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29. I have examined the later decision of the Judicial Committee with a view to as certian if there be any pronouncement which supports the broad interpretation of the ruling in Suraj Bansi Koer's case for which the plaintiffs respondents contend, but without success. On the contrary their Lordships express their indisposition to extend the doctrine of the alienability by a coparcener even of his undivided share without the consent of his co-sharers beyond the decided cases. In Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ramchandra Dada Naik (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 181 Sir James W. Colvile who delivered the judgment in Suraj Bunsi Koer's case, referring to the principle that the coparcener's powers of alienation is founded on his right to a partition, pointed out that Suraj Bunsi Koer's case was one of an execution against a mortgaged share and was decided "on the ground that the proceedings had then gone so far, in the lifetime of the judgment debtor (in report 'mortgagor') as to give, notwithstanding his death, a good title against his co-sharers to the execution purchasers." He then remarks: "Their Lordships are not disposed to extend the doctrine of the alienability by a coparcener of his undivided share without the consent of his sharers beyond the decided cases." In the case of Kameswar Prashad v. Run Bahadur Singh (1880) I.L.R. 6 Calc. 843 it was held by the Judicial Committee that in transactions such as the alienation by a Hindu widely of her estate of inheritance derived from her husband, a creditor seeking to enforce a charge on such an estate is bound at least to show the nature of the transaction and that in advancing his money he gave credit on reasonable grounds to an assertion that the money was wanted for one of the recognised necessities. Sir James W. Colvile again commented upon the decision in Hanoomanpersaud Panday's case and to the law as therein laid down, and then observes: "It appears to their Lordships that such being the law, any creditor who comes into Court to enforce a right similar to that which is claimed in the present suit is bound at least to show the nature of the transaction and that in advancing his money he gave credit on reasonable grounds to an assertion that the money was wanted for one of the recognised necessities. "This was, it will be observed, the case of a mortgage. In the case of Madho Parshad v. Mehrban Singh (1890) L.R. 17 I.A. 19 in which it was held that where a Hindu without the consent of his co-parcener had sold his undivided share in the family estate for his own benefit and received the purchase money to his own use, his surviving co-parcaner was entitled on his death under the Mitakshara law by survivorship to recover the share so sold from the purchaser, and that the latter had no equity or charge thereon against such survivor in respect of his purchase money. Lord Watson, who delivered the judgment of their Lordships, commented upon the decision in Suraj Bansi Koers case and pointed out that the right of the purchaser in that case was affirmed on the ground that before the death of the judgment-debtor execution proceedings had gone so far as to constitute in favour of the judgment creditor a valid charge upon, the joint estate to the extent of the undivided interest of the deceased which could not be defeated by that event, but at the same time observed that if no proceedings had been taken to enforce the debt in the lifetime of the judgment-debtor, his interest in the property would have survived on his death to his sons so that it could not be afterwards reached by the creditor in their hands". Then again in the case of Balgobind Das v. Narain Lal (1893) L.R. 20 I.A. 116 it was held to be the Fettled law of the Mitakshara as administered in Bengal and the North-Western Provinces, that a Hindu cannot without the consent of his co-parceners sell or mortgage his undivided share in ancestral estate for his own benefit. Sir Richard Couch in delivering judgment approved of the passage in the judgment in the case of Lakshman Dada Naik v. Ram chandra Dada Naik which I have quoted, and also the judgment in Madho Prasad v. Mehrban Singh. In regard to the judgment in the last mentioned case he observes: "In the judgment delivered by Lord Watson it is said that the counsel for the appellant conceded in argument that the rules of the Mitaklhara law which prevail in the Courts of Bengal are applicable in Oudh to the alienation of interests in a joint family estate, and that he likewise conceded that the sales being without the consent of the co-parcener, and justified by legal necessity, were according to that law invalid j but he maintained that the transactions being teal and the prices actually paid, respondent could only recover the shares sold subject to an equitable charge in the appellant's favour for the purchase money. It was held that it might have been quite consistent with equitable principles to refuse to the seller restitution of the interest which he sold except on condition of its being made at once available for the repayment of the price which he received but that the respondent who took by survivorship was not affected by any equity of that kind and that an equity which might; have been enforced against the seller's interest whilst it existed could not be made to affect that interest when it has passed to a surviving coparcener, except by repeating the rule of the Mitakshara laws. In view of these rulings it seems to me impossible to hold that their Lordships have extended the principle which underlies the decision in Suraj Bansi Koer's case. On the contrary they seem to mo to have guarded themselves against the suggestion that the clear and explicit rule of the Mitakshara which precludes the alienability of immovable property by a coparcener without the consent of his coparceners had been repealed or might be treated as a dead letter.