Document Fragment View
Fragment Information
Showing contexts for: CLRA in M/S. Hindustan Lever Ltd vs Contract Laghu Udyog Kamgar on 17 June, 2009Matching Fragments
31. Mr.Singh submitted that the question whether there exists a master-servant relationship between the Petitioner and the concerned workmen must be decided on the basis of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the "CLRA Act") Mr. Singh based this submission on sections 2(b), (c), (e), (g)(ii), 7, 10, 12, 21, 29 and 30 of the CLRA Act, which read as under :-
32. There is nothing in the CLRA Act in general and the above provisions in particular, that supports Mr.Singh's submission. The CLRA Act does not deal with the question at all. In other words, the provisions of the CLRA Act do not deal with the question about the circumstances or conditions on which an employer-
employee relationship can be said to exist. The CLRA Act does not define an employer-employee relationship vis-a-
vis the question as to whether a contract, such as the present contracts, is sham and bogus. It is not concerned with the same. The CLRA Act posits the existence of a genuine contract between the principal employer and the contractor.
::: Downloaded on - 09/06/2013 14:40:28 ::: 3433. The mere implementation of the provisions of the CLRA Act which require the principal employer or the contractor to do certain things or foist any liability upon them are not of any assistance in determining the existence of a contract of employment between the principal employer and the workmen. This is for the obvious reason that any such liability foisted on the party and any act done by them pursuant to the provisions of the CLRA Act, would be a consequence of or pursuant to a statutory mandate and not an act of volition on their part in furtherance of a contractual obligation.
42. The judgment does not support the submission that once there is even a sham contract under which a contractor purportedly supplies the workmen to the principal employer, the Court is precluded from considering whether the contract is sham or not and that the question does not and cannot even arise and that the employees would be deemed to be the contractor's employees. The CLRA Act being a complete code in itself, does not lead to this conclusion. It only means that in respect of the provisions covered by the CLRA Act, the Act is a complete code in itself. The question presently under consideration, as has already been held, is not covered by the CLRA Act.