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1. A Division Bench of this Court has referred the following question of law for the opinion of the Full Bench:--

"Whether the moral obligation of a father-in-law possessed of separate or self-acquired property, to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law ripens into a legal obligation in the hands of persons to whom he has either bequeathed his property or made & gift of his property?"

2. Cases similar to the one now referred to this Full Bench hereafter may very rarely come for adjudication before the Courts in view of the enactment of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act (LXXVIII 1956) under which the rights of daughter-in-law for maintenance have been codified. Section 19 provides for maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law by her father-in-law under the circumstances mentioned therein. Under Section 21 the widow of a pre-deceased son is a dependant. Section 22 speaks of the maintenance of dependants. Therefore, matters in respect of maintenance of widowed daughter-in-law are governed by the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, where the death of the father-in-law takes place subsequent to the coming into force of the above Act.

54. As there is a conflict of views between the decisions in Rangammal v. Echammal, (1899) ILR 22 Mad 305 and Sankaramurthy v. Subbamma, AIR 1938 Mad 914 we may briefly refer to the decision in Sankaramurthy v. Subbamma. In that case the Bench consisting of King and Stodart, JJ. held that the widowed daughter-in-law does not acquire legal right to maintenance out of the self-acquired property of her father-in-law which had been bequeathed by will. The reasoning given by the Bench is that Subramania Aiyar, J. was dealing with the very question which was then before them viz. whether a widow acquires a legal right to maintenance out of the self-acquired property of her father-in-law which had been bequeathed by will. The Bench extracted the relevant passage from that authority which has been extracted in the earlier pages of this judgment while dealing with the said authority. With reference to that passage the Bench observed:

"Whether the moral obligation of a father-in-law possessed of separate or self-acquired property to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law ripens into a legal obligation in the hand of persons to whom he has either bequeathed his property or made a gift of his property?" Here the words used are "in the hands of persons to whom he has either bequeathed his property or made a gift of his property."

Therefore, the word 'persons' includes either heirs or strangers. We have already expressed our view in respect of donee-heirs and devisee-heirs. Now remains the question about the donee-strangers and devisee-strangers.

71. It is further interesting to note that even though we have examined the development of law for the last hundred years, we have not come across even a single case where the property was bequeathed or made over by gift to strangers. In all the cases we find the gift or will was generally made in favour of immediate or next heirs, but not in favour of total strangers. Even in the present case, by no stretch of imagination could it be said that the transferee is a total stranger to the family. In fact, he is no other than the natural son that was given in adoption of the deceased. It may not be out of place to mention here that the natural son who was given in adoption and grandson in whose favour the property was bequeathed would be equally Interested, according to the ancient concept, in relieving his ancestors from bodily and mental discomfort and in protecting their souls from the consequences of sin, by providing maintenance to the dependents such as daughter-in-law. Even if we treat him as a stranger, still the principle has to be logically pursued. When the entire property is bequeathed or made over by gift to a stranger, the donor or testator would naturally expect that the obligations he has to fulfil during his lifetime would be fulfilled by the donee/devisee-stranger. Therefore, we have to presume that the donee or devisee stranger would fulfil all the moral obligations of the testator or donor. We often come across cases where the self-acquired property of a person is sought to be protected from going into the hands of a spendthrift-son by bequeathing the same to his grandsons or to another son so that the dependents are properly maintained. When that is so. can it be said that the moral obligation does not ripen into a legal obligation when the property is in the hands of the donee or devisee stranger. This is one aspect of the matter.