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(a) Rules 10 and 10A or substituted Rule 10 for the aforesaid two Rules after 6-8-1977 are of permanent nature. It cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that they are part of temporary statute. (Reliance is placed on R. C. Jall v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1281.)
(b) There is no question of repeal because Rules 10, 10A and 11 were substituted by Notification dated 6-8-1977 by Rule 10. Clause 4 of the said Notification specially states that for Rules 10, 10A and 11 of the said Rules, the following Rule 10 shall be substituted. Thereafter Rule 10 is omitted because of the introduction of Section 11A in the Central Excise Act with effect from 17-11-1980 by Notification dated 12-11-1980.
(d) Even with regard to the temporary statute, rights and liabilities created under the repealed statute are not ipso facto terminated. The accrued rights and liabilities are saved unless they are expressly extinguished or the Amending Act specifically provides to the effect. Liability to pay duty of excise arises immediately when excisable goods are manufactured or produced (Reliance is placed on Indira Sohanlal v. Custodian of E.P., AIR 1956 SC 76; Jayantilal v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 1193; Joint Secretary Union of India v. Khillu Ram, AIR 1975 SC 2275; M. S. Shivananda v. K. S. R. T. Corporation, AIR 1980 SC 77; I.T. Commissioner, U. P. v. M/s. Shah India & Sons, AIR 1987 SC 1217; Bansidhar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1989 SC 1614).

(iii) the Central Excise Rules framed under the provision of the Central Excises & Salt Act are statutory rules. They are law for all purposes and are part and parcel of the statute itself;

(iv) even with regard to temporary statute or rules, rights and liabilities accrued under the repealed statute are not ipso facto terminated. Rights and liabilities are saved unless they are expressly extinguished or an amending Act specifically provides to that effect.

(v) even with regard to substitution or omission or amending of an Act for ascertaining whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed Act have been put an end to by the Act, the line of enquiry would not be whether the new Act expressly keeps alive old rights and liabilities under the repealed Act but whether it manifests an intention to destroy them. Secondly, another line of approach may be to see as to how far the new Act is retrospective in operation.

"Learned Counsel for the Applt. has drawn our attention to Arts. 249(3), 250, 357, 358 and 359 were express provision has been made for saving things done under the laws which expired. It will be noticed that each of those Articles was concerned with expiry of temporary Statutes. It is well known that on the expiry of a temporary statute no further proceedings can be taken, unless the Statute itself saved pending proceedings. If, therefore, an offence had been committed under a temporary Statute and the proceedings were initiated but the offender had not been prosecuted and punished before the expiry of the Statute, then, in the absence of any saving clause, the pending prosecution could not be proceeded with after the expiry of the statute by efflux of time. If was on this principle that express provision was made in the several Articles noted above for savings things done or omitted to be done under the expiring laws referred to therein. As explained above, Art. 13(1) is entirely prospective in its operation in its operation and as it was not intended to have any retrospective effect there was no necessity at all for inserting in that Article any such saving clause. The effect of Art. 13(1) is quite different from the effect of the expiry of a temporary Statute or the repeal of a statute by a subsequent Statute. As already explained, Art. 13(1) only has the effect of nullifying or rendering all inconsistent existing laws ineffectual or nugatory and devoid of any legal force or binding effect only with respect to the exercise of fundamental rights on and after the date of the commencement of the Constitution. It has no retrospective effect and if, therefore, an act was done before the commencement of the Constitution in contravention of the provisions of any law which, after the Constitution, becomes void with respect of the excise of any of the fundamental rights, the inconsistent law is not wiped out so far as the past act is concerned, for to say that it is, will be to give the law retrospective effect. There is no fundamental right that a person shall not be prosecuted and published for an offence committed before the Constitution came into force. So far as the past acts are concerned, the law exists notwithstanding that it does not exist with respect to the future exercise of fundamental rights."