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"I was forced to borrow during the period 1965-67 due to the existence of criminal proceedings and civil suits between me and my son."

Practically all the debts which have been found to be true by the court below were incurred during this period. There is no dispute as to the nature of the civil suits and criminal proceedings that took place between the father and son at that time. The father claimed all the properties as his self-acquired and separate assets. It may be noted here that there were no other properties belonging to the family, though the first defendant had been earlier bequeathed 5 1/2 acres of land by Parasuramayya, husband of Venkataramanamma. Those he claimed as his separate properties and there does not appear to have been any dispute in respect of them between the father and the son. The quarrel between them was patently about the four acres of land which had been purchased by the first defendant after selling away his paternal estate and Ac. 1-10 cents to which the second defendant succeeded. Even this property was claimed by the first defendant as his own, trying to totally disinherit the second defendant. He leased out land. Ac. 5-10 cents in ,.xtent to his sister's sons and they filed a suit for injunction against the second defendant complaining that he was interfering with their possession. That was the civil litigation which the parties had between 1965 and 1967. The first defendant would have it that he borrowed these monies to finance the litigation of his nephews who were set UP as the lessees. The evidence discloses that the second defendant was beaten and he launched criminal proceedings against the father and others. There were also security proceedings. It is thus manifest that the civil and criminal actions were essentially between the father and the son through which the first defendant tried to assert his exclusive rights to the property denying to the second defendant all interest in them. Even Ac. 1-10 cents which came to the second defendant was claimed by the first defendant. It is now conceded before us that Ac. 4-00 out of Ac. 5-10 cents is joint family property and we have held that Ac. 1-10 cents is separate property of the second defendant. So, briefly stated the civil and criminal litigation at that time for which the debts were borrowed was for the purpose of denying the second defendant his legitimate right and share for asserting the unholy exclusive right of the 1st defendant. If such debts are to be; held to be binding on the son also, it would be perverting the very legal process. To put it mildly, to make the son liable for the debts incurred by the father for defeating his legitimate rights is something opposed to all public morals and decency in life. If law is not concerned with public morality and decency in life, then it loses all moral authority to govern the rights of citizens. No court of law and justice can be a party to such a position. Avarice, unfilial and unnatural anger against his only child and ;on, and immorality are writ large on these debt transactions. After all what is an Avyavaharika debt ? Colebrooke defined it as a liability incurred for a cause repugnant to good morals. If it is unrighteous or wholly improper they cannot be called vyavaharika or legal debts. It may be that the debts incurred by the father for defending himself against criminal action against others or defending himself in an action brought by others are legal in several circumstances. If a debt was incurred to defend the rights of the family and to safeguard its interests, it is certainly legal in nature. If a debt is not tainted with illegality at its inception it may be binding on the son. The son may not be able to claim immunity from the debts in such cases. But, where the father's conduct which prompted the incurring of the debt, is utterly repugnant to good morals or is grossly unjust or flagrantly dishonest, then certainly the son can claim immunity from its liability. The learned author Mulla of Hindu Law (at pp, 350 and 351 in l3th edition) places any debt which is avyavaharika which is rendered by Colebrooke as equivalent to a debt for a cause "repugnant to good morals'' in the list of Avyavaharika debts. It is further stated that the fundamental rule is that the sons are not liable for the debts incurred by father which are Avyavaharika. Colebrooke translates it as "debts for a cause repugnant to good morals." Aparaka explains it as not righteous or proper. In Jakati v. Borkar, the Supreme Court observed that the translation of the term given by Colebrooke may well be taken to represent its correct meaning and that the term did not admit of a more precise definition. In Ramasubramania v. Sivakami Ammal, AIR 1925 Mad 841, Venkatasubba Rao, J., speaking for the Division Bench stated the view that it was not essential for the son to prove criminal liability against the father in respect of the debt in question in order to claim exemption from payment of such debt. The learned Judge pointed out that the son can claim immunity only when the father's conduct is utterly repugnant to good morals or is grossly un-iust or is flagrantly dishonest. This decision was referred to by the Bombay High Court in Govindprasad v. Raghunathpra-sad, AIR 1939 Bom 289 (FB). The Full Bench held that Avyavaharika debt means illegal, dishonest or immoral one. It is not essential for the son to prove criminal liability of the father in order to claim exemption. So, where a person in possession of property, to which he is not entitled, disposes of that property and deprives the rightful owner of that property, his conduct is dishonest and the son is not liable for the debts arising out of such conduct. The debts in question now were more dishonest and the son is not liable for the debts arising out of such conduct. The debts in question now were more dishonest and unethical than the one in Govinda Prasad's case (Supra) because they were incurred by the father to defeat the legitimate rights of his own son whom he now seeks to bind. We cannot conceive of a graver Avyavaharika debt than this. Consequently we have no hesitation in agreeing with the lower Court in holding that these debts, though they were incurred by the father and in that sense true, are Avvavaharika debts and were not binding on the son the second defendant.

19. Moreover the contention of the learned counsel for the son that the father had sufficient means of his own to discharge those debts and it was not necessary for him to" sell the property for that purpose does not appear to be unwarranted. In the first place, he had 5 1/2 acres of land of his own which had been bequeathed to him by Parasura-mayya. This, the first defendant himself admitted in his evidence. Secondly, he was exclusively enjoying the income from the suit properties of Ac. 5-10 cents right upto May, 1969, when he handed over the possession to the plaintiff under Ex. A-1 He had leased them out to his sister's sons who had filed the suit for injunction against the second defendant. So the first defendant was getting the rent from this Ac. 5-10 cents. There is no evidence on record, excepting the ipse dixit of the first defendant, that he had sold away the land which had been bequeathed to him by Parasuramayya. So, he must have been getting the income therefrom. It is not, therefore unreasonable to hold that the first defendant had the means to discharge the true debts which are to the tune of Rs. 7,600/- with his own funds end there was really no need for selling these lands.