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Before parting with the judgment, it is necessary to deal with another question which was, however, not seriously canvassed before us. The question is whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit in ejectment or pass a decree against the appellant when his defence is that he is a statutory tenant and liable to be evicted only under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu (Buildings Lease and Control) Act. So far as this matter is concerned, it is by now well settled that there is nothing in Section 10 of the Act prohibiting the institution of a suit for possession or prohibiting a civil court from passing a decree for possession. What is prohibited under the section is only the execution of a decree for ejectment passed by a civil court. We may only refer to Muhamandunni v. Melapurakkal Unniri and B.V. Patankar v. C.G. Sastry in this behalf. As we have held that the appellant is not a tenant entitled to claim protection under the Tamil Nadu (Buildings and Lease Control) Act, it follows that even the bar of execution of the decree, contained in Section 10 will not be attracted.
After pronouncement of Ratnam, J. in 1989 T.N.L.J. 59, Natarajan, J. as he then was, had an occasion to consider identical issue as well as the view already expressed by Nainar Sundaram, J in 1985 T.L.N.J. 89. Nainar Sundaram, J., has held thus :
It is provided under Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act that nothing contained in this Act shall apply to any building for a period of five years from the date on which the construction is completed and notified to the local authority concerned. It cannot be said that Section 10 of the Act is applicable after the expiry of the period of five years contemplated therein. Similarly it was held in the above decision, which is reiterated by the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in (1987)4 S.C.C. 382 and also of a Division Bench of this Court reported in 1988 T.L.N.J. 1, that the rights of the parties will be determined on the basis of the rights available to them on the date of the suit and not at the time of execution unless there has been amendment to the Act or any change in the statute. It cannot be said that the decree is inexecutable. On both the grounds, the revision is to be allowed. In the face of the above decisions of the Supreme Court, which have been followed by this Court, the earlier decisions relied on by the learned Counsel for the respondent and also by the lower court reported in (1984)3 S.C.C. 352; (1960)1 M.L.J. 356; (1980)2 M.L.J. 463; 90 L.W. 573; (1978)1 M.L.J. 46; (1969)1 M.L.J. 153 and A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 272 are of no avail and they cannot be relied on. It is also pointed out in (1980)2 M.L.J. 179, the reference made to the Full Bench is only on the question whether a tenant inducted into possession by an usufructuary mortgagee of non-agricultural property can claim the benefits of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as against the mortgagor, after the redemption of the mortgage and this question is not the subject-matter of the said decision of the Full Bench. However, by way of observation and obiter dictum at the end of the judgment, without reference to Section 30 of the Act, it is generally observed : "It is by now well settled that there is nothing in Section 10 of the Act prohibiting the institution of a suit for possession or prohibiting a civil court from passing a decree for possession. What is prohibited under the section is only the execution of a decree for ejectment passed by a civil court.

23. On behalf of the petitioner reliance was also placed upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in (1987)1 R.C.J. 255 as well as (1988)1 L.W. 409. It is not necessary to refer to these decisions in detail. In Firm Amur Nath Basheshar Dass v. Tek Chand , the three Judges Bench of the Apex Court, while considering the provisions of Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 where a landlord who obtained a decree for ejectment was resisted at the stage of execution on the ground that the condition prescribed in the notification of exemption was not complied with. The Apex Court, after considering the provisions of the Punjab Urban Rent Restrictions Act, 1949 has held thus :