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8. The next question Is, whether there is any formal document executed on behalf of the Union of India in compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India and if not, what is the consequence thereof in this application. The learned Subordinate Judge had come to the conclusion that as there was no contract or agreement between the parties because of non-compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in the suit. Learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that it could not be said that the plaintiff has no prima facie case on this ground to go to trial. It may be mentioned that the plea that there was no document in compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India was not originally taken in the written statement by the Union of India. Later on by an amendment of the written statement the plea was introduced. The said amendment of the written statement was the subject-matter of a rule in this High Court. We were told that the said rule has since been disposed of and the order for amendment has been upheld. Learned Additional District Judge in his judgment referred to the decision in the case of Union of India v. Rallia Ram, . No formal contract in the name of the President of India nor any formal document in compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India giving the plaintiff the rights claimed in the suit was shown to us. It appears that the siding in question was the property of the Railways. If the plaintiff has acquired any right in respect thereof it must be either by sale, lease, licence or by any contract. Mr. Dutt, learned Advocate for the respondent, has argued before us that there can be a contract between the Government and the plaintiff if that position has been accepted by the Government and work has been done even though there was non-compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Dutt relied on the decision in the case of Chatturbhui Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram, . Mr. Dutt next contended that there can be a contract by correspondence and as there were some letters in this case written on behalf of the Railways, it was apparent that there was a contract. Mr. Dutt lastly contended with reference to the rules and the forms contained in the Indian Railways Code that the notice given by the Railways in this case clearly indicated that the Railways were proceeding on the basis that there was a contract in respect of private siding with the plaintiff and the notice was given in terms of the same. Before the aforesaid contentions urged on behalf of the respondent are considered, it is necessary to state that this is not a suit based on either Section 70 or Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act. It is a suit based on assertion of the plaintiff's rights on the private siding which is the property of the defendant. Plaintiff's rights must therefore be the rights granted by transaction either in the nature of sale, or lease, or licence or contract. The observations of the Supreme Court in the case of (supra) upon which Mr. Dutt strongly relied were explained by the Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal v. B.K. Mondal & Sons, . Referring to the observations of Bose, J., in the aforesaid decision Gajendragadkar, J., in the last mentioned case at page 783 of the report observed :

"All that this Court meant by the said observation was that the contract made in contravention of Article 299(1) could be ratified by the Government if it was for its benefit and as such it could not take the case of the contractor outside the purview of Section 7(d). The contract which is void may not be capable of ratification, but, since according to the Court the contract in question could have been ratified it was not void in that technical sense. That is all that was intended by the observation in question. We are not prepared to read the said observation or the final decision in the case of Chatturbhuj, as supporting the proposition that notwithstanding the failure of the parties to comply with Article 299(1) the contract would not be invalid. Indeed, Bose, J., has expressly stated that such a contract cannot be enforced against the Government, and is not binding on it."

9. In the case of K. P. Chowdhury v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court has observed that in view of Article 299(1) of the Constitution, there can be no implied contract between the Government and any other person, the reason being that if such an implied contract between the Government and any other person were allowed, that would in effect make Article 299(1) useless, for then a person who had a contract with Government which was not executed at all in the manner provided in Article 299(1) could get away by saying that an implied contract may be inferred. The Supreme Court further observed that if the contract between the Government and another person was not in compliance with Article 299(1) it would be no contract at all and could not be enforced either by the Government or by the other person as a contract. In the case of Mulamchand v. State of Madhya Pradesh, , the Supreme Court has held that the provisions of Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 or the corresponding provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India are mandatory in character and contravention of these provisions nullifies the contracts and makes them void. The Supreme Court further observed that in those circumstances there is no question of estoppel or ratification. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of S. Raiam v. Indian Union, . It appears from the aforesaid decisions that the provisions of Article 299(1) of the Constitution are mandatory in character. Any contract upon which a person relies against the Government must be in compliance with that provision of the Constitution. There cannot be any question of ratification of such a contract, which is not in compliance with that provision. Such compliance with art. 299(1) of the Constitution may in a particular case be fulfilled even in a case where the contract has been entered into by correspondence provided taking the entire correspondence in the background of a particular case it appears that there has been compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution. In a particular ease where the Government has received benefits in respect of an agreement which is not in compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution, the Government may be liable under certain provisions of law to the party from whom the benefits were received by it. Such questions might arise in a suit based on Section 70 or 65 of the Indian Contract Act. As mentioned hereinbefore there is no formal contract in compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India in this case, embodying the terms upon which the plaintiff now sues the defendant. Certain correspondence have been annexed with the petition and the affidavits and were placed before us. From such correspondence it does not appear that there was compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution in respect of any contract embodying the rights of the plaintiff upon which the plaintiff is now suing the Government.

11. In view of the provisions of the Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India and in view of the several decisions referred to hereinbefore it appears to us that the plaintiff's case is of a very doubtful nature. It was not necessary for the Courts below and equally is it not necessary for us to determine at this interlocutory stage finally whether the plaintiff's suit would fail on this ground but it is important to bear in mind that on this aspect of the matter the plaintiffs case is not free from doubt and is of a very doubtful nature. As we have held the suit is not maintainable because of non-service of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in view of the doubtful nature of the plaintiff's case for non-compliance with Article 299(1) of the Constitution of India, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed in obtaining an injunction in the suit, which it appears has already continued over four years. We are therefore of the opinion that the learned Additional District Judge acted illegally and with material illegality in setting aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge in an appeal from the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge of the 6th Court, Alipore, in view of the mandatory provision of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in view of the doubtful nature of the plaintiff's case under Article 299(1) of the Constitution. Learned Subordinate Judge had held that on a balance of convenience the plaintiff would not suffer if no injunction is granted. Learned Additional District Judge has reversed that finding of fact. In view of our decision on the first two points referred to hereinbefore, it is not necessary for us to consider this aspect of the matter, nor is it necessary for us to consider whether the suit is bad in view of non-compliance with Section 56, Clause (d) of the Specific Relief Act