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industries, did not apply to the catchment areas of Himayat Sagar and Osman Sagar lakes and that notification was applicable only to the Doon Valley of UP and Dahanu in Maharashtra. The appellate authority accordingly directed the AP Pollution control Board to give its consent for establishment of the factory on such conditions the Board may deem fit as per GOMs 153 dated 3.7.1997 (as amended by GO 181 dated 7.8.1997). Before the above order dated 5.1.98 was passed by the appellate authority, some of these public interest cases had already been filed. After the 5.1.98 order of the appellate authority, a direction was sought in the public interest case W.P.No.2215 of 1996 that the order dated 5.1.1998 passed by the appellate authority was arbitrary and contrary to interim orders passed by the High Court in W.P. 17832, 16969 and 16881 of 1997. The respondent company, in its turn filed WP No.11803 of 1998 for directing the A.P. Pollution Control Board to give its consent, as a consequence to the order of the appellate authority dated 5.1.1998. As stated earlier, the A.P. Pollution Control Board contends that the categorisation of industries into red, green and orange had already been made prior to the notification of 1.2.1989 by Office Memorandum of the Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of India dated 27.9.1988 and that in that notification also "Vegetable oils including solvent extracted oils" (Item No.7) and `Vanaspati Hydrogenated Vegetable oils for industrial purposes (Item 37)" were also included in the red category. It also contends that the company could not have started civil works unless NOC was given by the Board. The Division Bench of the High Court in its judgment dated 1.5.1998, held that the writ petitioners who filed the public interest cases could not be said to be having no locus standi to file the writ petitions. The High Court observed that while the Technical Committee of the A.P. Pollution Control Board had, some time before its refusal, suggested certain safeguards to be followed by the company, the Board could not have suddenly refused the consent and that this showed double standards. The High Court referred to the order of the Appellate authority under Section 28 of the Water Act dated 5.1.98 and the report of Dr.Sidhu, to the effect that even if hazardous waste was a by-product, the same could be controlled if the safeguards mentioned in the Hazardous Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules, 1989 were followed and in particular those in Rules 5,6 and 11, were taken. The Rules made under Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (MSIHC) Rules 1989 also permit industrial actively provided the safeguards mentioned therein are taken. The Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules 1991 supplement the MSIHC Rules, 1989 on accident preparedness and envisage a 4-tier crisis management system in the country. Therefore, merely because an industry produced hazardous substances, the consent could not be refused. It was stated that as the matter was highly technical, interference was not called for, as "rightly" contended by the learned counsel for the respondent company. The High Court could not sit in appeal over the order of the appellate authority. For the above reasons, the High Court dismissed the three public interest cases, and the writ petitions filed by the Gram Panchayat. The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent industry and directed grant of consent by the A.P. Pollution Control Board subject to such conditions as might be imposed by the Board. It is against the said judgment that the A.P. Pollution Control Board has filed the five appeals. One appeal is filed by SPEQL. In these appeals, we have heard the preliminary submission of Shri R.N.Trivedi, learned Additional Solicitor General for the A.P. Pollution Control Board, Shri M.N.Rao, learned senior counsel for the respondent company, and Sri P.S.Narasimha for the appellant in the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.13380 of 1998 and others. It will be noticed that various issues arise in these appeals concerning the validity of the orders passed by the A.P. Pollution Control Board dated 30.7.97, the correctness of the order dated 5.1.98 of the Appellate Authority under Section 28 of the Water Act, the validity of GOMs No.153 dated 3.7.97 by which Government of A.P. granted exemption for the operation of the 10 k.m. rule in GOMs 111 dated 8.3.1996. Questions also arise regarding the alleged breach of the provisions of the Act, Rules or notification issued by the Central Government and the standards prescribed under the Water Act or rules or notifications. Question also arises whether the "appellate" authority could have said that as it was a highly technical matter, no interference was called for. We are just now not going into all these aspects but are confining ourselves to the issues on the technological side. In matters regarding industrial pollution and in particular, in relation to the alleged breach of the provisions of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, its rules or notifications issued thereunder, serious issues involving pollution and related technology have been arising in appeals under Article 136 and in writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India filed in this Court and also in writ petitions before High Courts under Article 226. The cases involve the correctness of opinions on technological aspects expressed by the Pollution Control Boards or other bodies whose opinions are placed before the Courts. In such a situation, considerable difficulty is experienced by this Court or the High Courts in adjudicating upon the correctness of the technological and scientific opinions presented to the Courts or in regard to the efficacy of the technology proposed to be adopted by the industry or in regard to the need for alternative technology or modifications as suggested by the Pollution Control Board or other bodies. The present case illustrates such problems. It has become, therefore, necessary to refer to certain aspects of environmental law already decided by this Court and also to go into the above scientific problems, at some length and find solutions for the same. Environment Courts/Tribunals - problems of complex technology:
The difficulty faced by environmental courts in dealing with highly technological or scientific data appears to be a global phenomenon.
Lord Woolf, in his Garner lecture to UKELA, on the theme "Are the Judiciary Environmentally Myopic?"

(See 1992 J.Envtl. Law Vol.4, No.1, P1) commented upon the problem of increasing specialisation in environmental law and on the difficulty of the Courts, in their present form, moving beyond their traditional role of detached "Wednesbury" review. He pointed out the need for a Court or Tribunal "having a general responsibility for overseeing and enforcing the safeguards provided for the protection of the environment ....... The Tribunal could be granted a wider discretion to determine its procedure so that it was able to bring to bear its specialist experience of environmental issues in the most effective way"

Lord Woolf pointed out the need for "a multi- faceted, multi-skilled body which would combine the services provided by existing Courts, Tribunals and Inspectors in the environmental field. It would be a `one stop shop', which should lead to faster, cheaper and the more effective resolution of disputes in the environmental area. It would avoid increasing the load on already over burdened lay institutions by trying to compel them to resolve issues with which they are not designed to deal. It could be a forum in which the Judges could play a different role. A role which enabled them not to examine environmental problems with limited vision. It could however be based on our existing experience, combining the skills of the existing inspectorate, the Land Tribunal and other administrative bodies. It could be an exciting project"

According to Lord Woolf, "while environmental law is now clearly a permanent feature of the legal scene, it still lacks clear boundaries." It might be `preferable that the boundaries are left to be established by Judicial decision as the law developed. After all, the great strength of the English Law has been its pragmatic approach". Further, where urgent decisions are required, there are often no easy options for preserving the status quo pending the resolution of the dispute. If the project is allowed to go ahead, there may be irreperable damage to the environment; if it is stopped, there may be irreperable damage to an important economic interest. (See Environment Enforcement: The need for a specialised court - by Robert Cranworth QC (Jour of Planning & Environment, 1992 p.798 at 806). Robert Cranworth advocates the constitution of a unified tribunal with a simple procedure which looks to the need of customers, which takes the form of a Court or an expert panel, the allocation of a procedure adopted to the needs of each case - which would operate at two levels - first tier by a single Judge or technical person and a review by a panel of experts presided over by a High Court Judge - and not limited to `Wednesbury' grounds. In the USA the position is not different. It is accepted that when the adversary process yields conflicting testimony on complicated and unfamiliar issues and the participants cannot fully understand the nature of the dispute, Courts may not be competent to make reasoned and principled decisions. Concern over this problem led the Carnegie Commission of Science & Technology (1993) and the Government to undertake a study of the problems of science and technology in Judicial decision making. In the introduction to its final report, the Commission concluded: