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"the act complained of creates a continuing source of injury and is of such a nature as to render the doer of it responsible for the continuance; in such cases a fresh cause of action arises de die in diem. To put the matter in another way, where the wrongful act produces a state of affairs every moment's continuance of which is a new tort, a fresh cause of action for the continuance lies."

21. The cases of continuous injury were considered in this judgment, one of which was Raj Rup Koer v. Abul Hossein, (1881) 2nd 6 Cal 394, where facts were that an artificial watercourse had been constructed on the defendants land to take water from a natural stream to the plaintiff's land. The defendants had, without authority, obstructed the flow of water by making dams and cuts in the water channel and they used to lake water from the plaintiff's channel to irrigate their own fields. The question arose whether such an act of the defendants was a continuous injury or not? The Privy Counsel held that the dams, cuts and other modes of obstructing or diverting the water from the water course were in the nature of a continuous nuisance as to which the cause of action was renewed de die in diem so long as the obstructions causing such interference were allowed to continue. Other instances of continuous wrongs are continued pollution of stream (Hole v. Chard Union, (1894) 1 Ch 293), obstruction caused to immemorial egress of rain water from the plaintiff's house through a drain on the defendant's land (Punja Kuvarji v. Rai Kuvar, (1981) 2nd 6 Bom 20), obstruction of discharge of surface water (Kaseswar Muker-jeev. AnnodaProsad,(1917)41 Ind Case 863 : (AIR 1918 Cal 422), obstruction of light and air through ancient windows and similar such wrongs Shadwell v, Hutchinson, (1831) 2 B & Ad 97, Ponnu Nadar v. Kumaru Reddiar, and Moti Ram v. Hans Rai AIR 1936 Lahore 334. In all such cases the injury was said to be continuous and, therefore, limitation runs every moment of the time during which the injury continues. The learned Judge held that the present case stands on different footing as the injury was inflicted and completed on the construction of the Chabutra (platform). It was held that with the construction of such Chabutra on the common land there has taken place complete dispossession and ouster of the plaintiff. So, it was not a continuing wrong but a wrong which was completed at the time the construction was put up and it was not an injury which had been committed by continuation from one given day to another. The suit was held to be time barred. Din Mohammad, J. also agreed with the main judgment but he expressed the view that distinction drawn between an injury which itself continues and an injury whose effect alone continues is too subtle to be of any practical use. It requires a very acute brain to distinguish between the case of a dam that diverts the flow of water and that of a permanent structure which blocks a public way as was the case in Municipal Commissioner for the City of Madras v. Sarangapani Mudaliar, (1896) 2nd 19 Mad 154.

23. Reference is then made to Aqtabuddin Khan v. Johar Ali Kazi, AIR 1935 Cal 201. In this judgment it was held that limitation does not apply in a case of obstruction to the right of way it being a continuous nuisance. The judgment does not clarify the facts as to whether the obstruction amounted to complete ouster or not.

24. The cases of Movva Butchamma v. Movva Venkateswararao, and Damodara Naidu v. Thirpura sundari Ammal, , relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant are of no help to decide the present issue inasmuch as the point of limitation was not raised in these cases.