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6. As regards the other important question as to how far a Judge could use his own knowledge when arriving at a conclusion on the evidence adduced before him, the authorities are by no means clear. In the case of Hurpurshad v. Sheo Dyal 3 I.A. 259 at p. 282; 26 W.R. 55 the Judge in the lower Court imported into the case his own knowledge of the fact that the family of the parties had recognised the division which one Chandan had made prior to his demise though there was no evidence let in about such recognition by the family. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that this ought not to be done as the Judge's knowledge might have depended on mere rumour or hearsay. Their Lordships in the next sentence (page 286) state: "But even if the Commissioner's statement of facts from his own knowledge be taken as evidence"--this shows that their Lordships did not finally decide that if the Judge's knowledge was not based upon mere rumour or hearsay but was the impression made directly on his own senses and if such knowledge had been communicated to the parties for criticism and comment, such knowledge could not be used by him in arriving at a conclusion on the evidence before him. In Lakmidas Khushal v. Bhaiji Khushal 35 B. 317 : 10 Ind. Cas. 914 : 13 Bom. L.R. 313 a Subordinate Judge decided the suit after local inspection in which he found that a passage for rain-water spoken to by the plaintiff's witnesses as existing did not really exist. It was contended before the High Court that the Subordinate Judge acted illegally in importing his knowledge obtained at the local inspection in deciding the case and the appellant's Vakil relied on the oft-quoted and as often misunderstood case of Kessowji Issur v. Great Indian Peninsular Railway Company 31 B. 381 : 11 C.W.N. 721; 6 C.L.J. 5; 4 A.L.J. 461; 2 M.L.T. 435; 9 B.L.R. 671; 17 M.L.J. 347. 34 I.A. 115. But one of the learned Judges (Chandavakar, J.) easily distinguished that case on the ground that all that the Privy Council decided was that the learned High Court Judge's personal knowledge obtained on an inspection of the locality on a different day amidst possibly different surroundings was no safe criterion in deciding the question in issue in that particular case. The learned Judge (Chandavarkar, J.) in Lakmidas Khushal v. Bhaiji Khushal 35 B. 317; 10 Ind. Cas. 914; 13 Bom. L.R. 313 clearly held that the Subordinate Judge did not act illegally in using his knowledge of the non-existence of the rain water passage in deciding the case before him. In Bourne v. Swan & Edgar, Ltd. (1903) 1 Ch. D. 211 at p. 225; 72 L.J. Ch. 168; 51 W.R. 213; 87 L.T. 589; 19 T.L.R. 59; 20 R.P.C. 105, Farwell, J., said that two classes of cases must be distinguished in these matters and while in one class of cases the, Judge's direct knowledge can be used only for the purposes of enabling him to understand the questions that are being raised, to follow the evidence and to apply the evidence, there are cases of a different kind where it is the eyesight of the Judge that is practically the ultimate test. In cases of infringement of patent rights or infringement of trademarks and in cases of 'passing off' the defendant's goods as plaintiff's, the Judge has mostly to rely upon the evidence of his own senses. As regards the demeanour of witnesses, the Judge has to depend upon the knowledge and the impression brought to his mind by his eyes and ears. Even as regards the credibility of witnesses, let us suppose that a person known to the Judge as of the highest character is produced as a witness before the Judge. Is it possible for him to put out of his mind his knowledge of the character of the witness in coming to a conclusion upon the evidence? It is simply asking the Judge to perform an impossible feat. As to using the observations made by the Judge at a local inspection merely to understand the evidence, I shall here quote the remarks of Bissel, J. in an American case,--"We are very frank to say we do not appreciate the refined distinction which is drawn by some authorities wherein it is held that the Jury are not at liberty to regard what they have seen as evidence in the case but must utterly reject it otherwise than as an aid to the understanding of the testimony offered. The folly of it is apparent from the constitution of the human mind and the well known processes by which Juries arrive at conclusions. If a dozen witnesses should testify that there was no window on the north side of the house from which one had sworn that he had viewed the affray and the Jurors on view should see the window, all lawyers would know that it would be futile in the argument to insist on the Jury that their verdict must be based on the non-existence of the window since the point had been sustained by a vast preponderance in the number of witnesses" (11 Colo. App. 41.) I know that there are old dicta to the effect that a Judge should decide only on the evidence before him and should not at all use his private knowledge. Wigmore refers (paragraph 2569, note 2) to a case in Henry IV's time where the Judge allowed a prisoner to be convicted on the evidence but got a pardon for him from the King because the Judge knew of his personal knowledge that the accused was not guilty. This shows the absurd lengths to which the doctrine of not using personal knowledge in coming to a conclusion in the case could be carried and why it is that there is some agitation now in this country for village panchayets to be constituted as Judges so that they might use their own knowledge of the facts of the case and the character of witnesses to come to conclusions on facts. I do not, of course, wish to restore the days of Mariada Raman or Haroun-al-Raschid but a Judge must be allowed to use even his knowledge of concrete private facts, provided he mentions his knowledge to the parties and they do not object to his deciding the case and he must be allowed, of course, to use his knowledge of general or public facts, historical, scientific, political and otherwise in coming to his conclusions. Let us take the case of a witness who belongs to a hill tribe which is known to the Judge by his past experience as a Revenue Officer as consisting of persons who are generally incapable of telling complicated lies. Is not the Judge entitled to use his said knowledge in arriving at a conclusion on the evidence of that witness? Judges and Juries do use and, it seems to me, are entitled to use their general past experience of men and things in arriving at conclusions of fact and such experience is not only not considered as a disqualification but is a very necessary qualification for coming to sound conclusions of fact. I know that English Judges have laid down in some cases the rule as to the using of the Judge's own knowledge in coming to conclusions upon the evidence rather too strictly. See. London Omnibus Company Ltd. v. Lavel (1901) 1 Ch. D. 135; 70 L.J. Ch. 17; 83 L.T. 453 : 17 T.L.R. 60 : 18 R.C. 74. But, with great respect, I am inclined to think that the only restriction which can be imposed upon the Judge is that he should not import knowledge obtained by mere rumour or hearsay of concrete facts connected with that particular case before him for arriving at a conclusion. When a Judge is supposed to be reliable enough to come to a conclusion on the evidence of facts deposed to before him as seen or heard by witnesses, it is surely anomalous and even startling to hold that he cannot be relied on to use impartially the facts directly seen and heard by himself. The only result of thus holding would be that Judges would be induced to take some formal evidence of the same facts from much less reliable sources than themselves and to omit all mention of their own knowledge in their judgments and this course cannot be held as conducive to a satisfactory decision of the cases when they come up on appeal before the Appellate Court.

9. If a Judge has knowledge of some particular concrete fact, which is a matter of mere 'private interest' peculiar to the particular case before him, which fact is not as existing natural fact (of relative permanence like the existence of a stream or a tree) but one that has already happened and which fast is a matter of strong controversy between the parties, he should, no doubt, retire from the case as Judge so as to be able to give his evidence for one side or the other before another Judge, But where a Judge has no personal or pecuniary interest in a case and merely uses his knowledge of human nature or his general opinion of large classes of people based on his previous experience or the testimony of his own senses in respect of things and persons observed by him in the course of the proceedings before him after he had given notice to the parties (or even outside the proceedings, provided he mentions such knowledge to the parties), I do not see how he could be prevented (except by asking him to do the impossible feat of forgetting everything and even not to be led sub-consciously by facts within his knowledge) from using such knowledge. I cannot even bring myself to understand why he should be so prevented, especially if he has special technical learning, knowledge and general information which gives him very useful materials for arriving at a proper conclusion. A Judge is appointed presumably for the reason that his learning, impartiality and trained powers of observation are superior to and more reliable than the average learning, etc., of the litigants and witnesses before him. In systems of law where the Judge has very little to do with findings on facts, a Judge might be made merely to sum up the evidence before him impartially (without asking the Jury to consider what he knows) and leave it to the Jury to come to their own conclusions. But where, (as in India in all Civil cases and most Criminal cases), the Judge is a Judge of both facts and law, it is impossible to ask him not to use his knowledge of particular classes of people, and other like circumstances when arriving at a conclusion on facts. Of course, if an Appellate Court finds that a lower Court has unduly pressed such general knowledge (say, by unduly suspecting the genuineness of an unregistered document because it was executed in a town notorious for forgeries or because the writer was of a particular caste or profession), the appellate tribunal would use its own presumably sounder knowledge of human, nature to set right the inferior Court and give advice to the lower Court not to be led too much away by such considerations. It has been sometimes laid down that a Judge must as Judge "ignore what he knows as a private man" and he may have to ignore" as a private man what he knows as Judge. I respectfully dissent from such observations. In some old cases (collected in foot-note 4 in Wigmore, para. 2569), it was held that the Judge's personal knowledge of a witness's lack of credit should not be used. In a later case, however, the trial Judge's "great familiarity with that portion of the state" was considered as a ground for not reversing his judgment and a Judge's personal knowledge of the services of a Counsel (obtained as Judge sitting in the previous case) was allowed to be used by the Judge in fixing the remuneration of that Counsel in an action brought by the Counsel for such services. I think the only practical rule which can be laid down in these cases is that if a Judge knows of his own knowledge as an individual observer of a past relevant concrete private incident and that fact cannot be subjected to clear proof at the time of trial (such as a person's colour, resemblance of features, appearance, behaviour, chemical experiments on the present condition of the object) and if the truth of such incident is contested between the parties, he should mention his private knowledge of such incident to the parties and he should refuse to be the Judge in that case, unless both the parties, after he so mentions to them his said personal knowledge of that particular incident, state that they have no objection to his continuing as Judge. That the Judge was competent to give evidence in the witness-box and to subject himself to cross-examination and then to decide the case was the old rule but this has been discountenanced for obvious reasons in modern times and, in my opinion, should not be allowed. All that can be permitted is that the Judge's personal knowledge should (as in cases of proceedings for contempt) be recorded and be allowed to be commented upon in a moderate manner. In the case of concrete particular facts, the Judge who uses his own knowledge should only be obliged to state whether he knows it by direct knowledge or by rumour or hearsay and should not be subjected to cross-examination. General knowledge of the tenures in a particular area or of the character of certain populations as also direct knowledge gained by his own senses and mind--it is impossible to prohibit the Judge from using such knowledge in drawing inferences from the evidence before him and in coming to conclusions as to the rights of parties before him. In the present case, the learned Judge has not gone further than using the general knowledge which he had acquired as a past Revenue Officer and as a Revenue Court of experience in the course of the performance of his duties in zemindari tracts; and I hold that he was entitled to use such knowledge in coming to a conclusion on the facts after the consideration of the evidence let in in this case. One other short point has to be noticed, viz., whether the leases granted after 1st July 1898 are wholly shut out as evidence by Section 185 of the Estates Land Act. I am inclined to hold that they are so shut out if sought to be used for the purposes of proving the character of the tenure of the land and even if such leases are sought to be proved merely in order to show that a land was treated in the same manner after July 1898 as before July 1898. I agree, however, with my learned brother that leases granted before 1st July 1398, though they were to come into force only after 1st July 1898, are admissible in evidence and in the result, I agree that these second appeals should be dismissed with costs.