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13. that takes us to the main point on which the suit Has dismissed. This suit was dismissed following the judgment in Apaji Narhar v. Ramchandra Ravjl, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB). A Full Bench of the Bombay Higb Court consisting of Sir Charles Sargent, C. J. and Justices Bayley, Telang and Candy (Telang J. dissenting) there held that under Hindu Law applicable to the Satara District (in the then Presidency of Bombay) a son could not in the life-time of his father sue his father and uncles for a partition of the immovable family property and for possession of his share therein, the father not assenting thereto, it is common ground before us that there was no assent of the father of the plaintiff on record given before the institution of this suit. Mr. Patel's contention was that following Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB) this suit was rightly dismissed. The learned Judge Interpreted the plaint in this suit as a suit not for partition of tee immovable properties by metes and bounds simpliciter but as a suit for severance of the joint family. He held that it was a suit for general partition of the joint family property and accordingly Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29(FB) directly applied. He accordingly held that there being no assent given by the father the plaintiff, in the absence of such assent, was not entitled to sue his father and the others during the life-time of his father when his father was joint with his own father and brothers, in the view that he took of the matter of the interpretation of the plaint, he felt himself bound by the judgment in Apaji's case ILR 16 Bom 29 (F8) and accordingly dismissed the suit In our view, the suit not being a suit for general partition, that is, a suit for the severance of the joint family status and for possession, the ratio decidendi in Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB), could not and does not apply and the suit is maintainable.

15. There is no doubt that the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Apaji's case, ILR 18 Bom 29 (FB) is binding on us. The question that arises for determination is that, in deciding Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB) did the learned Judges also decide the question regarding the maintainability of a suit for partition by metes and bounds by a son without the assent of his father? In Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 FB) the suit was by a son against his father and uncial, defendants Nos. 1 and 3 being uncles and defendant No. 2 being the father of the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that he and the defendants were members of an undivided Hindu family and he claimed partition of the family property and possession of his share. He alleged that his father Defendant No. 2) was a man of weak intellect and that his uncles (defendants Nos. 1 and 3) ill-treated the plaintiff and had turned him out of the family house. The uncles (defendants Nos. 1 and 3) filed a written statement contending that the plaintiffs father had relinquished his rights In the ancestral properties in their favour by a release in the year 1863 and that, therefore, the plaintiff had no claim to a share. The learned subordinate Judge passed a decree for the plaintiff which was confirmed by the District Court. The matter came up in appeal before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court and the Court referred the following question for determination to a Full Bench :-

"Under Hindu law applicable to this Presidency, (the Satara District in this case), can a son in the lifetimes of his father sue his father and uncles for a partition of the Immovable ancestral family property and for possession of his share therein, the father not assenting thereto?"

The matter came up before the Full Bench consisting of the above mentioned Judges. Sargent C. J. and Bayley and Candy JJ. answered this question in the negative. In the course of the judgment the learned justice relied on certain original Sanskrit texts and in their view, on a correct interpretation of these texts, a son had no general right of partition without the assent of his father. Telang J, delivered a dissenting judgment from the majority view and also considering the various texts In the Mitakshara and other texts. It may be mentioned in passing that the lone dissenting voice of Telang J. in Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB), found an echo in the Judgments of various other High Courts in this country, but as far as the High Court of Bombay was concerned, the view taken by the majority of the Full Bench in Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB), held the field and was followed In subsequent cases. The law, therefore, laid down by the majority in Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB) is the law which is binding on us. We will, therefore, proceed to find out what is precisely laid down by Sargent c, J. and Baley and Candy, JJ., in Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB).

24. Then Mr. Patel tried to reinforce this very argument in regard to the extension of the principle in Apaji's case, ILR 16 Born 29 (FB), in a different way. He stated that apart from authority, the suits which were, according to him, loosely characterised as suits for partition were suits for division of property. His argument turned this way : A severance was merely an expression of intention to over and that being so, the principle in Apaji's case should be extended because whether it: is a suit for severance or whether it is a suit for partition by metes and bounds, the question relates to the division of ancestral property. In the first place, having regard to the consensus of opinion between the Courts other than the Bombay High Court on what is laid down in Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB), we do not think that the principle laid down in Apaji's case, ILR 16 Born 29 (F8), should be extended to a suit for partition by metes and bounds - simpliciter. For a long time since Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB), all the other High Courts have taken a different view on the subject. There is a strong and a learned judgment of-dissent delivered by Telang, J. in Apaji's case, ILR 16-Bom 29 (FB), itself. In these circumstances, we do not think that we should accede to Mr. Patel's argument that the principle in Apaji's case, ILR 16 Bom 29 (FB), should be extended. Second, the real reason why an assent was thought necessary in a suit for severance of status was. that the son should not be allowed to disturb the whole family status. When the father is joint with his own father and his collaterals it was thought that It would be undesirable to allow the son to disturb the whole family by effecting a severance thereof without the as sent of his father. This is also reflected in the judgment of Sargent, C. J. at page 36 where he says, "indeed it is plain that If the son could assert such right against the will of his father, the segregation might lead to grave practical difficulties."