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5. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the legal position as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Aneeta Hada vs. Godfather Travels & Tours Private Limited, (2012) 5 SCC 661, wherein the Supreme Court has categorically held that for maintaining the prosectuion under section 141 of the NI Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, in view of explanation to section 141 of the NI Act, the word "company" means any body corporate which includes firm or other association of individuals and director in relation to a firm means a partner in the firm. Hence, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Aneeta Hada (supra) that arraigning of a company as an accused is ABS 4 of 14 WP 2909-2013-J imperative in a prosecution under section 141 of the NI Act, is equally applicable when the prosecution is launched against a partnership firm. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that in the instant case, as the partnership firm is not made an accused and one of the partner alone is sued, the prosecution itself is not tenable and on this count the process issued against the petitioner is required to be quashed and set aside.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent no.1 has submitted that legally speaking a partnership firm and a company registered under the Companies Act stand on two different footings.

A partnership firm is not a juristic person. It is not a separate and distinct legal entity. As against it, a company is a separate juristic person. Hence, the law laid down in the case of Aneeta Hada (supra), which was in the context of a company, which is a separate juristic person, cannot be made applicable in the case of a partnership firm which is not a separate juristic person. Further, according to learned counsel for respondent no.1, a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is the essence of the decision is the ratio and every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts. He has further submitted that the very basis for the Apex Court in laying down the law in the case of Aneeta Hada (supra) holding that arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative, is that the company is an independent separate juristic person; as the same is not the case in respect of a partnership firm, ABS 5 of 14 WP 2909-2013-J according to him, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Aneeta Hada (supra) needs to be distinguished and cannot be made applicable in the case of a partnership firm.

8. In the case of Aneeta Hada (supra), the question that arose for determination of the Apex Court was whether an authorised signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution under section 138 of the NI Act without the company being arraigned as an accused. As initially there was difference of opinion between the two learned Judges regarding interpretation of section 138 of the NI Act, reference was made to the Larger Bench of three ABS 7 of 14 WP 2909-2013-J Judges. While deciding the said reference and interpreting sections 138 and 141 of the NI Act, the Supreme Court observed as under:

10.

However, as referred to above, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, a distinction has to be made between the partnership firm, which is not a separate juristic and legal entity, and the company which is a juristic entity. To substantiate his contention, learned counsel for respondent no.1 has relied upon a landmark judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Dulichand Laxminarayan vs. CIT, AIR 1956 SC 354, which has laid down that a partnership firm cannot be equated with a company as it is not a corporate entity nor a separate juristic person. Hence, according to learned counsel for the petitioner, the law which was made applicable to the company by the Apex Court in the case of Aneeta Hada (supra) cannot be made equally applicable to the partnership firm.