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Rule 6 provides for objections to interrogatories by answer. It runs as follows:

"Any objection to answering any interrogatory on the ground that it is scandalous or irrelevant or not exhibited bona fide for the purpose of the suit, or that the matters inquired into are not sufficiently material at mat stage, or on any other ground, may be taken in the affidavit in answer."

Rule 7 empowers the Court to set aside and strike out the interrogatories in appropriate cases. It lays down as follows:

"Any interrogatories may be set aside on the ground that they have been exhibited unreasonably or vexatiousiy or struck out on the ground that they are prolix, oppressive, unnecessary or scandalous; and any application for this purpose may be made within seven days after service of the Interrogatories."

It will appear from the above that the main object of the interrogatories is to ensure fair and speedier disposal of the suit and to save unnecessary costs. The aforesaid rules provide the extent and limitation of the interrogatories. The interrogatories must relate to any matters in question, not necessarily to matters directly in issue, and should tend to ensure speedier disposal and minimisation or costs. The other limitations which emerge from these rules are that (1) they should not be exhibited unreasonably, vexatiousiy, or at improper length; (2) they should not be scandalous or irrelevant or not exhibited bona fide for the purpose of the suit; and (3) they are not unreasonable, vexatious, prolix, oppressive, unnecessary or scandalous Within these limitations the Court has ample power to order amendment of the pleadings (sic). These provisions are based upon the principles obtaining in the English Courts.

Mr. Datta objected to the interrogatories on two grounds," first, that the existence of the contracts which form the subject-matter of the interrogatories has already been denied in the pleadings, and, second, that the interrogatories should not be directed to obtaining admission from the other side. Both these grounds are, in my opinion, unsubstantial. In Attorney-General v. Gaskill, (1882) 20 Ch. D. 519, Cotton, L. J., made the following significant observations:

".....a party has a right to interrogate with a view to obtaining an admission from his opponent of everything which is material and relevant to the issue raised on the pleadings. It was said in argument that it is not discovery where the plaintiff himself already knows the fact, but that is a mere play on the word 'discovery'. Discovery is not limited to giving the plaintiff a knowledge of that which he does not already know, but includes the getting an admission of anything which he has to prove on any issue which is raised between him and the Defendant, to say that the pleadings have raised the issues, and that therefore the interrogatories should not be allowed is an entire fallacy. The object of the pleadings is to ascertain what the issues are, the object of interrogatories is not to learn what the issues are, but to see whether the party who interrogates cannot obtain an admission from his opponent which will make the burden of proof easier than it otherwise would have been. As regards the interrogatories relative to the right of way they clearly are proper interrogatories. The object is to get from the Defendant in this case an admission of that which no doubt he denied by his defence, but not on oath, viz. a fact supposed to be within his knowledge that there is a right of way, and an admission of it by him must obviously save an enormous amount of expense at the trial."

In the case the defendant was sought to be restrained from building across a public footpath. The defendant, by his defence, denied the existence of any public right of way over the ground. The plaintiffs delivered interrogatories as to the existence of a public right of way over the land. It was laid down in that case that the defendant was bound to answer as to the existence of the right of way, for that one object of interrogatories is to enable a party to obtain admission from the other party, and so to relieve himself of the necessity of adducing evidence. Therefore, the denial in the pleadings of the fact that the defendant was called upon to admit what plaintiff, had to prove is no ground for refusing to administer the interrogatories. So far as the interrogatories are restricted to matters in question, there is, in my opinion, absolutely no justification for refusing to deliver the interrogatories. It is true that the interrogatories shall not be delivered for obtaining evidence or for making out a case. As laid down in Dinajpur Trading and Banking Co. Ltd. v. Probhash Chandra Sen, AIR 1933 Cal 151, a party is not entitled to administer interrogatories for obtaining discovery of facts which constitute exclusively the evidence of his adversary's case.