, being a person with disability, in the event of death of the individual or the member of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) in whose name the subscription to the scheme stipulated in the said provision has been made.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that having regard to the order passed by this Court in the case of Ravi Agrawal vs. Union of India, being Writ Petition (C) No.1107/2017 disposed of on 03.01.2019 and the observations made therein, the Parliament has amended Section 80DD of the Act in terms of Section 21 of the Finance Act, 2022. Consequently, on attaining the age of 60 years or more by an individual subscriber or a member of an HUF, the payment or deposit to the scheme envisaged under Section 80DD can be discontinued and the monetary benefit which would have accumulated can be made use of. It is submitted that the said amendment ought to be made retrospective as the same is with effect from 01.04.2023 to the existing policies as it will benefit a large number of subscribers who are interested in making use of the benefit of the such policies for the benefit of the disabled persons on turning 60 years of age. That an option could be reserved to the subscribers to have the benefit of the amendment in respect of policies which were made much prior to 2014 as in the said year such policies have been discontinued. He contended that if the amendment is given a retrospective effect, many subscribers as well as disabled persons would benefit and hence the concerns of the petitioner being purely in public interest may be considered and relief may be granted.

6. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent contended that Section 80DD refers to a situation where the benefit of the policy would be provided to a disabled person only on the death or demise of the caregiver or the subscriber. The event at which the benefit of the policy would be given to the disabled person is on the death of the subscriber. It is only then the policy would come to end and the monetary benefit would be given to the disabled person. That there is a salient object with which the terms and conditions of the policy have been devised. That having regard to the order of this Court on 03.01.2019, there has been an insertion of a clause under Section 80DD taking into consideration the concern expressed by the very same petitioner herein in the earlier writ petition and to that extent, amendment has been made. But it is too farfetched for the petitioner to seek retrospective operation of the said amendment to the existing policies. It was contended that the terms of the policies cannot be changed subsequent to their crystallization and the premiums being paid on the said terms. Therefore, there can be no retrospective operation of the amendments.

7. We have considered the submissions advanced at the Bar in light of the object of Section 80DD and the fact that pursuant to the order of this Court, the Parliament has taken note of the observations made in the said order and has amended Section 80DD as extracted above. We find it difficult to accept the plea made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the said amendment be applied retrospectively to policies which were taken prior to 2014 so that the benefit of the amendment is given to those subscribers also. The reasons are not far to see. The whole object of Jeevan Adhar Policy is to benefit disabled persons by making provision by the subscriber post his demise. The concern and apprehension of a caregiver or subscriber of a policy for a disabled family member or other person for whose benefit the policy is taken after the demise of the caregiver is of utmost significance. It is only with that object that the caregiver or a subscriber would take such a policy so that he would not leave a disabled person in the lurch on his demise. If that is the object of the policy then we do not think the subscriber or the caregiver of the subscriber should be given the liberty to discontinue the policy during his lifetime on attaining 60 years of age. That would only go against the object with which the policy has been taken and against the interest of the beneficiary, namely, a disabled person.