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We need not go into the details except to state that even Gandhiji took the view that anything like compensation could possibly not be give when property was taken from the property owners by the State of community benefit. I mention this only to drive home the point that right to property is not part of the basic structure of the Constitution even as right to poverty is not be basic structure of India for ever. The whole adventure of the Constitution is to remove poverty and in that process remove concentration of property, not for a return, but for almost free, if the justice of the situation commended itself to the legislation to take it that way. (Ibid., p. 89) Of course, it may be a deception to say that an "amount" is paid if nothing is paid except a little. So, what we have to consider is whether the amount of Rs. 2 lakhs is so utterly deceptive and totally nominal as to be discarded as a farthing with contempt. Having regard to the human condition of a large percentage of pavement dwellers and slum dwellers in our urban areas and proletarian miserables in our rural vastnesses, any one who gets Rs. 2 lakhs can well be regarded as having got something substantial to go by. In a society where half of humanity lives below the breadline, to regard Rs. 2 lakhs as a farthing is farewell to poignant facts and difficult to accept. In my view, with the greatest respect for my learned Brother. I am unable to assent to the view that Section 11(6) contravenes Article 31(2) because the payment stipulated is a mere mockery.

1). Article 31-C, as it stood prior to the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act does not damage any of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure.

Since the impugned Act has been put in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Act, 1976 i.e. after April 24, 1973, the said Constitution Amendment would be open to challenge on the ground that the same is beyond the constituent power of the Parliament if it damages the essential features or basic structure of the Constitution; but at the same time the impugned Act has, apparently, received the protective umbrella of Article 31-C as it stood prior to its amendment by 42nd Amendment Act inasmuch as it seems to have been enacted in furtherance of the Directive Principles contained in Article 39(b) and (c) with the result that in order to succeed in their challenge the petitioners will have to cross two hurdles. In the first place they will have to establish that the Act is outside the pale of the protective umbrella of Article 31-C which they can do by showing that though purporting to do so, it does not, in fact, further any of the said Directive Principles. A scrutiny of the Directive Principles contained in Article 39(b) and (c) clearly shows that the basic postulate underlying the former obviously is that diffusion of ownership and control of the material resources of the community is always in public interest and hence the State is directed to ensure such distribution (equitable) thereof as best to subserve the common good, while the postulate underlying the latter obviously is that concentration of wealth as well as means of production in the hands of few is detrimental to common interest and hence the State is directed to ensure such economic system to operate which prevents such concentration. It would, therefore, be clear that if by the impugned enactment the aforesaid objectives of these Directive Principles are not furthered or if the provisions of the enactment run counter to these objectives the Act would lose the benefit of the protective umbrella of Article 31-C. Secondly, after crossing this hurdle, the petitioners will have to show further that the 40th Amendment Act by which the impugned Act was included in the Ninth Schedule was beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since it has damaged the basic structure or the essential features of the Constitution as reflected in Articles 14, 19 and 31, which, of course, they will be able to do by showing that the impugned Act itself flagrantly violates those aspects of Articles 14, 19 and 31 which constitute the basic structure or the essential features of the Constitution.

63. In Waman Rao v. Union of India ( 588-89), this Court by its order, in the context of the decision in Kesavananda Bharati case (1973 Supp SCR 1 :

has laid down : (SCC pp. 588-89, paras 2-3) Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent constitutional amendments except to say that if any Act or Regulation included in the Ninth Schedule by a constitutional amendment made after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 31-C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the Ninth Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose.Article 31-C of the Constitution, as it stood prior to its amendment by Section 4 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, is valid to the extent to which its constitutionality was upheld in Kesavananda Bharati (1973 Supp SCR 1 : ). Article 31-C, as it stood prior to the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act does not damage by of the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure.
"These directive principles very briefly, but eloquently, lay down a policy of action for the different State Governments and the Central Government, and in a sense, they embody solemnly and recognize the validity of the charter of demands which the weaker sections of the citizens suffering from socio-economic injustice would present to the respective governments for immediate relief"

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80. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain () after observing that the ratio of the majority in Kesavananda Bharati case (1973 Supp SCR 1 : ) were merely illustrative of what constitutes the basic structure and are not intended to be exhaustive, observes : (SCC p. 252, para 664) ....... I consider it beyond the pale of reasonable controversy that if there be any unamendable features of the Constitution on the score that they form a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, they are that : (i) India is a Sovereign Democratic Republic; (ii) Equality of status and opportunity shall be secured to all its citizens; (iii) The State shall have no religion of its own and all persons shall be equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and propagate religion; and that (iv) the Nation shall be governed by a Government of laws, not of men. These, in my opinion, are the pillars of our constitutional philosophy, the pillars, therefore of the basic structure of the Constitution.