Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

Order Reportable Reserved on: 01/07/2024 Pronounced on: 11/07/2024 [2024:RJ-JD:28508] (2 of 15) [CMA-913/1999]

1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant/insurance company under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('MV Act') assailing the validity of the judgment and award dated 16.09.1999 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Udaipur ('Tribunal')in Claim Petition Nos. 493/90 and 494/90, whereby the learned Tribunal had reviewed its own order and awarded compensation in favour of the respondent/non-claimants to the tune of Rs. 1,42,200/- each along with interest @ 8% per annum and an additional claim of Rupees 1,17,000 was passed in review petition to be paid within 2 months from the date of the award failing which the claimants will be entitled to get 12% interest per year till the payment of the award is made.

3. Thereafter, the claimant filed a review petition under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC before the learned Tribunal Udaipur in Claim Petition No. 493/90 and claimed additional compensation in addition to the no fault claim of Rupees 25,000 that was paid in [2024:RJ-JD:28508] (3 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] the claim petition No. 493/90. In the review petition learned Tribunal issued notice to the United Insurance Company and the United Insurance Company submitted objections to the review petition on 14.09.1999 alleging therein that the review petition under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is not maintainable for review of the order dated 08.02.1999 by which claim petition is finally adjudicated and the claimant cannot get more than 25000 rupees that was awarded as no fault claim. Thereafter the matter was placed for arguements on 15.09.1999 and the award of Rupees 1,42,000 was passed in favour of the claimant on 16.09.1999 and an additional claim of Rupees 1,17,000 was passed in review petition to be paid within 2 months from the date of the award failing which the claimants will be entitled to get 12% interest per year till the payment of the award is made. Thus the appellant being aggrieved of the judgment and award dated 16.09.1999, filed the present appeal.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that review cannot be filed as there is no provision specifically [2024:RJ-JD:28508] (4 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] mentioned for the same in the statute and the learned Tribunal has committed an error in allowing the review of the claimants. He further submitted that the first award operates as res judicata and thus second award cannot be passed or adjudicated on the same facts and law. He also submitted that the claimant failed to produce any evidence or witness in support of the claim and thus the claimant could not be awarded additional compensation.

172. The relevant paras of the judgment is reproduced as under:

[2024:RJ-JD:28508] (5 of 15) [CMA-913/1999] "11. The expression 'review' is used in two distinct senses, namely (i) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a Court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it and
(ii) review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of record. In the case of Narshi Thakershi's case (AIR 1970 SC 1273) it is held that no review lies on merits unless the statute specifically provides for it. Obviously, when a review is sought due to a procedural defect, the inadvertent error committed by the Tribunal must be corrected ex dcbito justitiac to prevent the abuse of its process and such power inheres in every Court or Tribunal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has given a limited power of review to the Tribunal and while considering the scope of Sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11, it was held that the review is maintainable. Similarly, in Satnam Verma's case (AIR 1985 SC 294) (supra), considering the scope of powers of the Tribunal under Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was held that the Tribunal is endowed with such ancillary or incidental power as are necessary to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of doing justice between the parties. The jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal under the wide powers cannot be denied by the Tribunal itself.