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18. The learned trial Judge, on an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, found the appellant guilty of all the three charges and dealt with him as stated earlier.

19. The only point which deserves consideration in this appeal, is whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt ?

20. Mr. N. Jothi, the learned counsel, appearing for the appellant, contended that the trial Court, as Assistant Sessions Judge, had no power to impose a sentence of 11 1/2 years, which included the default sentences and, therefore, in view of the exceeding of jurisdiction by the trial Judge, the whole judgment was vitiated, necessitating its being set aside. He further contended that the compartment in the train can never be construed as a building used as a human dwelling or a place of worship or a place for custody of property and further it cannot be deemed to be the property in the possession of P.W. 1 to attract the ingredients of Section 452, I.P.C. On that sole ground, conviction for the offence under section 452, I.P.C. will have to be necessarily set aside. In respect of the offence under section 333, I.P.C., he urged that the public servant was not attacked in the discharge of his duty as such public servant or with intent to prevent or deter that person or any other public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant and, therefore, the prosecution had not established the offence under this section as well. With regard to the offence under section 307, I.P.C., it is his submission, that the prosecution had suppressed material evidence and indulged in exaggerated versions at every stage, casting a suspicion, that the entire truth had not been placed before the Court, which would be sufficient to enter a verdict in favour of the appellant. He referred to the evidence of some of the witnesses to substantiate his contention, which will be referred to a little later. He also contended, that the injuries on the accused had not been explained by the prosecution, which was an additional factor enuring in favour of the appellant. According to him, Ex.P. 6 cannot be treated as the first in formation report, since the telephonic message of P.W. 17 had reached P.W. 22 much earlier and he had commenced investigation as well, on such telephonic message. Ex.P. 6, according to him, would be hit by section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code. He pointed out that Ex.P. 12, the discharge certificate, had been produced by P.W. 14 for the first time when he was in the witness box, and that had substantially prejudiced the defence. He would rely on the remand report Ex. D. 2 and submit that if; as stated therein, the appellant had travelled from Kathivakkam Railway station, the present prosecution version, as though he had commenced the journey only from Ennore Railway Station will have to be rejected. He would point out the hostility of P.Ws. 8 and 9 and contend that there was infirmity in the prosecution case, in every facet.

22. Mr. G. Krishnamurthy, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Respondent would contend that the default sentence awarded for non-payment of fine will merely be a penalty and cannot be taken along with the substantive sentence imposed for the offence and, therefore, the contention of lack of jurisdiction, in the trial Court to award default sentence over and above 10 years imposed for substantive offences, could not be said to be illegal or without jurisdiction. He would strenuously urge that P.W. 1, a first class pass holder, was legitimately travelling in the train, and entering into that compartment by the appellant, would be trespass sufficient to attract the ingredients of Section 452, I.P.C. In respect of the offence under section 333, I.P.C., it is his contention that the appellant had voluntarily caused grievous hurt to P.W. 1, a public servant, in consequence of something done by that person in the lawful discharge of his duty as such public servant. He would substantiate it by submitting that the public servant, P.W. 1, had passed an order, dismissing E.A. No. 384 of 1984 against the interests of the appellant in the lawful discharge of his duty as a public servant, which was referred to by the appellant while attacking P.W. 1. In respect of the offence under section 307, I.P.C., he would submit that the very words of the appellant while he attacked P.W. 1, that he can deliver no more judgment coupled with P.W. 1 having been chased and attacked would be sufficient to sustain the conviction, on this count. He would emphatically argue that in a day light occurrence where the appellant had been caught red handed and the prosecution had substantiated the occurrence by examining several eye-witnesses, there was practically no scope for suppression of any material evidence by the prosecution to either gain undue advantage, because the victim was a Judicial Officer, or to cause prejudice to the case of the appellant. On the question of sentence, he submitted that the Court can take note of the motive and the manner of attack and decide the suitable sentence that could be awarded and the State as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant was not vindictive.

(2) that person so hurt was a public servant; and (3) that such public servant was then discharging his duty or that the accused did so with intent to prevent or deter such public servant or any other public servant from discharging his duty, or the accused did so in consequence of something done or attempted to be done by such public servant, in the lawful discharge of his duty.

The first part of Section 333, I.P.C. cannot be attracted, since at the time when grievous hurt was caused to P.W. 1, he was not discharging his public duty. The second part of Section 333, I.P.C. can come into operation, because the appellant must be deemed to be aware of P.W. 1 travelling daily by electric train to reach Ponneri, to do his duty as a public servant, since he was at the relevant time, the District Munsif, Ponneri. The appellant by attacking P.W. 1 in the train, while the latter was on his way to discharge his duty as a public servant, the intention to prevent or deter P.W. 1 as contemplated in Section 333, I.P.C. can be deemed to have been spelt out. In any event, the third part of Section 333, I.P.C. is most certainly attracted, without any doubt whatsoever. The attack was in consequence of the judgment pronounced against the appellant, in the lawful discharge of his duty as a public servant by P.W. 1. The evidence of P.Ws. 1, 15 and 17 taken along with the words of challenge thrown by the appellant, while attacking P.W. 1 would clearly attract the third part of Section 333, I.P.C. The two rulings aforementioned obviously, therefore, cannot apply to the facts of this case. The conviction for an offence under section 333, I.P.C. imposed by the trial Court has to be necessarily confirmed.

57. The sentence to be awarded to the appellant for the offences under Section 333, I.P.C. and Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, will have to be next considered. The stand taken by the defence and the prosecution has already been stated. The correlation between crime and punishment, has always been a subject of perennial problem. The question, that had agitated the Courts, the criminologists and social scientists was whether immediate aim of criminal law was to punish, with a view to deter likeminded persons or deter the wrong doer from repeating his conduct or reform him by suffering the pain of punishment. The society today has more or less eschewed retribution as an aim of punishment. Crime is now considered as a disease, a problem of social hygiene, in that the emphasis has moved from retribution to cure and reform and to reclaim the ailing member of the society, into the society itself. The modern approach to penology is that the sentence must inhere a humanitarian approach. This poses a complex problem requiring a compromise between reformation, deterrence and retribution. Disproportionately heavy sentence can be deemed arbitrary and at the same time too light a sentence bearing no proportion to the gravity of the offence charged, can bring the administration of criminal justice to ridicule. Soft sentencing justice, may even be gross injustice where many innocents are the potential victims.