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In Kesavananda Bharati (1973, Suppl. SCR 1) decided on April 24, 1973 it was held by the majority that Parliament has no power to amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy its basic or essential features or its basic structure. We hold that all amendments to the Constitution which were made before April 24, 1973 and by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are valid and constitutional. Amendments to the Constitution made on or after April 24, 1973 by which the 9th Schedule to the Constitution was amended from time to time by the inclusion of various Acts and Regulations therein, are open to challenge on the ground that they, or any one or more of them, are beyond the constituent power of the Parliament since they damage the basic or essential features of the Constitution or its basic structure. We do not pronounce upon the validity of such subsequent constitutional amendments except to say that if any Act or Regulation included in the 9th Schedule by a constitutional amendment made after April 24, 1973 is saved by Article 31A, or by Article 31C as it stood prior to its amendment by the 42nd Amendment, the challenge to the validity of the relevant Constitutional Amendment by which that Act or Regulation is put in the 9th Schedule, on the ground that the Amendment damages or destroys a basic or essential feature of the Constitution or its basic structure as reflected in Articles 14, 19 or 31, will become otiose.

The validity of the constitutional amendment by which Article 31A(1)(a) was introduced is challenged by the petitioners on the ground that it damages the basic structure of the Constitution by destroying one of its basic features, namely, that no law can be made by the legislature so as to abrogate the guarantees afforded by Articles 14, 19 and 31. It is tautologous to say so but, if we may so put it, the obliteration of the rights conferred by these Articles, which Article 31A (1) (a) brings about, is total and complete because, as the clear and unequivocal language of that Article shows, the application of these three articles stands totally withdrawn in so far as laws falling within the ambit of clause (a) are concerned. It is no argument to say that the withdrawal of the application of certain articles in Part III in respect of laws of a defined category is not total abrogation of the articles because they will continue to apply to other situations and other laws. In any given case, what is decisive is whether, in so far as the impugned law is concerned, the rights available to persons affected by that law under any of the articles in Part III is totally or substantially withdrawn and not whether the articles, the application of which stands withdrawn in regard to a defined category of laws, continue to be on the Statute Book so as to be available in respect of laws of other categories. We must there fore conclude that the withdrawal of the application of Articles 14, 19 and 31 in respect of laws which fall under clause (a) is total and complete, that is to say, the application of those articles stands abrogated, not merely abridged, in respect of the impugned enactments which indubitably fall within the ambit of clause (a). We would like to add that every case in which the protection of a fundamental right is withdrawn will not necessarily result in damaging or destroying the basic structure of the Constitution. The question as to whether the basic structure is damaged or destroyed in any given case would depend upon which particular Article of Part III is in issue and whether what is withdrawn is quint-essential to the basic structure of the Constitution.

The judgment of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) provoked in its wake a multi-storied controversy, which is quite understandable. The judgment of the majority to which seven out of the thirteen Judges were parties, struck a bridle path by holding that in the exercise of the power conferred by Article 368, the Parliament cannot amend the Constitution so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. The seven learned Judges chose their words and phrases to express their conclusion as effectively and eloquently as language can do. But, at this distance of time any controversy over what was meant by what they said is plainly sterile. At 'this distance of time', because though not more than a little less than eight years have gone by since the decision in Kesavananda Bharati (supra) was rendered, those few years are packed with constitutional events of great magnitude. Applying the ratio of the majority judgments in that epoch-making decision, this Court has since struck down constitutional amendments which would otherwise have passed muster. For example, in Smt. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain Art. 329A(4) was held by the Court to be beyond the amending competence of the Parliament since, by making separate and special provisions as to elections to Parliament of the Prime Minister and the Speaker, it destroyed the basic structure of the Constitution. Ray C.J. based his decision on the ground that the 39th Amendment by which Art. 329A was introduced violated the Rule of Law (p. 418); Khanna J. based his decision on the ground that democracy was a basic feature of the Constitution, that democracy contemplates that elections should be free and fair and that the clause in question struck at the basis of free and fair elections (pp. 467 and 471); Mathew J. struck down the clause on the ground that it was in the nature of legislation ad hominem (p. 513) and that it damaged the democratic structure of the Constitution (p. 515); while one of us, Chandrachud J., held that the clause was bad because it violated the Rule of Law and was an outright negation of the principle of equality which is a basic feature of the Constitution (pp. 663-665). More recently, in Minerva Mills, (supra) clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 itself were held unconstitutional by a unanimous Court, on the ground that they destroyed certain basic features of the Constitution like judicial review and a limited amending power, and thereby damaged its basic structure. The majority also struck down the amendment introduced to Article 31C by section 4 of the 42nd Amendment Act, 1976.

I have no doubt that the power of amendment is plenary and would include within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles including those relating to fundamental rights. (p. 688) But he clarified the true position in his judgment in the Election Case (supra) (pages 497-499), by drawing the attention of doubters to a significant qualification 'which he had engrafted on the above statement, at pages 688 and 758 of his judgment in Kesavananda Bharati (supra). The qualification was that subject to the retention of the basic structure or framework of the Constitution, the power of amendment was plenary. The law on the subject of the Parliament's power to amend the Constitution must now be taken as well-settled, the true position being that though the Parliament has the power to amend each and every article of the Constitution including the provisions of Part III, the amending power cannot be exercised so as to damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. It is by the application of this principle that we shall have to decide upon the validity of the Amendment by which Article 31A was introduced. The precise question then for consideration is whether section 4 of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which introduced Article 31A into the Constitution damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution.