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15. Impotency is the lack of ability to perform full and complete sexual intercourse. It has been accepted that partial and imperfect intercourse is not consummation and if a party (husband) was incapable of performing the sexual intercourse fully he would be in law deemed to be impotent. vide Snowman (otherwise Benisinger) v. Snowman. 1934 Pd 186.

Any penetration however transient cannot amount to consummation of marriage vide W (otherwise K) v. W. 1967-3 All Er 178.

16. Now Section 12(1)(a) of the Act provides that a decree a nulity can be given on the ground that respondent was impotent at the I time of marriage and continued to be so until the institution of the proceedings. The parties were married in 1954. and a son was admittedly born in 1959. We have already found that it is not possible for us to hold that the birth of a son can be said to be the result of fecundating ab extra because apart from any thing else, no such specific plea was put forward. We have also noticed that though in the evidence the appellant has stated that there was no penetration at all yet in the pleadings it has been stated that there was some penetration when pregnancy took place. It is apparent that in order to attract Section 12(1)(a) of the act it has to be positively proved that the husband respondent was impotent at all material times i.e. right from the time of the marriage i.e., in 1954 and continued to be so until the institution of proceedings in 1967. The requirement is so strict that even if it could be shown that the marriage was consummated just once during this period a decree of nullity cannot be granted in terms of Section 12(1)(a) of the act. The burden of proving that the respondent was impotent at all material times is on the appellant. We find that evidence on record falls short where a firm finding can be given that the respondent was impotent right from the time of marriage till the institution of the proceedings in spite of the birth of a son. We, therefore, feel that in this state of evidence it would be some what hazardous to come to a conclusion that the respondent is impotent. This is not to say that we are disbelieving the overall evidence of the appellant regarding the sexual weakness of the respondent or the sexual relations and performance as deposed to by her. All that we are indicating is that though we are inclined to believe overall evidence of the appellant in this regard it still leaves a doubt wherein we cannot with absolute certainty say that there was not even one occasion when proper penetration took place during all the period form 1954 to 1967, more especially when the appellant became pregnant in 1958. It is because of this peculiar nature and circumstances of the case that we find the evidence insufficient t come to a finding of impotency. We are. therefore, inclined the agree with the view taken by the Courts below that the appellant has failed to prove that the respondent was impotent at the time of marriage and continued to be so. on the date of the presentation of the petition. We therefore affirm the finding of the Courts below on issue No.1.