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4. During the pendency of the complaint, the complainant union moved an application dated 9th June, 1995 and therein contended that subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the Apex Court in the case of Parimal Chandra Raha & others v. Life Insurance Corporation of India and others, reported in (1995)II C.L.R. 194 and in the case of Bharat Petroleum Limited v. Lal Bawta Hotel and Bakery Mazdoor Union, unreported judgment dated 4th April 1995 in Civil Appeal No. 1445 of 1993 had held that the workmen of statutory canteen are to be treated as workmen of the principal employer with retrospective effect from the date of joining and as such prayed that the petitioner be directed to treat the canteen workers represented by the complainant union as permanent regular workmen with retrospective effect from the date of joining and to give them all the wages, benefit and privileges of the permanent and regular skilled employee with retrospective effect from the date of joining. The Industrial Court by order dated 19th November, 1996 allowed the complaint and directed the respondent to abolish the contract system to run the canteen by respondent No. 1 and declared that the employees mentioned at Exhibit "C" to the complaint are employees of the principal employer i.e. petitioner from their date of joining. The petitioner were further directed to pay the minimum scale as paid to Class IV employees.

7. Shri Gonsalves appearing on behalf of the respondent Union, on the other hand contended that the petitioner's all throughout were fully aware of the contentions raised by the petitioner and has filed a detailed reply to the complaint filed by the complainant Union. He further contends that the application dated 9th June, 1995 was moved subsequent to the declaration of law by the Apex Court and as such the question of want of opportunity would not arise as the petitioners were fully aware of the law laid down by the Apex Court in so far as a statutory canteen is concerned and once the Apex Court laid down the law the question of any further opportunity did not arise, as all that the Industrial Court had to do was to apply the law. He further contended that the petitioner was merely the new 'occupier' and in fact a notification had been issued by the State Government as far back as 28th December, 1965 in respect of the factory which was then known as 'Carbide Chemicals Company, division of Union Carbide India Limited". He points out that petitioners are carrying out the same manufacturing process as was carried on by their predecessor and not only that the workmen engaged are also the same. He further points out that the agreement between the petitioner and the predecessor has not come on the record. Nonetheless, the condition of services were maintained which included the maintenance of the canteen and as such the petitioner as successors in interest of Union Carbide India Limited were bound to maintain the canteen. He contends that though the Industrial Court has directed to abolish the contract system to run the canteen by the present respondent No. 4, nonetheless, there is a further direction by the Industrial Court whereby the employees at Annexture "C" to the complaint are declared as employees of principal employer. He contends that this could have been done based on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Parimal Chandra Raha & others (supra). Learned Counsel relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dattatraya Shankararao Kharde & others v. Executive Engineer, Chief Gate Erection Unit No.2 Nagpur & another, reported in 1994(1) C.L.R. 1022 to point out that the Division Bench has given a wide definition to the term "Agreement" as set out under Item No. 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTP & PULP Act. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees Union v. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Limited and another, reported 1986(1) L.L.J. S.C. 490 to contend that it is an implied condition of every agreement including a settlement that the parties thereto will act in conformity with law and in the instant case once the petitioner were bound to maintain the statutory canteen and in terms of the law laid down the employees became employees of the principal, the employer was bound to comply with the terms and conditions which were applicable to similarly situated other employees and to this extent the term 'agreement' as contained in Item 9, Schedule IV would be attracted. He also contended that the points now contended on behalf of the petitioner were not raised before the Industrial Court and the petitioner should be precluded from raising the points herein.

12. A Division Bench of this Court, thereafter in the case of Dattatraya Shankarao Kharde & others (supra) had occasion to consider the expression "Agreement". The Division Bench noted that the word "Agreement" in Item No. 9 of Schedule IV of the Act is not viewed strictly in the sense in which it is understood in the law of contract, although under the said law also, as held by the Supreme Court in its judgment in S. G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees Union v. S.G. Chemicals Dyes Trading Ltd. & another, reported in 1986(1) C.L.R. 360 and some of the provisions of law creating rights, obligations and duties can be held to be "implied terms" of the contract. The Division Bench thereafter further noted that, "it is pertinent to see that strict concept of an "Agreement" viz. that there should be identity of mind between the employee and the employer with regard to the conditions of service applicable to the employee is absent in such collective bargaining agreements arrived at between the Trade Union representing its members, or if it is a representative Union having authority under the above Acts to represent all the employees". It thereafter proceeds to observe "It is thus quite clear that certain terms and conditions of service which are regulated by the provisions of the statutes can form implied terms of individual contract of employment particularly keeping in view the development of industrial law. The object of the Act which is a piece of Social Legislation is to prevent the mischief of the employers in not carrying out the obligations upon them under the agreements, settlements and awards and therefore the word "Agreement" used in Item No. 9 of Schedule IV of the Act cannot be construed in narrow sense as otherwise it would defeat its very object". In the instant case, the status of workers employed in a statutory canteen has been finally laid to rest by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Parimal Chandra Raha & others (supra). True, questions are still being raised and are being debated and discussed by way of various petitions as to the kind or categories of employees that would be entitled to protection. But suffice it to say one aspect of the matter covered viz. that if there is a statutory canteen required to be maintained by the principal employer then in that event the employees working in the canteen will become direct employee of the principal employer is no longer open. Once that is the law declared, can it be thereafter said that if the employer does not pay such employee minimum wages which are paid to workers similarly situated, that there is no breach of an agreement so as to contend that Item 9 of Schedule IV is not attracted. As noted by the Division Bench of this Court, the word "Agreement" cannot be considered in a narrow sense. In the instant case, even this is not required as once it is held that such canteen workers are the employees of the principal employer, then it is the requirement of law that such employer pay the minimum wages to these employees and that too in consonance with the minimum wages paid to the similar employees in the same establishment. Thus the non payment of minimum wages to employees working in the canteen must be held to be an act of unfair labour practice covered by Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act.

15. Learned Counsel relied on the judgment in the case of Managing Director, E.C.I.L Hyderbad v. B. Karunakar, reported in (1993)II C.L.R. 1129 to contend that the judgment in Parimal Raha's case should be prospective. The facts of that case were that the Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, E.C.I.L while interpreting Article 311 of the Constitution held that giving a copy of the Inquiry Report where the Disciplinary Authority was different from the Inquiry Officer was essential. However the question remained from what date the said judgment would apply. The Apex Court observed that subsequent to the amendment to Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the requirement of giving a copy of the Inquiry report which was vital material as was laid down in Mohammed Ramzan case there should be a cutoff date for applying the law. The facts in the case of Parimal Chandra Raha and the cut off date laid down in the case of Managing Director, E.C.I.L (supra) based on the decision of Mohammed Ramzan are different. In the case of Mohammed Ramzan the Apex Court was considering the law after the amendment of the Constitution, whereas in the case of Parimal Chandra Raha (supra) the Apex Court has declared the law contained in the Factories Act.