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Showing contexts for: orgasm in Rita Nijhawan vs Balakishan Nijhawan on 21 February, 1973Matching Fragments
11. The contention of the counsel for the petition was that this letter which was admittedly written by the respondent is clearly a confession of the fact that he was having sexual difficulty and the allegation of the petition that the respondent suffered from sexual disability and was impotent was correct. The respondent in his evidence had tried to explain this letter by taking the plea that he fell fill ill sometime in October and November. 1958 at Bhopal from sever cough. pain in the left said of the abdomen and fever and the doctor had told him that the disease could develop into pleurisy. He also stated that he remained hospitalized for some time and was left very weak by the disease. In March 1959. according to him there was a recrudescence of his illness. In August 1960 there was again an attack of the same old disease. In 1962 he states to have consulted a Hakim in Delhi in connection with his illness which had been to rub in him recurrently since 1958. He has denied that the reference to weakness in Ex. P. W. 3/1 refers to the sexual weakness which had been complained to him by the letter written to him by his mother-in-law. this reference to weakness according to him is as a result of cough and fever from which he was suffering from 1958 onwards. It will thus be seen that the case of the respondent is that P. W. 3/1 only referred to his cough and pain in the chest which the doctors told him might lead to pleurisy. He would have us believe that he was referring to this illness and the same had nothing to do with the sexual disability or weakness. It is a however relevant to note that in support of his allegation that this letter referred to his cough and pain he had not produced any evidence. According to him. Dr. Kapur was one for the doctors who attended on him at Bhopal but he had not been produced. The respondent also stated that he had been hospitalised at main hospital at Bhopal for 2/3 weeks but no proof even of this has also been given. Even though he states to have remained on leave during the period he was in hospital no evidence has been given with regard to that also. It is impossible to believe that the respondent who is a government servant if he had been hospitalised and on leave would not have been able to produce this evidence which was easily available and which would have supported his case beyond any doubt that there fence to the weakness in Ex. P. W. 3/1 was to a pleauriy or cough and not to sexual weakness. The evidence of R. W. 1 is worthless as he alleges to have treated the respondent for cough pain in 1960. but is not even in a position to indicate what medicine was supplied. It does not stand to reason that any mother-in-law or the wife ill make any grievance or complaint to a man suffering from pain or cough which are normal aliment in any one's life. The manner of writing of Ex. P. W. 3/1 and the apologetic tone of the reference to the weakness clearly support the case of the appellant that the reference was to nothingelse but to sexual weakness of which complaint had been made by the petitioner as well as by her mother. As a matter of fact the Additional District Judge after referring to this letter was convinced and gave a finding that it can be safely concluded that both in 1958 and 1962. the respondent had suffered from some sort of sexual weakness and had been taken treatment to regain virility and that it is reasonable to believe that the appellant left the respondent in 1963 because she was not satisfied by his sexual performance and also that he was weak to such as extent that he would suffer emission quickly after penetration and thus leave her in the bed without and having ever enjoyed orgasm. The learned single Judge did refer to this letter. He has not disagreed with the findings of the Additional District Judge but had taken the view that as this letter was written in 1962 after as son had been born and even it if be assumed that the respondent had become weak at some time there was not warrant for assumption that he was impotent either at the time of the marriage or at the we time of the presentation of the petition and therefore the so-called admission of the facts do not help the appellant. It will thus be seen that both the appellant . It will thus be seen that both the courts below have accepted the plea of the appellant bout the sexual weakness and disability of the respondent and have rejected have case of the respondent that the reference in the letter was to court and chest pain.. The learned single Judge however observed that apart from the statement of the person bout this allegation of asexual weakness. With respect. we cannot agree. there is the evidence of the mother who has deposed that the appellant had talked to her in 1958 on which she has complained to the respondent and had also written a letter to him. Ex. P. w. 3/1 which is written by the respondent to the mother-in law- also corroborates this version of the mother that this version of the mother that this complaint of weakness of respondent had been mentioned to her by the appellant in 1958.
23. The appellant is only in mid thirties. To force the appellant to this life of frustrating and unsatisfied sexual life which would inevitably damage her health both mental and physical. is within but cruelty. The Additional District Judge found that the respondent in 1958/1962 has suffered some sort of sexual weakness. The appellant was not satisfied by his sexual performance and that he was weak to such an extent that he would suffer emission quickly that he would suffer emission quickly after penetration and thus leave her in the bed without her having ever enjoyed orgasm and that perhaps the desired result could be achieved by mutual understanding and necessary encouragement and stimulus to the respondent and he went on to hold that from this appellant developed extreme harder against the respondent though the respondent's own weakness was partly responsible for it and that is why she did not care to proved any stimulation to the respondent. He then took the view that the marriage bed could perhaps he a happy bed if instead of putting the respondent to shame and telling him after his failure as to why he had harassed her, she had used language of love and encouragement. It is a little difficult to appreciate what exactly the Additional District Judge was suggesting. If as he found that the respondent was sexually weak and was not able to satisfy the appellant in the normal way it is difficult to appreciate the suggestion that appellant should have given necessary stimulation. It is nobody's case that the respondent was not able to have sexual intercourse with the appellant because of any inhibition or repugnance shown by the appellant. On the contrary it is the case of the appellant, which we are accepting that it was because of sexual weakness of the respondent that he was not able to have normal sexual intercourse. In that view the suggestion of the Additional District Judge that even though the husband was sexually weak shed should have provided stimulation to the respondent can be answered best in the words of Pearce J. in L. v. L., 1949-1 All Er nullity cases there comes a moment sickened by the role. so unnatural to a sensitive woman of trying to stimulate an impotent suppose sufficiently to enable him to achieve penetration. the learned single Judge referred to the letters Exs. R-42, R-43, R-46 and R-48 written by the appellant form Bombay to the respondent to hold that there was no love lost between the two till that stage which would not have been the case if the appellant had developed dislike for the respondent which is sought to be made out as a mental torture of the magnitude that should be held to amount to cruelty. With respect. it seems to us that the finding of mental cruelty on the gourd that the respondent was not able to have approver sexual intercourse with the appellant ins not rebutted by a reference to these letters. Those letters at the most show that the appellant was writing in a routine and polite manner. It does not follow that since no complaint was made in the letters about the sexual weakness of the respondent is must be taken that there was son mental torture and that the version of 5th appellant is an afterthought. Ex. Paw 3/1 clearly negatives that assumption. It is also relevant to note that even during the time when the appellant was at Bombay she had gone and stayed in holidays with the respondent in 1963 as well as 1964 in the hope that the respondent might have improved but had unfortunately found the respondent sexually weak as before. Ass the respondent because of his sexual weakness remained unable to have normal sexual intercourse. the mental torture and danger and apprehension to the health f the appellant was inevitable and the finding of cruelty inevitably follows. Learned single Judge has also opined that social disparity between the two is the root cause of trouble. We cannot agree. The mere fact that the appellant has now got an independent job does not mean that she would want to break her marriage without nay reason. the job (though paying her somewhat more than the respondent) is an ordinary kind of job which does not in any manner add to her social status or standing in society. the respondent holds a reasonably good job and is better qualified than the appellant. Had there been no such sexual weakness of the respondent we cannot believe that the wife would have gone to a Court of law simply because she has now got an independent job. There is no material on record to so hold and we feel that this finding of the learned Judge cannot be sustained on the material on record. We are therefore, constrained to hold that the courts below were not rights in holding that the appellant has failed to prove the plea of cruelty. We are of the view that the appellant has successfully proved that the respondent has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the appellant that it would be harmful and injurious for the appellant to live with the respondent. The appellant would. therefore. be entitled to a decree of judicial separation under Section 10(1)(b) of the Act. Issue No.2 is, therefore, decided in favor of the appellant.