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"7. Where this Act, or any Bombay Act made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-
(a) .....
(b) .....
(c) affect the right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed: or"

Apparently, therefore, in terms of the provisions of Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904, if any right is acquired under the provisions of the old Rent Act, the same cannot be said to be affected on account of its repeal. However, whether in fact in the case in hand, by virtue of this provision, the right of being the deemed tenant which is claimed to have been accrued to the petitioners under the old Rent Act would survive and would not be affected on account of repeal of the old Rent Act has to be considered after considering the contentions by the respondents that the old Rent Act was a temporary statute and secondly that the status of tenant bestowed upon the licensee under Section 15A was only "for the purpose" of the old Rent Act. Before considering the same, however, it will be appropriate to refer to the relevant provisions of the new Rent Act.

7. Before adverting to the arguments and the point in relation to cessation of the character of the petitioners as that of the tenant or deemed tenant or as to whether the said character was only for the purpose of the provisions of the old Rent Act, it will be appropriate to scan through the various decisions relied upon and relevant for the decision in the matter in hand.

8. In Marutrao Pandurang Zende v. Eknath Shivram Jagtap and Anr, reported in 1980 Mh. L.J. 238, it was held that the old Rent Act was a temporary statute and therefore the provisions corresponding to Clause 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act would not apply to the same being a temporary statute and the said position is well settled in terms of various decisions, including that of the Apex Court. However, considering the same the Legislature had made a provision under Sub-section (3) of Section 7 that Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act would apply upon the expiry of the old Rent Act or any provision thereof ceasing to be in force in any area, as if it had been repealed by the Maharashtra Act and therefore it is clear that it any provision which was applicable to any particular area is repealed or ceases to be in force in any area pursuant to a notification issued by the State Government, under Section 2(4) of the old Rent Act, the provisions of Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act would come into play. Section 2(4) of the old Rent Act empowers the State Government to direct, at any time by issuance of notification that any of the provisions of the said Act would cease to apply to such area as may be specified in such notification. This decision, however, was sought to be relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondents for drawing attention to the observations in para 11 thereof wherein reference is made to the decision of the Apex Court in Qudrat Ullah v. Municipal Board, Barielly, , and to contend that provisions of the old Rent Act, be it Section 15A or any other provision, it only provides for a procedural disability to the landlord and it does not create any substantive right as such in favour of the person claiming to be a tenant. In other words, it is the contention of the learned Advocate for the respondents that the protection which was granted to a person by fiction of law under Section 15A was to the extent of creating procedural disability to the landlord to seek eviction of such person from the premises during the subsistence of the temporary statute and nothing more than that and therefore it does not create any right as such in favour of such person claiming to be the tenant.

"Of course, the consequences laid down in Section 6 of the Act will apply only when a statute or regulation having the force of a statute is actually repealed. It has no application when a statute, which is of a temporary nature automatically expires of afflux of time. The Ordinance in the present case was undoubtedly a temporary statute but it is admitted that the period during which it was to continue had not expired when the Repealing Act was passed. The repeal therefore was an effective one which would normally attract the operation of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act."