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11. In view of what has been held in Thayyil Mammo v. Kottiath Ramunni, , and Kuppuswami Chettiar v. A. S. P. A. Arumugam Chettiar, , as also in Natvarlal Punjabhai v. Dadubhai Manubhai, , by the Supreme Court, surrender of property will not amount to transfer or alienation if it is mere self-effacement without an intention to transfer the same in favour of a person having no interest in it and if it is not contrary to the intention of the settlor of the trust. On the strength of his enunciation of law made by the Supreme Court, on behalf of the assessee, it was contended that the surrender made by her in favour of her husband who has a beneficial interest in those rights, merely resulted in acceleration of his rights. Thus, by surrender, she has merely effaced herself from the rights flowing from the trust deed and that act will not confer any new benefit at all one her husband but is only consequence flowing from he trust deed. The surrender on her part cannot amount to a transfer as contemplated in section 56 or 58 of the Indian Trusts Act. To counter this argument, it was argued on behalf of the Revenue that :

(i) In the trust deed, there is restraint on anticipation during coverture and this claim prohibits self-effacement or surrender or relinquishment and this is contrary on the intention of the settlor of the trust deed;
(ii) The renunciation is in favour of the trustees who have no beneficial interest in the trust and, therefore, relinquishment amounts to transfer;
(iii) the doctrine of acceleration cannot be applied to the present case (a) as the trust deed contains a clause of restraint on anticipation during the subsistence of marriage and is contrary to the intention of the set or of the trust; (b) the subsequent rights, after the assessee as provided in the trust deed, are all contingent rights; and
(iv) The contrary intention being expressed in the trust deed and the conditions for the application of the doctrine of acceleration not being fulfilled, there is a clog on surrender of her rights by he assessee and such relinquishment amounts to a transfer for purposes of sections 56 and 58 of the Indian Act.

12. The settlement deed provides that the assessee shall receive the residue of such interest, dividends and other income during her life absolutely but without power of anticipation during coverture and other provisions are made to be effective after her demise. Therefore, we have to consider the effect of the expression "without power of anticipation during coverture". This very concept is dealt with in Snell's Principles of Equity (27th Edition), at page 516, and also in Cheshire's Modern Law of Real Property (11th Edition), at page 911. If property was given to a married woman by words which indicated expressly or by necessary implication that she was to enjoy it for her sole and separate use, equity removed that property from the control of the husband by regarding him as a trustee, and conferred upon the wife full powers of enjoyment and disposition. But equity went further than this, for, perceiving the danger that a husband might over-persuade his wife to sell her separate property and hand the proceeds to him, it permitted the insertion in marriage settlements of what was known as restraint upon anticipation. The effect of such restraint was that a woman, while possessing full enjoyment of the income, was prevented during her coverture from alienating or charging the corpus of the property. She could devise, but could not sell or mortgage it. In Snell's Principles of Equity, the origin of the doctrine of restraint on anticipation in trust, is traced. It also states that the same stood abolished after the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, as it was considered unnecessary as a protection against her husband and would work unfairly against her creditors. But whatever that may be, the effect of such restraint is that if the property was given to a married woman, the same was effective until she died or again became single by the death of her husband or divorce or on remarriage and it only means that when a property was given for the separate use of a married woman without power of anticipation or words to that effect, she was disabled, during coverture, from alienating the property or the right to future income. Therefore, a condition of restraint on anticipation could be equated with restraint on alienation or transfer. It is, therefore, clear from a reading of the relevant clauses of the trust deed that the prohibition or restriction on the assessee is not to alienate her right and in the present case no such ground can be set up. The document does not say that she has no right to surrender her interest but what is prohibited is only alienation of her right. Hence, it must be held that there is no prohibition against surrender or relinquishment of interest in the trust deed and the intention of the settlor is not against such an act on the part of the assessee.

14. The Act does not contain any provision relating to the acceleration of subsequent interests on the failure or premature determination of a prior interest. In cases covered by the Act, the provisions of the Act govern the matter but in cases not covered by the Act, the court is entitled to apply rules of equity and good conscience, and in order to ascertain the principles of equity and good conscience, the court may rely upon the English law. Acceleration of subsequent interest under the trust is a doctrine applicable in Indian both to trusts created by wills and to settlements inter vivos, provided two conditions are fulfilled, namely, that the settlor has not shown a contrary intention in the document creating the trust and that the subsequent interest is a vested interest and not a contingent interest. If the document expresses or indicates a contrary intention, the subsequent interests are not accelerated, but there is a resulting trust of the income in favour of the settlor or the assessee. This very aspect was considered by the Bombay High Court in Devlakshmi Harisukh Vahalia v. Vishwakant P. Bhatt. .