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1. In this petition, the petitioner-Board has assailed the award dated 29.5.2012 passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Gurdaspur granting re- employment to the 2nd respondent/workman from the date when the award comes into operation alongwith seniority from the date of demand notice i.e. 29.9.2008 or from the date when juniors to the workman were re-employed by the petitioner/Board, whichever is later.

2. The case of the petitioner-Management is that the workman had worked for 583 days from 1.3.1988 to 1.12.1993 with the Assistant Executive Engineer, Sub Division, Dehriwal. The dispute was raised for the first time after a lapse of 15 years through demand notice served on the Management in the year 2008 after inordinate delay on the ground that Section 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act") was violated by the Management. Per contra, worker contended that since he had a preferential right of re-employment, notice should have been given to him, then he could have exercised his choice of re-employment 1 of 7 or to forego the offer. The Management did not comply with Rules 76 and 77 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rule, 1957 (for short "Rules of 1957") framed under the Act. The reference deserves to be answered in his favour for non-compliance of Section 25H of the Act. The issue referred to the Tribunal was whether the workman is to be re-employed and if so, to what benefits the workman is entitled to.

3. Upon notice, the Management appeared before the Tribunal and objected that the reference was not maintainable as the workman had not applied for re-employment at the proper stage when applications were invited from the daily wage workers by the Management of the Board in September, 1997 and as such the workman had lost his preferential right for re-employment under Section 25H of the Act. Press notice was published in a number of leading English and Punjabi newspapers on 3.9.1997 vide which applications were invited from retrenched daily wagers for re-employment, but the workman did not apply for re- employment and as such he cannot claim any remedy at the belated stage invoking Section 25-H of the Act. A preliminary objection was taken that the reference was time barred with a passage of 15 years from the alleged termination and this unreasonable delay has not been explained by the workman. Another objection to maintainability was that necessary parties who are alleged to be junior to the workman and had been re-employed in 1997, had not been impleaded as parties to the reference who are likely to be affected.

6. The contention of the Management before the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court was that mere advertisement in the newspapers will not in any way offend Section 25H, but on the other hand, it should be taken as invitation for the discharged workman to apply and get himself reinstated. This argument was not accepted by the Division Bench. Hence failure to give registered notice is fatal to the argument advanced by the Management as regards compliance of Section 25H is concerned. The Tribunal was correct in coming to the conclusion that there was violation of Section 25H and on that ground also the workman was reinstated in service. The same principle has been applied by our Court in State of Punjab vs. Parvesh Kumar, 1994 (3) RSJ 37 that violation of Section 25H is fatal and the preferential right in Section 25H comes to the rescue of the workman in case procedure of service of notice is not followed. Other than the judgments noticed in the award of the Tribunal, the respondent-workman has relied on Jasmer Singh vs. State of Haryana and another (Civil Appeal No.346 of 2015 decided by the Supreme Court on 13.1.2015 that Section 25-F, Clauses (a) and (b), 25G and 25H of the Act stand on the same footing in case of non- compliance of those provisions. There can be no quarrel with the legal principle laid down in the judgments that Section 25H is mandatory and has to be complied with by the Management in case outsider is taken on the same job after termination of service of aggrieved person.

8. Another factor which refrains me from granting relief to the respondent-workman is that necessary parties alleged to be junior to the workman in the demand notice and siad to be re-employed by the Management in 1997 have not been made parties to the reference and the 5 of 7 rights of such junior workers may be affected for the purpose of seniority et. in case the workman succeeds in the reference case.

9. There is still another factor which works against the respondent-workman when it is pleaded that he left service in December, 1993 without any intimation and prior permission from his JE/Incharge and, thereafter, continuously remained absent from duty indefinitely. There is no rebuttal to this pleading. This leads to pragmatic inference that the respondent abandoned his job from 1993 onwards showing up his face for the first time in 2008. In such circumstances, there is no termination or retrenchment which is the necessary ingredient of Section 25H of the Act. Admittedly, there is no termination order in existence in the present case. If this is so, then it is highly doubtful whether the provisions of Section 25H of the Act are attracted as his name may not be in a live list of terminated employees who would have preferential right to re-employment. This vital aspect has been completely over-looked by the Tribunal. All the cases cited by the workman are built on termination and right to re-employment on proposed induction of outsiders. Keeping in view all this in mind, I am unable to support the award of the Tribunal on re-employment to a person who has abandoned his job. And much more on ante-dated seniority from 2008. Principles of Section 25H of the Act are well known as enunciated in the precedents. But the application of those principles to the facts of this case appear to lead to different results and, if granted, it may cause avoidable chaos in the department in case the workman is allowed to be reinstated at this belated stage on a public post and, therefore, this Court in the special facts and circumstances reaches the conclusions, as discussed above, to deny relief awarded by the Tribunal.