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3.10 Subsequently, the petitioner received a show-cause notice dated March 30, 2016 under Section 345-A of the DMC Act, with a direction to stop charging parking fees from visitors / public visiting the petitioner‟s complex / premises. It was mentioned in the said show-cause notice that as per MPD-2021 / sanctioned building plan, the area reserved for parking cannot be put to commercial use / profit-making by collecting parking fees as the same is sanctioned free from FAR.

3.12 Respondent No.2 / DMRC also responded to the show- cause notice dated March 30, 2016 by stating that recovery of parking charges is in line with paragraph no.12.14.3.7 of MPD-2021 and MoUD order dated March 30, 2009.

3.13 Thereafter the petitioner received a notice dated April 26, 2006 for a meeting in the chamber of Deputy Commissioner of respondent No.1 / SDMC on April 27, 2016 at 11.00 am. The petitioner, however, vide its letter dated April 28, 2016 informed respondent No.1 / SDMC that collection of parking charges was in pursuance to the Concessionaire Agreement entered into with respondent No.2 / DMRC and that in the meantime the petitioner was not colleting any charges under the head of parking charges. 3.14 Petitioner‟s case is that after a period of one and a half years, the petitioner received a second show-cause notice dated October 30, 2017 under Section 345-A of the DMC Act. The contents of the show-cause notice were verbatim to the earlier show-cause notice dated March 30, 2016, alleging misuse of parking space against sanctioned plan. The petitioner, immediately, replied to the second show-cause notice dated October 30, 2017 vide letter dated November 02, 2017, reiterating its stand with respect to the issue and informing respondent No.1 / SDMC that respondent No.2 / DMRC is the owner of the property and that petitioner is only a concessionaire and further stating that parking fee is being charged in line with MPD-2021 and as well as in the terms of Concessionaire Agreement.

23. He admitted that respondent no.1 issued a show-cause notice dated March 30, 2016 under Section 345-A of DMC Act directing petitioner to stop the misuse of parking areas by way of charging parking fee from visitors. In response to the same, petitioner preferred a letter dated April 01, 2016, inter- alia stating that petitioner was a mere concessionaire and not the owner of the property and that charging of parking fees and its sanctity does not come within the purview of misuse under Section 345-A of the DMC Act. It is also stated that respondent No.1/ SDMC does not have jurisdiction over the subject land, there was no misuse of parking area and as per provisions of para 12.4.3 and 12.4.3.7 of MPD-2021, petitioner was well within its rights to claim parking charges.

Respondent No.2/DMRC also replied to the show-cause notice vide letter dated April 28, 2018 on similar lines. In the context of the said show-cause notice and replies, it is submitted by Mr. Vajani that it was well within its powers under Section 345-A and 347 read with Section 491 of the DMC Act as well as Rules made thereunder to take action in respect of misuse of the ECS parking spaces in the free of FAR areas constructed by the petitioner at the "Pacific Metro Mall". It is also submitted that para 12 of MPD-2021 referred to by the petitioner has no application whatsoever as the same falls under the Chapter named „Transportation‟ which has no bearing whatsoever to a commercial complex. In support of his contentions, Mr. Vajani has relied upon two Apex Court judgments reported as 1992 (2) SCC 683, M/s Pine Chemical v. Assessing Authority , wherein paragraph 9 it was held that " It is well settled that if power to do an act or pass an order can be traced to an enabling provision, then even if that provision is not specifically referred to, the act or order shall be traced to, the act or order shall be deemed to have been done or made under the enabling provision" and 2004 (2) SCC 297, DDA v. Joginder Mongiya, wherein paragraph 30 it was held that, "Only in a case where a conflict arises between a statute and an executive instruction, indisputably, the former will prevail over the latter".