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"As a general rule, and unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired, no proceedings can be taken upon it and it ceases to have any further effect."

13. It, therefore, appears that if the life of the temporary Act expires, consequences of the same also get extinguished with the date of its expiry. In S. Krishnan V. State of Madras, (AIR 1951 SC 301) Patanjali Sastri, J. observed;--

"The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of a special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires."

14. The same is the view taken by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Jagmander Das, AIR 1954 SC 683, where Mahajan C. J. dealing with a similar controversy about the repeal of a temporary statute, observed:--

"When a statute is repealed or comes to an automatic end by efflux of time, no prosecution for acts done during the continuance of the repealed or expired Act can be commenced after the date of its repeal or expiry because that would amount to the enforcement of a repealed or a dead Act. In cases of repeal of statutes this rule stands modified by Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. An expiring Act is, however, not governed by the rule enunciated in that section."

Gajendragadkar, J. speaking for the Court in Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1959 SC 609, observed in paragraph 14 of the judgment;--

"It is argued that, in dealing with this point, it would not be permissible to invoke the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act because the said section deals with the effect of repeal of permanent statutes, This argument is well founded......"

14-A. It, therefore, appears that it admits of no doubt in the case of a temporary statute the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act are not applicable as this section does not deal with the repeal of temporary statutes, and deals only with permanent statutes. It is in the light of these observations of the Supreme Court that we have to consider the various authorities which have been cited by the learned Advocate General. It may be noticed at the very beginning that none of the authorities cited by the learned Advocate General deals with the contingency with which we are faced in the present case.

"From the above it must be clear that-where the repealed Act is a permanent Act, the effect of Section 8 of the Bengal General Clauses Act is to restore it for the purposes specified, as such Act, unless the repealing Act shows a contrary intention; and upon such restoration of the Act the rights and, liabilities accrue and incurred under it before the appeal, can be enforced and proceedings in regard to them can be commenced or continued to completion at or up to any time unless forbidden by the law of limitation or otherwise, the restored Act being a permanent one. But where the repealed Act is a temporary Act, it is restored only as an Act due to expire on the date originally specified. There can be no other effect of deeming the repealing Act as not passed. Upto the original date of its expiry, rights and liabilities accrued and incurred under the Act before its repeal can be enforced and proceedings in regard to them under the Act can be instituted or continued by virtue of Section 8, because by virtue of that section, the Act will remain in force up to that date for the purposes of such rights, liabilities and proceedings. But once that date has passed. Section 8 will have spent itself. The temporary Act will then have expired under its own terms and the position in regard to rights and liabilities accrued and incurred under it before its repeal and in regard to proceedings under the Act respecting them, whether pending or intended, will then be as in the case of an expired temporary statute. Whether or not such rights and liabilities can still be claimed and enforced and whether proceedings under the Act in regard to them can still be instituted or continued, will depend on the general incidents of temporary statutes and the construction of the particular Act."