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2. By virtue of the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, Angammal became entitled to a half share in the properties of the family, the other half vesting in the appellant. Misunderstandings, however, arose between the two persons, the outcome of which was a suit O. S. No. 63 of 1952 in the District Munsif Court, Coimbatore, by Angammal, for an injunction to restrain the appellant from interfering with her possession. That suit, though contested at the beginning terminated in a compromise. The substance of the arrangement was that Angammal was to be declared entitled to half a share of the properties, but possession of that share was to be with the appellant so long as he paid her rents stipulated. The terms of the compromise being material for the purpose of this case, we give below certain relevant clauses thereof :

"It is agreed that the plaintiff (Angammal) would be entitled under the law to a half share in all properties which belonged to her husband and that the first defendant (appellant) should enjoy the suit properties without prejudice to such a right."

3. Both the parties to the compromise enjoyed their respective properties in accordance with the terms thereof. While so, the Central legislature passed the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, (Act XXX of 1956); that became effective on 17-6-1956 when the President gave, his assent to it, Under Section 14 of the enactment every property (subject to the exceptions mentioned therein) held under a limited right under the law by a Hindu female, vested forthwith in her with absolute rights. Angammal, claiming that by reason of Section 14(1) of the Act, she became entitled to a full disposable interest in what she held, made, on 7-3-1957, a testamentary disposition of the same in favour of her daughters, the respondents herein. Soon afterwards, i.e. on 25th March 1957, the testatrix died.

6. The other feature, viz., the disposal of a remainder of the estate after Angammal's lifetime in favour of the appellant would prima facie suggest that what the former was given under the compromise was a mere life estate. It is a recognised rule of construction of documents that they should be read as a whole and effect should as far as possible be given to all the parts thereof. For that purpose it is essential to ascertain first the precise nature of estate given to Angammal. The decree as we said is a little obscure; in order therefore to ascertain the intention of the parties, it will be essential to read it along with clause 1 of the compromise which clearly indicates that Angammal was to have what she under the law would be entitled to in respect of her husband's properties. At the time the compromise was made, the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act was in force; Angammal had obtained her husband's share by virtue of it. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of that enactment states-

8. Once the conclusion is reached, namely, that it was not any new title that she acquired under the decree which only declared her pre-existing right under the law, the gift over contained in clause 9 will have to be regarded as invalid, as both a Hindu widow's estate and a vested remainder cannot co-exist. The appellant cannot, therefore, obtain any rights 'under clause 9.

9. It was then argued that even if Angammal were held to have a Hindu woman's estate, that estate having been secured to her, under the com. promise, provisions of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 would prevent an enlargement of that estate into an absolute one. From what we have said, it will be plain that what the compromise did was merely to recognise the pre-existing title of Angammal to a half share in the properties. It was not intended as a fresh source of title or as a family arrangement of doubtful claims. No restriction has been imposed on the enjoyment of Angammal except what is inherent in the nature of the estate, as a part of the law; in other words there is no restriction imposed by virtue of any term in the compromise or grant. But Mr. Gopalaswami Iyengar argues that even so, Angammal having obtained the property by reason of the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, the restriction imposed by Section 3 (3) will continue to subsist by reason of Section 14(2). In other words, the contention is that Section 14(1) will apply only to cases where a woman inherited the property under the ordinary Hindu law and not where she got it by virtue of the provisions of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. Before we consider that point, it will be useful to refer to Section 14 which runs :