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"Nothing contained in any contract made by a tenant shall take away or limit his rights under this act, provided, that nothing herein contained shall affect any stipulations made by the tenant in writing registered as to the erection of buildings in so far as they relate to buildings erected after the date of the contract."

The preamble to the Act itself recited that it was found necessary to give protection to tenants who, in the municipal towns and adjoining areas in the State of Madras have constructed buildings on others' land on the hope that they would not be evicted so long as they pay a fair rent for the land. There was material enough noticed by the Supreme Court, that in the wake of the First World War, consequent on the inflation and the growing rise in prices of land, many such tenants were sought to be evicted by the landlords, and the City Tenants Protection Act 1922 was enacted, to avoid the mischief and to remedy the evil. The contract of lease in the case before the Supreme Court provided that the lessee be entitled to surrender the lease before the expiry of the term, in which case, he had to dismantle the building at his expense; and on default, the landlord could take possession after dismantling the constructions. As to the scope of Section 12 of the Act and whether the above term was outside or within the purview of its proviso, the majority and dissenting judgments of the Supreme Court were in sharp conflict. The majority judgment held stipulations "as to the erection of buildings" would include only restrictions as to the size or nature of the buildings, the building materials to be used, and the purpose for which the building is to be used, but would not include a stipulation to remove buildings on the determination of the lease. The term in question was therefore not protected by the proviso. Section 9 was held constitutional and valid. The dissenting judgment, on the other hand, held that the proviso to Section 12 had application to the relevant term of the lease and that the contract between the parties was free to operate. In that view the dissenting judgment did not consider the constitutionality of Section 9.

"It (the court) can only disregard the Act when those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one. -- so clear that it is not open to rational question. That is the standard of duty to which the courts bring legislative Acts; that is the test which they apply, not merely their own judgment as to constitutionality, but their conclusion as to what judgment is permissible to another department which the Constitution has charged with the duty of making it. This rule recognises that, having regard to the great complex ever-unfolding exigencies of Government much which will seem, unconstitutional to one man, or body of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the Constitution often admits of different interpretations: that there is often a range of choice and judgment: that in such cases the Constitution-does not impose upon the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional." (See "The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law" by J. B. Thayer-7 Harvard Law Review 129), "The logic and rhetoric of a Brandeis dissent were in terms of judical deference to the legislative judgment. The Court should not read laissez faire into the Constitution however great its belief in it. If there was an evil to be remedied and the remedy was fitting the Court must permit the experiment. In the exercise of power under the due process clause 'we must be ever on our guard.' he said, 'lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles'.