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2. It would be advisable to briefly summarise the background that has given rise to this proceeding.

3. The applicant before me, Savithramma is one of the daughters of Kalappa Reddy. After his death in 1983, Bhagyamma one of the daughters brought a suit for partition and possession of her 1/7th share in respect of the estate of her father. There were various pieces of property involved and ultimately, a compromise decree was passed in OS.3939/83. One of the properties that came to the share of Savithramma, the present applicant, and in fact the only one with which we are concerned in this application is site No. 2 which is demarcated in the sketch. It is relevant to point out, that the adjoining Site No. 3 came to be allotted to the three brothers. Another aspect of the matter which is of some consequence is the fact that to the East of these properties, lies the property of one Gurappa Reddy and it is relevant to also mention that at the time when the compromise decree was passed in the year 1984 that Gurappa Reddy is alleged to have laid a claim and in fact encroached upon certain portion of both these sites Nos. 2 & 3. The sketch indicates that this encroachment consisted of a triangular portion of land, the larger part of the triangle lying in the site No. 3 and the narrow part of it lying in Site No. 2. Subsequently Gurappa Reddy had filed OS 3065/80 in the Court of the 14th Addl. City Civil Judge, Bagalore for declaration of title and possession and he had claimed the whole of sites Nos. 2 & 3 which formed part of Survey No. 8. His case was that his father had purchased this land under sale deed dated 29-7-1925. The trial Court had dismissed this suit on 27-7-1982. Gurappa Reddy had gone in appeal against this decision by way of R. F. A. No. 18-83. Katappa Reddy was alive at the time when R.F.A. 18/83 was filed but he died shortly thereafter. After his death, his widow Revamma and two sons namely A. K. Chandrashekhar Reddy and A. K. Purushothama Reddy were brought on record. According to the present applicant, who is one of the daughters of Kalappa Reddy, she was totally unaware of this litigation in which the compromise was arrived at on 29-3-1984. It is his case that shortly after the compromise was filed in the Court, orders were passed on 29-3-1984 in her absence, and without her knowledge, that she came to know about it and that therefore, she applied for setting aside of that order. It may be stated here that her principal grievance is not merely to the effect that she ought to have been made a party but that according to her in the compromise, a substantial portion of site No. 2 has been conceded to Gurappa Reddy and in sum and substance she contends that the property which had become hers by virtue of the decree passed in the year 1984 has been given away by the respts. to that appeal who are her family members, without her knowledge and to her prejudice. A serious allegation was made that her family members had colluded with Gurappa Reddy and given away part of her valuable property and in the light of this allegation, it was contended that with this objective in mind, she had not been made a party to that appeal which virtually ought to have been done.

In that case, a partition had taken place of certain property ami an award came to be passed in the absence of the deceased widow. The Court held that the order would have to be set aside as she was a necessary party and that the decision taken without notice to her was not sustainable. I need to record here that one of the arguments canvassed in the case was that since the sons were represented that there was adequate and substantial representation of the widow. The Court took note of the fact that in situations of this type particularly where the interest could be conflicting, that such a situation was not tenable. The next decision relied on is the case reported in AIR 1956 Trav-Co 147 (FB) in the case of Chacko Pyli v. Lape Verghese. The Court was on this occasion concerned with an application for setting aside and the question arose as to whether while doing so, it was possible to pass a piecemeal order. Analysing the law on the point, the Court held that it was permissible in certain cases but that in the first instance legal representation was not of the type as contemplated by law, that the order passed would not hold good as against one of them. In this case again, the Court had occasion to examine the defence of substantial representation and the Court observed that such substantial representation though permissible, could not hold good as defence in all cases unless there was adequate material before the Court to show that the representation was not only by complete authority of the person but also that the interest of that person was sufficiently safeguarded. In the present instance, the principal allegation of the applicant is that her mother and brothers were not competent to safeguard her interest and that they in fact did not do so. There is a direct charge of collusion and the allegation is that the interests have been jeopardised and that she was deliberately not made a party in order to sacrifice a part of her land while saving the land of the respt. I shall deal with this aspect of the matter at a subsequent stage when I come to the arguments advanced by the respts' learned counsel. The applicant's learned counsel has thereafter drawn my attention to a.decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Daya Ram y. Sham Sundari wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the provisions of Order 22 Rules 4 and 11, CPC. In that case, the contention raised was that the plaintiff after a diligent search and enquiry had brought on record those of the legal heirs whom he bona fide considered to be the only legal representatives of the deceased. The Court had occasion to observe, that in situation such as this, the decree could bind all the legal heirs and, therefore, that it was the duty of the Court when it was pointed out that all the L.Rs. are not on record to ensure that all of them were in fact impleaded. The applicant's learned advocate has contended that undoubtedly, the other side would submit that it is open to his client to point out before any of the competent forums that the compromise decree passed in the appeal does not bind her as she was not a party thereto and if so advised to take appropriate steps, quite apart from the inappropriatness of this remedy through further litigation. He further submitted that there is an inherent danger in this argument in so far as in a given situation it would be permissible for a Court to hold that the present applicant was bound by the decree in so far as her mother and brothers were parties before the Court and it could therefore be contended that they were representing her. He has pressed forward these arguments in support of his contention that there is no alternate remedy available. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court however, in this decision was that it is absolutely essential that each and everyone of the L.Rs. of the deceased litigant must be brought on record. In that proceeding, the question before the Court was slightly different, namely as to whether, if after diligent search only some of the LRs. were impleaded, whether it could still be argued that the order passed in such a case would be vitiated. We are not really concerned with that aspect of the matter in the present proceeding.

6. I need to mention here, that quite apart from the aforesaid aspect of the matter which the applicant's learned counsel contends is fundamental and is sufficient for him to seek an order of review of the compromise decree, that he has pressed the subsidiary argument that it is well settled law that an order obtained through unfair means or by practising fraud is basically a still born order, that therefore the order itself is non est and that this Court must restore the appeal to life and direct that it should be heard on merits. In support of this argument, he has sought to hammer home two significant aspects of the matter. Firstly he contends that the family members who arc represented in the appeal namely the applicant's mother and brothers knew of her existence and more importantly knew of the fact that she was the person to whom site No. 2 had gone and the person who was in fact the owner of site No. 2 which was the subject of the dispute in that appeal. He, therefore, submits that it was very much to the knowledge of the respts. in that appeal that the present applicant must be impleaded. As far as the appellant is concerned, his charge is that he is the adjoining property owner, that he contends that a transaction of the year 1925 gave him certain rights in respect of that property and that having regard to the totality of the circumstances on record, it was impossible for him to even contend that he was not aware of the existence of the present applicant. It is in this background that a direct allegation has been made that in the first instance, the parties before the Court had colluded with each other and the learned counsel goes to the extent of submitting that it is his considered "view that the appeal itself was devoid of substance, the suit having been dismissed by the trial Court and that in this background, there was virtually no justification for even considering any compromise formula and to give away the property. Secondly, what is submitted by him is that the present applicant was deliberately not cited as a party respondent because under no circumstance would she have agreed to give away a part of her land and in order to hustle through the compromise, the parties had virtually joined hands and recorded the compromise behind the back of the present applicant. In sum and substance, there are a series of allegations of considerable seriousness which have been levelled on the basis of which the learned counsel submits that the compromise decree passed on the basis of misrepresentation and fraud would straightway be vitiated. He submits that if that is so, it is unnecessary for the Court to go into any other aspects regarding the scope of a review because this Court should temporarily restore the appeal to file after holding that in this situation, the earlier order is non est.

9. The learned advocate who represents the other legal heirs, Mr. Shankar has submitted that the circumstances and the ground on which a Court is permitted to review a decision are well defined and well circum-

scribed. In support of this contention he has drawn my attention to a few of the cases which 1 shall refer to briefly. Firstly, he relies on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale. That was a case in which the aspect of error apparent on the face of the record had been considered and the Supreme Court had occasion to rely on two of the earlier decisions as also the observations in . Mr. Shankar submitted that before asking for a review, it would be necessary for the applicant to demonstrate that there has been an error apparent on the face of the record which is not the case here in so far as that has not even been pleaded. Secondly, the learned counsel has relied on another decision of the Supreme Court , in the case of M/s. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh. That was a case in which the Court had occasion to consider the subtle distinction between an erroneous decision and a decision which is vitiated by error apparent. Whereas a review is permitted in the latter, it is completely barred in cases of the former. Mr. Shankar submitted that if the compromise decree is bad on merits, that the law provides several avenues available to the present applicant and that the review petition is not a proper remedy. Thirdly, Mr. Shankar relied on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1954 SC 526 in the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasins wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the wording in O. 47, R. 1 of the clause viz. very sufficient reason. On the basis of the decisions reported in AIR 1922 PC 112, AIR 1934 PC 213 and AIR 1949 FC 106, the Court went on to hold that it is necessary, where a review is sought on these grounds to demonstrate that the grounds are substantial, that they are real, that they are cogent and that, there is enough material on that basis to contend that the decision would have been otherwise. In sum and substance, what the learned counsel submits is that it is insufficient to merely contend that the applicant ought to have been made a party without demonstrating that had the applicant been before the Court, with enough material both on facts and in law in her possession on the basis of which, the result in that appeal would have been other than the present one. As far as a compromise decree is concerned, by implication, this argument means that if the present applicant contends that she ought to have been a party, she would have to demonstrate that had she been before the Court, that she would have been able to, on the basis of factual and legal material not only oppose the compromise but ensure a decision whereby in the final verdict, no amount of her property would have ended up with the appellant. In other words, what is contended by the learned counsel is that a mere averment that had I been before the Court, 1 would not have agreed or that the decision would have been otherwise is insufficient because it is necessary to demonstrate cogently that this would have been the position and in the absence of any such exercise, that the review itself is not competent. The last submission advanced by the learned counsel is that at the time when the litigation was pending, the family had taken a decision to once and for all put an end to the conflict and since the appellant appeared to be able to demonstrate that he had a semblance of a right, that the learned advocates and the clients were of the view that it was far more judicious to compromise the matter which was why a compromise was entered into. Significantly enough, the learned counsel who represents the heirs points out that as far as his clients were concerned, they genuinely believed that through the compromise they were in fact saving half of their property rather giving away a portion thereol and they felt that this was a prudent, correct and a safe step.