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12. The dispute pertains to an extent of Act 18-04 cents situate at Bit II village, Nellore district. It is the case of the plaintiff that the schedule property is a wakf property for performing Khatib and Mouzzan services. It was given to Nizam Sherrief and others to perform these religious ceremonies and so long as they perform these religious rites they could enjoy the property. At any rate, the defendants could not claim the properties on the ground that they had purchased it from service holders. It was a grant to the institution. On the other hand, it is the contention of the defendants that scheduled property was granted to the named individuals burdened with service. Alienation of the same is not void. It is not a wakf property, since the original inamdar had alienated the property by way of settlement deed, as long back as in 1928 under Ex. B.19, and the settees having enjoyed the property for some time, alienated in their favour under registered sale deeds Exs. B.1 to B.41, they were entitled to the properties. In the light of these contentions, the moot point would be whether it is a wakf property or a personal grant to the service holders.

36. Learned advocate for the appellants contended that the suit is barred by limitation. Learned Counsel for the appellants relying on decision in L. Machi Reddy v. Wakf Board, A.P. contended that a suit filed by Wakf Board for recovery of possession of property alienated by the Mutawalli, whether he is in or out of the office, is, governed by Article 96 and not by Article 65 and therefore is barred by limitation. That was a case where admittedly the property was a wakf property. It was held:

(iii) a wakf-alal-aulad;....

7. The aforesaid definition shows that at least from 1964 when sub-clause (ii) was added to the definition in Section 3(1) thereof, grants' including mashrut-ul-khidmat were also to be treated as part of wakf. Apart from the question whether 1954 Act definition of wakf can be read with the definition of public wakf under the Extension Act, in 1952 when the first alienation by the Paish Imam took place even this definition was not available to cover the said transaction. But even proceeding on the basis that on the date of the suit, the definition of Wakf as per Wakf Act, 1954 was available for being pressed into service, it only treated mashrut-ul-khidmat, i.e. grant for rendering service to be Wakf. The Extension Act required the property to be of a public wakf and not a mere wakf before Section 3 thereof can be pressed in service for extending the period of limitation. Consequently, on the express language of definition of public wakf as found in Section 3 of the Extension Act read with Section 3 thereof, the conclusion becomes inevitable that the extension of time would not be available to the appellant for challenging the alienations in question. It is obvious that suit property even if a wakf as per Wakf Act, 1954 as not within the sweep of the definition of a 'public wakf' as per the Extension Act wherein service grants are not treated to be public wakf. In view of our aforesaid conclusion it is not necessary for us to examine the other question whether the Extension Act could have been of any assistance to the learned Counsel for the appellant for treating the suit to have been filed within limitation on account of Pongal holidays during which the Civil Courts were closed in Andhra Pradesh and after holidays the Courts reopened on 17-1-1973. It is also not necessary for us to examine the other question whether there was practice in the Civil Courts of Andhra Pradesh about reopening of the registry for filing of cases on a day previous to the date on which the Courts reopen after Pongal holidays. We keep this question open.

12. A mere look at the said Act indicates that Sections 66-D to 66-H were brought on the statute of Wakf Act, 1954 by amending Act 69 of 1984. Since the present suit was filed in 1973 the said provision was not available to the appellant for getting the extension of period of limitation. Consequently, even this section can be of no avail to learned Counsel for the appellant.

42. Coming to the facts, admittedly the land in question was alienated by way of settlement by the service holder by name Nizam Shereef in 1928. It was granted to him for performing services at the mosque. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that it was not directly dedicated to the mosque. Therefore, as per the definition of Public Wakf, the suit land being a service land, cannot be treated to be a public wakf. Later, pursuant to the settlement deed Ex. B.19 dated 29-1-1928, they alienated the properties to the defendants under Exs. B.14 lease deed dated 1-12-1939, B.20 lease deed dated 11-4-1953, B.2 sale deed dated 11-7-1957 etc. The Honourable Supreme Court in Wakf Board Andhra Pradesh (supra 13) has categorically held that the suit property is even if a wakf as per Wakf Act, 1954 is not within the sweep of the definition of public wakf, as per the extension Act wherein service grants are not treated to be public wakf. Evidently, the board came into existence on 4-3-1961 in the state of A.P. The suit was filed on 31-12-1975. Necessarily, twelve years period has to be counted from 4-3-1961. The nature of the suit must be such that plaintiff therein must seek to recover possession of the property alienated by the previous inamdar. I may state herein that Nizam Shereef never managed the mosque. His alienation was on 29-1-1928, it cannot be said to be alienation by the previous manager of the mosque. Article 96 of the Limitation Act cannot be of any assistance, since the alienation was made by the inamdar, who cannot be said to be a manager. Neither Article 134B of the old Act nor 96 of the Limitation Act is of any avail.