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4. In 1992 around 136 workers were employed through a contractor for the work of trolley retrieval at the domestic and international airports at Delhi. In view of the perennial nature of the work, where they were employed on three shifts in a day, the workmen approached the CACLB for abolishing the contract labour system in trolley retrieval and for their absorption in AAI as regular employees. On 20th July, 1999 the CACLB made a recommendation declining to abolish the contract labour system in trolley retrieval in the Delhi airports. The above decision dated 20th July, 1999 was challenged by the Indira Gandhi Airport TDI Karamchari Union (the workers union) by filing W.P. (C) No. 5248 of 2002. By a judgment dated 5th November, 2003 the learned single Judge of this Court quashed the recommendation dated 20th July, 1999 and directed the CACLB to reconsider the matter. In the course of the judgment it was clarified by the learned single Judge that in case a recommendation was made for the abolition of trolley retrieval and an appropriate notification was issued by the Central Government, then in terms of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Steel Authority of India Limited v. National Union Waterfront Workers (2001) 7 SCC 1 (hereafter „the SAIL case‟), the workmen would be entitled to preference/regular employment in accordance therewith and the breaks, if any, in their employment shall not come in their way.

20. DIAL contends that it is not an agent of AAI. Further, since AAI is itself an eo nomine entity in terms of Section 2 (a) ID Act and an entity constituted under Section3 of the AAI act, DIAL cannot be considered to be a delegate of such entity. The contention is that the "establishment" in question is that of DIAL, wherever it conducts its business and that in relation to DIAL there has to be a separate Section 10 Notification issued by the Government of the NCT of Delhi prohibiting the employment of contract labour in trolley wok in the establishment of DIAL. If the employer is not the AAI in a given case then there can be no industrial dispute concerning the AAI. The dispute, if at all, is between DIAL and its workmen and the AAI is not concerned at all. In other words, the contention is that the focus is not so much on the place to determine what is an establishment but whether there exists relationship of employer and employee with reference to the principal employer and the labour and whether, in the event of a dispute arising between them, the appropriate Government would be the Central Government or the State Government. Referring to the observations in the SAIL case, it is submitted that since DIAL is not an entity that carries on its industry "by or under the authority of the central government" and no such authority is in any event conferred by any statute, the appropriate government in relation to DIAL cannot be the central government. DIAL disputes that it is carrying on an air transport service. It is pointed out that DIAL is not required to and in fact does not have a licence issued to it under Rule 134 of the Aircraft Rules. DIAL says that it is performing its functions independently in its own establishment which is not that of AAI‟s. Reliance is placed on the decision of the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court in Cochin International Airport Limited Vs. Regional Labour Commissioner 2009 (3) LLN 350. It is submitted that only certain functions have been entrusted to DIAL by the AAI by virtue of the OMDA and therefore recourse to Section 12 A of the AAI Act to justify the application of the Notification under Section 10 CLRAA to DIAL was not legally permissible.

45. There has been a considerable argument advanced on the basis of the judgment in the SAIL case where a reference was made to the definition of „appropriate Government‟ as it stood before the amendment in 1986. In para 20 of the SAIL judgment it was noticed that prior to that amendment the function of appropriate Government was not a static one. It reads as follows:
"20. Addressing the definition of "appropriate Government", it may be pointed out that clause (a) of Section 2(1) was substituted by the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Amendment Act, 1986 with effect from 28.1.1986. Before the said amendment, the definition reads as under:

61. Once it has been held by this Court that the DIAL continues to be bound by the notification under Section 10 CLRAA, the question that next arises is the consequential order that requires to be passed. This is governed by the SAIL case. Clauses 5 and 6 of para 125 of the SAIL judgment require a determination of the issue whether the contract under which the workers were employed by the TDIPL is a sham or bogus one. It is apparent that there is already an industrial dispute raised in this regard. In terms of the judgment in SAIL v. Union of India (2006) 12 SCC 233, this issue is to be decided only by the industrial adjudicator. The outcome of that dispute will determine the ultimate reliefs that can be granted to the workmen in terms of the SAIL judgment.