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5. The question is whether the adoption of defendant No. 3 would be valid after the death of Rudrappa. It is contended on behalf of defendant No. 3 that by the adoption defendant No. 8 did not divest the interest of Kalyanava, and therefore the adoption is not invalid according to the decision in Chandra v. Gogarabai (1890) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 463, and that, according to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Kumud Bandhu Saha v. Ravnesh Chandra Saha (1919) I.L.R. 46 Cal. 749, the adoption of defendant No. 3 by Rudrava would be valid. It was held in the latter case that where a person made a bequest of four annas to his widow and twelve annas to his son, the widow could make an adoption even after the son left a widow to succeed to him because the adoption by the widow would not divest the estate vested in the widow of the son as she herself got an interest in the property by bequest. The decision in Chandra v. Gojarahai proceeds on two grounds: (1) that the adoption made to Nana'a brother Bhau after the estate had vested in Nana'a widow would be invalid as the joint family pro-perty ceased on Nana's death; and (2) on the ground that the adoption made by a widow in a joint Hindu family would be invalid if it divested the estate of one on whom the inheritance devolved from a person other than her husband, and that the adoption by Bhau's widow would be invalid as it would divest the estate which had devolved on Nana's widow. In the full bench decision in the case of Ramkrishna v. Shamrao (1902) I.L.R. 26 Bom. 526 : s.c. 4 Bom. L.R. 315, F.B., which related to a Hindu grandmother who succeeded as heir to her grandson who died unmarried, it was held that the power of the grandmother to make an adoption came to an end. It was observed in that case that according to Mussuraat Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishore Acharj Chowdhry (1865) 10 M.I.A. 279 a widow's power to adopt is limited and that the power would be limited both where a widow had a written authority from her husband to adopt and also where, though she had no such authority, she adopted, as a widow can in the Bombay Presidency under the law giving her the power of adoption in the absence of express or implied prohibition from her husband. It was further observed at p, 532 as follows:-

Where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son, and that son dies leaving a natural born or adopted eon or leaving no son but) his own widow to continue the line by means of adoption, the power of the former widow is extinguished and can never afterwards be revived.

The question, therefore, in such a case is whether, in the event of the last surviving owner of the property leaving a widow to continue the line by means of an adoption, the power of adoption of any other widow in the joint family would be extinguished and would never afterwards be revived. The full bench decision in Ramkrishna's case has been approved by the Privy Council in Madana Mohana v. Purushothama (1918) L.R. 45I.A. 156 : s.c. 20 Bom. L.R. 1041, where it was held that an authority to adopt given by a Hindu governed by the Mitakahara to his widow cannot be exercised to make a second adoption when the son first adopted has died after attaining full legal. capacity to continue the line, either by the birth of a natural born son or by the adoption to him of a son by his own widow. The full bench decision in Bamkrishna's case was followed in Adivi Suryaprakam Bao v. Nidamarty Gangaraju (1909) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 228, where it was held that a power given to a widow to adopt is absolutely at an end when once the estate has vested in the heir of her deceased son and is not revived even if she afterwards succeeds to the estate, and that in such a case the consent of the son's heir in whom the estate was vested will not validate the adoption, and the sama rule was held by Wallis J. to apply in the case of an adoption by a widow of a coparcener who has lost her right to adopt by reason of the estate having devolved on the widow of the last coparcener. In Pratapsing Shivsing v. Agarsingji Raisingji (1918) L.R. 46I.A. 97 : s.c. 21 Bom. L.R. 496 it was held that a Hindu widow can exercise a power to adopt which is vested in her so long as the power is not extinguished or exhausted, although her husband's estate is not vested in her. It would, therefore, appear that the trend of recent decisions is that the test as to the validity of an adoption is not merely whether the adoption does or does not divest the estate of any other person but also involves the question whether the power of adoption of the widow is merely suspended or is at an end and has become incapable of being revived.

20. The only question that is left over is, whether the adoption of the third defendant by the second defendant was valid. If the two brothers Chennappa and Eudrappa had effected a severance of the estate of each from that of the other, no such question would have arisen. In the events, however, that have taken place, we have the widow of a predeceased coparcener ( the elder brother's widow) purporting to adopt, after the only other surviving coparcener (the younger brother) had died; and, consequently, after his estate had devolved upon the last coparcener's widow or, to be accurate, would have devolved but for his will. If the circumstances had been, as I have stated, un-complicated by the will of the younger brother and the partition deed, which itself provides for the adoption, I presume there would have been no difficulty in deciding the case. The events that have happened, however, place the widows of Chennappa (the predeceased elder brother) in the very situation in which they would have been had Chennappa separated his share in the joint family estate from Rudrappa's : as it is, the widows of the two brothers are each in possession of half the estate. Why, then, it is argued, should not the adoption stand on the same footing as though separation had taken place ?

47. The rule is indeed so stated in some cases as to leave no room for a revival of the power to adopt. Thus, where the widow purported to adopt after, in the first place, the estate had already devolved on her husband's nephew, and, he having died leaving two widows, the estate had, in the second place devolved on the nephew's widows: the adoption was held invalid: Tejrani v. Sarupchand Chhaganbhai (1919) I.L.R. 41 Bom. 483 : s.c. 22 Bom. L.R. 209. That a power given to a widow to adopt is absolutely at an end when once the estate has vested in the heir of her deceased son; and is not revived if she afterwards succeeds to the estate as the heir to the heir of her deceased son, was held in Adivi Suryaprakasa Rao v. Nidamarty Gangaraju (1909) I.L.R. 33 Mad. 228. The proposition had been stated as a general rule in Annammak v. Mabbu Bali Reddy (1875) 8 M.H.C.R.108 in the form that an inheritance once vested in possession cannot be defeated and divested by an adoption,-following directly the words of the Privy Council in Bhoobun Moyee's case (1865) 10 M.I.A. 279, 310..