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"12 Another principle of law which has to be borne in mind is stated thus by Sutherland on Statutory Construction (Vol. I, 3rd edn. p. 486) WP-2813-17 with WPL-2032-17 & WP 2684-17.sxw "Repeal of special and local statutes by general statutes: The enactment of a general law broad enough in its scope and application to cover the field of operation of a special or local statute will generally not repeal a statute which limits its operation to a particular phase of the subject covered by the general law, or to a particular locality within the jurisdictional scope of the general statute, An implied repeal of prior statutes will be restricted to statutes of the same general nature, since the legislature is presumed to have known of the existence of prior special or particular legislation, and to have contemplated only a general treatment of the subject matter by the general enactment. Therefore, where the later general statute does not propose an irreconciable conflict, the prior special statute will be construed as remaining in effect as a qualification of or exception to the general law."

46] In the case of State of M.P. vs. Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd and Others1, Their Lordships of the Apex Court were considering the question, as to whether after enactment of Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, there was implied repeal of Section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Negating the said contention, Their Lordships observed thus :-

"13. There is presumption against a repeal by implication; and the reason of this rule is based on the theory that the Legislature while enacting a law has a complete knowledge of the existing laws on the same subject matter, and therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provisions, the intention is clear not to repeal the existing legislation. (See: Municipal Council Palai v. T.J. Joseph [AIR 1963 SC 1561], Northern India Caterers (Private) Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Punjab [AIR 1967 SC 1581], Municipal Corpn of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker [(1971) 1 SCC 442: 1971 SCC (Cri) 195] and Ratan Lal Adukia v. Union of India [(1989) 3 SCC 537: AIR 1990 SC 104]. When the new Act contains a repealing section mentioning the Acts which it expressly repeals, the presumption against implied repeal of other laws is further strengthened on the principle expressio unius (persone 1 (2003) 7 SCC 389 WP-2813-17 with WPL-2032-17 & WP 2684-17.sxw vel rei) est exclusio alterius. (The express intention of one person or thing is the exclusion of another), as illuminatingly stated in Garnett v. Bradley [1878 3 AC 944]. The continuance of existing legislation, in the absence of an express provision of repeal being presumed, the burden to show that there has been repeal by implication lies on the party asserting the same. The presumption is, however, rebutted and a repeal is inferred by necessary implication when the provisions of the later Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlier Act and that the two cannot stand together. But, if the two can be read together and some application can be made of the words in the earlier Act, a repeal will not be inferred. (See: A.G. v. Moore [(1878) 3 Ex D 276], Ratan Lal case [(1989) 3 SCC 537 : AIR 1990 SC 104] and R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [(1992) 1 SCC 335]
14. The necessary questions to be asked are:
(1) Whether there is direct conflict between the two provisions.
(2) Whether the Legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of the subject-matter replacing the earlier law;
(3) Whether the two laws occupy the same field.

(See: Pt. Rishikesh v. Salma Begum [(1995) 4 SCC 718] and A.B. Krishna v. State of Karnataka [(1998) 3 SCC 495]") "15. The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the theory that the Legislature, which is presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any confusion WP-2813-17 with WPL-2032-17 & WP 2684-17.sxw by retaining conflicting provisions and, therefore, when the court applies the doctrine, it does no more than give effect to the intention of the Legislature by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and by a comparison of their provisions. The matter in each case is one of the construction and comparison of the two statutes. The Court leans against implying a repeal, unless two Act are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implied, or that there is a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together. (See Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. page 366, with reference to Berrey, Re [(1936) 1 Ch 274] To determine whether a later statute repeals by implication an earlier, it is necessary to scrutinize the terms and consider the true meaning and effect of the earlier Act. Until this is done, it is impossible to ascertain whether any inconsistency exists between the two enactments. The area of operation in the Code and the pollution laws in question are different with wholly different aims and objects, and though they alleviate nuisance, that is not of identical nature. They operate in their respective fields and there is no impediment for their existence side by side."

"31. One of the important tests to determine the issue of implied repeal would be whether the provisions of the Act are irreconciably inconsistent with those of the Code that the two cannot stand together or the intention of the legislature was only to supplement the provisions of the Code. This intention is to be ascertained from the provisions of the At. Courts lean against implied repeal. If by any fair interpretation both the statutes can stand together, there will be no implied repeal. If possible, implied repeal shall be avoided. It is, however, correct that the presumption against the intent to repeal by implication is overthrown if the new law is inconsistent with or repugnant to the old law, for the inconsistency or repugnancy reveals an intent to repeal the existing laws. Repugnancy must be such that the two statutes cannot be reconciled on reasonable construction or hypothesis. They ought to be clearly and manifestly irreconciable. It is possible, as contended by Mr. Jethmalani, that the inconsistency may operate on a part of a statute. Learned counsel submits that in the present case the presumption against implied repeal stands rebutted as the provisions of the Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of the earlier Acts that the two cannot stand together. The contention is that the provisions of Section 306 and 307 cannot be complied with by the special court and thus the legislature while enacting the Act clearly intended that the said existing provisions of the Code would not apply to the proceedings under the Act. Learned counsel contends that this Court will not construe the Act in a manner which will make Sections 306 and 307 or at WP-2813-17 with WPL-2032-17 & WP 2684-17.sxw least part of the said sections otiose and thereby defeat the legislative intendment whatever be the consequences of such an interpretation."