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12. Learned Advocate General has also contended that Article 226 of the Constitution has been held to be part of the basic structure of the Constitution; hence, such remedy to the aggrieved persons ought to be available. It is also submitted that if a relief is not granted to such intending candidates in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, an irreparable prejudice is likely to be caused in a given situation inasmuch as such aggrieved intending candidates would be required to be relegated to the remedy of filing election petition to challenge the election even in respect of minor causes. According to him, this would bring about harsh consequences on such candidates.

20. Furthering such converse argument, Mr. Anturkar has next submitted that it may be considered that the judgment in N.P. Ponnuswami (supra) has been explained and amplified in paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 the decision in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) and further explained in Ashok Kumar (supra), which is of three Judges Bench and lastly considered by the Supreme Court in its decision in Benedict Denis Kinny Vs. Tulip Brian Miranda, reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 802. It is submitted that the decisions in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) and Ashok Kumar (supra) be read that a writ petition would be maintainable against rejection of nomination but whether to entertain it is in the discretion of the Court. It is submitted that the Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125, has held that a right to seek judicial review under Article 226 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Hence, this principle is required to be applied even to sng wpst-26 & 28.2021 the petitions which are filed by the candidates whose nomination to contest election stand rejected. It is submitted that this position is also recognized by the Supreme Court in Manda Jagannath vs. K.S. Ratnam, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 492.

62. Mr. Anturkar has also contended, placing reliance on the decision in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) that judicial review is a basic structure of the Constitution and that even by provisions inserted in the Constitution the same cannot be taken away, not to speak of a statutory provision. He is right in so contending based on L. Chandra Kumar (supra). But the argument appears to us be unsound when considered on the touchstone of the original sng wpst-26 & 28.2021 Constitution and the amended Constitution. If the Preamble is the base of our Constitution, "Rule of Law", "Parliamentary Democracy", "Federalism", "Fundamental Rights" and "Independence of the Judiciary" are some of the pillars of the basic structure on which the Constitution rests. That judicial review is a facet of an independent judiciary cannot be disputed. Even then, Article 329 ~ starting with a non-obstante clause ~ was inserted in the Constitution by the framers. They must have been conscious of the legal position that in a given case, judicial review would have to stay at a distance in view of such non-obstante clause being inserted. While gathering the intent of the particular legislation, it would seem to be clear that the framers were not oblivious of the effect that a provision like Article 329 was bound to create, i.e., pushing out Article 226 or that Article 226 would stand eclipsed in given cases. Any restriction or limitation imposed on judicial review by an original enactment, thus, has to be distinguished from a restriction or limitation imposed by an amending provision. True it is, Article 243-O has been inserted in the Constitution by an amendment along with all other Articles in Part IX by a Constitution Amendment Act. However, nothing turns on it for two reasons. First, there is no decision of any Court holding Article 243-O ultra vires; second, and more importantly, Part IX has sng wpst-26 & 28.2021 been incorporated in the Constitution to achieve a specific object and having regard to the limited life of every Panchayat, the Parliament thought it fit and proper to borrow the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution and thus inserted a like provision which would bar the interference of Courts at an intermediary stage of an electoral process leaving it open for challenges to be thrown after declaration of the election results. The Constitutional justification for judicial review and the vindication of the Rule of Law though remaining constant in all the areas, the mechanism for giving effect to that justification could be varied, and has indeed been varied. If indeed section 15A of the MVP Act were a standalone provision, not much argument would have been necessary to declare it unconstitutional. However, section 15A has Article 243-O as its source and, therefore, so long Article 243-O stands, section 15A would also stand. We see no reason to accept the contention urged by Mr. Anturkar and while rejecting it, we make it clear that the aforesaid observations must be read in the context of the contention urged and dealt with.