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4. The second question being significant one having bearing on the other two questions, I propose to deal with it for proper appreciation of the other two questions. By virtue of Section 341 of the U.P.Z.A, and L.R Act, the provisions of the C.P.C. it is well established by catena of judicial precedents, are attracted for application. Section 341 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R Act are excerpted below for ready reference.

It brooks no dispute that the proceedings under Section 229D have the complexion of temporary injunction and by virtue of Section 341 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are intended for application inasmuch as the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, does not have any independent provision to deal with the situation such as the situation emerging from of Order 39. Rule 2A C.P.C. can he invoked in aid to deal with the situation such as emerging from disobedience of the orders. My view receives reinforcement from a decision of this Court in Nepal Sing v. Board of Revenue reported in 1994 Prayag Nirmal Patrika at p. 205 in which it has been held that the procedure prescribed for temporary injunction in the C.P.C. will be applicable to the proceeding under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. In the light of the above discussion, it thus crystallises that the situation emerging from disobedience of the order can be dealt with by application of the provisions contained under Order 39, Rule 2A, C.P.C. and by the reckoning, the matter can, by way of alternative remedy, be relegated to the Court initiating reference to deal with the matter resulting from disobedience of its orders, the contempt proceeding, instituted in the Court under the Contempt of Courts Act by Reference, is not maintainable.

12. Sri Kesari has urged that the provisions of Order 39, Rule 2A would not automatically apply in such proceedings inasmuch as Order 39, Rule 1 and Rule 2 are not applicable to suits under Section 229B. For this, he contends that the opening words of Section 341 clearly states that unless otherwise expressly provided under the 1950 Act the provisions of Civil Procedure Code would apply. He contends that Section 229D is an express provision made by the Legislature in respect of the powers of the revenue Court for granting temporary injunction pending trial of a suit. In such a situation Sri Kesari contends that the Legislature once having expressly provided for grant of injunction under Section 229D it has to be presumed that the applicability of the provisions of Rules 1 and 2 of Order 39'stand excluded from application by virtue of the opening sentence of Section 341. Once the provisions of Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 are not applicable, he contends that Rule 2A cannot be applied because Rule 2A can only be pressed into service provided orders are passed under Rules 1 and 2. In respect of injunctions granted under Section 229D of the 1950 Act, he further contends, that had the Legislature intended to apply Rule 2A, it would have specifically mentioned such powers while framing the provisions under Section 229D. It is, therefore, urged that in the absence of any express intention of the legislature to confer such powers on the revenue Courts it should be presumed that they do not have any power to proceed for contempt in the event any breach is complained of in respect of the orders passed under Section 229D of the 1950 Act. He relies on the decision of Manmohan Das Shah and Ors. v. Bishun Das para 6 to buttress his submissions to the effect, that such an interpretation should be avoided which was never intended by the legislature. Relying on the other decision of Dr. Ranjana Tiwari v. Director of Higher Education, Allahabad and Ors. reported in 2003 (3) AWC 2366 : 2003 All LJ 2716 he contends that what has specifically not been included and provided for by the legislature, cannot be added or subtracted by this Court. He repeats that even otherwise assuming that the Court below could have entertained such an application, this Court is not precluded from proceeding to take cognizance under the powers conferred under Article 215 of the Constitution of India read with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. According to him this Court has already taken cognizance and therefore, there is no occasion for this Court to relegate the applicant to the Court concerned at this stage.

15. Applying the aforesaid analogy, what has already been provided for under Section 229D, cannot exclude the applicability of the provision of Rule 2A of Order 39. Section 229D is analogous to the provision of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 which in sum and substance empowers the Court to grant temporary injunction pending trials. The word 'unless otherwise expressly provided' is a phrase which connotes a limitation to restrict the applicability of such provisions which are otherwise provided for in 1950 Act. It is evident from a bare perusal of Section 229D that it does not by itself provide for any action empowering the Court to proceed in the event a breach is complained of in respect of an injunction granted under Section 229D. At the same time it does not restrict the applicability of the other provisions including Order 39, Rule 2A C.P.C. read with Section 341 of the 1950 Act. The entire scheme does not prohibit the application of the mandate contained in Order 39, Rule 2A. As a matter of fact the provisions of Order 39 C.P.C. are supplemental to Section 229D of the 1950 Act. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Urmila Devi v. Pooran Chand Dabar reported in 1999 (1) AWC 655 Para 7, had the occasion to hold that Order 39 C.P.C. does not stand excluded in its applicability by virtue of Section 229-D of the 1950 Act.

16. The contention of the learned Counsel for the applicant that in the absence of any express provision Rule 2A cannot be pressed into service, is unacceptable also because of the reason that proceedings under Section 229D are proceedings in a declaratory suit to the total exclusion of civil Courts. In such a situation the revenue Courts have to be possessed of powers to give effect to their orders. The legislature never intended the revenue Courts to be toothless and therefore, suitably empowered the revenue Court with the applicability of provisions of Civil Procedure Code. There is no reason to presume that the legislature did not intend to empower the revenue Courts for taking action for breach of its order in respect of injunctions granted under Section 229D. No intention to the contrary has been expressed by the legislature disempowering the Court from taking any such action.