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"Subject to the provisions of the said rules, and of the schedule, for the time being in force, framed by the Commissioners under Section 30, the power of appointing, promoting suspending, dismissing, fining, reducing or granting leave to the officers and servants of the Commissioners shall be exercised by the Chairman or the Deputy Chairman in the case of officers and servants whose monthly salary does not exceed two hundred rupees; and in every other case by the Commissioners in meeting."

If the power of Suspending, dismissing, finding and reducing was to be exercised "subject to the provisions of the said rules", that is to say, subject to the rules framed under Section 31, it seems clear that, in the view of the Legislature the rules framed under Section 31 could cover all such matters or, in other words, there was authority in Section 31 to frame rules in regard to them. It was contended that what the prefatory clause "subject to the provisions of the said rules", meant . was that the exercise of the powers, in regard to the sevpral matters mentioned in Section 32, would be subject to rules framed under Section 31 only where, in regard to any of the matters, rules could be framed under that section and had in fact been framed, if, in regard to any or the matters, there was no power in Section 31 to frame rules, there would be no rules, subject to which the powers given in Section 32 would have to he exercised. I can see no reason to adopt that restricted construction of the prefatory clause in Section 32. Of the several matters mentioned in Section 32, only the granting of leave is expressly provided for in clause (a) of Section 31 (1). Not a single one of the other matters is expressly mentioned anywhere in that section. If the view of the Legislature was that of the several matters mentioned in Section 32, rules could be framed under Section 31 only with regard to the granting of leave, it is hardly reasonable to think that in order to make the power of the Chairman, the Deputy Chairman and the Commissioners subject to the rules framed under Section 31 in that single case, the Legislature would use the restrictive expression "subject to the provisions of the said rules" at the beginning of the section, while providing in the body of it for the exercise of powers in regard to that and six other matters. To my mind, the opening clause of Section 32 is a clear pointer to the true scope and nature of Section 31. It is implicit in that clause that rules framed under Section 31 (1) can relate to each one of the various matters specifically mentioned in the section, namely, appointment, promotion suspension, dismissal, imposition of a fine, reduction and granting of leave. Except grant of leave, which is expressly provided for in clause (a) of Section 31 (1), pro-vision for the rest can only he read as implied in clause (d). I have already commented on the infelicity of the clause as a vehicle of expressing the idea of regulating the conditions of service, particularly as respects control by disciplinary action, but, at the same time. I do not consider it altogether incanable of bearing that meaning. In my view, having regard to the considerations to which I have adverted, "regulating the period of service" must be read as meaning "control-line by regulations the service of employees dur-ing the period of their incumbency." If that be the true meaning of Clause (d), the Commissoners had power even under the old section to frame rules regarding the taking of disciolinary action against their employees and if. instead of framing their own rules they adopted the Fundamental Rules framed by Government, the rules so adopted were valid and statutory rules

16. The only argument I ean think of against such construction of clause (d) is that, in 1951, the Legislature amended Section 31 (1) by inserting Clause (i) and it must have done so in the view that the matters provided for in the new clause were not covered by the section, as it stood prior to the amendment. Clause (d) was not repealed and yet clause (i) was added. It may, therefore, he said that if clause (d) already covered the matters mentioned in the new clause (i), then by Inserting another clause dealing with the same matters, the Legislature was making itself guilty of unnecessary tautology. I do not, however, con-sider this argument sufficient to outweigh the considerations I have mentioned. What the Legis-lature of a later day thinks of a provision of an earlier statute is not always decisive of its true meaning. Besides, I find no difficulty In holding that by enacting clause (i), the Legislature only clarified the true scope of Section 31 (1). It made explicit what was implicit in clause (d) and committed the implied connotation of a clause to be a separate provision, leaving the old clause to bear thenceforward only the plain meaning of the words. Such clarification was necessary, because the right to exercise the several powers mentioned in Section 32 being indubitably there and the power to make rules regarding them being a necessary concomitant of such right and such power having been recognised in the prefatory clause of that section, the power had to be read In clause (d) of Section 31 (i) which was, as a matter of language, not very clear Or explicit. It was thus necessary to draw out the latent meaning of clause (d) and set it out in clear terms and that was what was done by means of inserting the new clause (1).