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10. Viewing the matter from another angle on a plain reading of Sub-section (2) and its proviso, of Section 10, I have no hesitation to hold that the proviso in question does not speak of the character of the person from whom sample is taken as it refers explicitly to the character of the food of which sample is taken which conclusion is buttressed by the object of the provision and its context and setting. Because, Sub-section (1) authorises vide. Clause (a)(i) to take sample from "any person" selling the article, a different purpose is achieved by Sub-section (2). What is authorised by Sub-section (2) is to enable the Food Inspector to enter the particular place described therein. It is the statutory authority enabling him to enter the particular place and of course for the particular purpose of taking "samples" with the particular object of "analysis". The proviso refers merely to a specified category of such food, namely, a "primary food" which is"not intended for sale as such food". If the Food Inspector conterriplates taking sample of the particular category of food envisaged under the proviso he must, in accordance with Section 11, make his intention clear to the vendor that he was taking sample of the primary food concerned assuming the same to be "intended for sale as such food". Because, in such a case the vendor shall have the opportunity to state that the concerned item of primary food of which the Food Inspector proposed to take sample was not "intended for sale as such food".The key expression, in my opinion, are the words "as such food" in which legislative intent is vocally projected. Such construction on the proviso has to be placed, according to me, as will allow other relevant provisions of the Act to operate and not to become otiose. Therefore, the provision of Section 12 which empowers any purchaser"other than a Food Inspector to have the food analysed must also be seen. In such a case, Section 10(2) and the proviso for that matter, does not at all operate and Section 12 shall be rendered impotent if prosecution, on the basis of a report received from the Public Analyst pursuant to "analysis" made Under Section 12, is denied. Further, it must also be noted that liability to prosecution arises Under Section 7 while Section 20 deals with the provision of "cognizance and trial of offences" while Section 17 concerns "offences by companies". On the other hand, Sections 10 and 11. do not deal either with the jurisdiction of the court or with the character of the offender. According to me the later provisions merely inhere procedural safeguards and do not control Section 7 or 20. In each case, therefore, the Court shall be entitled to decide on the basis of evidence the question of breach thereof when raised by the accused. In Banwarilal, 11984) 2 Gauhati LR 320 : 1985 Cri LJ 1148, this Court took the view that Section 17 controls Section 7. and therefore strict compliance with the former must be regarded as a jurisdictional requirement. I have no doubt that proviso to Section 10(2) as in the case of Section 11, inheres merely a procedural safeguard and as such if infringement is complained, on the evidence recorded the court must see whether it so happened. It carries no jurisdictional requirement. The first contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee must, therefore, fail. I hold that the prosecution in the instant case was not still-born.