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1. Initially in 1979 the tenancy was created under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'DRC Act') by the mother of the petitioner in favour of respondent No.2-Skipper Sales Private Limited for a period of two years. In 1995 a petition for eviction was filed by the petitioner under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act against respondent No. 2, Skipper Sales Private Limited, and an eviction order was passed on 10.11.1995. When that order was to be executed, Sardar Tejwant Singh filed objections claiming that in 1986 the tenancy had been transferred by Skipper Sales Private Limited in favour of Skipper Towers Private Limited, respondent No.1. Thereafter amended objections were filed. Additional Rent Controller, being the executing Court, dismissed the objections vide its order dated 30.7.1997.

3. Mr. G.L. Rawal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1-Skipper Towers Private Limited, has argued that rent was paid by Skipper Towers Private Limited for almost ten years and he contended that initially Skipper Sales Private Limited was taken as a tenant in suit property when two families headed by Dr.Inderjit Singh and Professor Harbans Singh floated various companies carrying on various businesses in the name of Skipper Sales Private Limited, Skipper Towers Private Limited, Skipper Construction Private Limited, Skipper Builders Private Limited and Anand Construction Private Limited. Mr.Rawal has contended that rent was paid by Skipper Towers Private Limited through cheques which were deposited in the account of the petitioner and from the conduct of the petitioner, who was otherwise meeting the respondent No.1, it can be implied that petitioner has impliedly accepted respondent No.1 as a tenant. In support of his ontentions, Mr.Rawal has cited the cases of Sri Krishnapur Mutt, Udipi & anr. Vs. P. Gopalakrishnayya & others AIR 1967 Mysore 65 and Jagannath Vs. District Judge Mathura & ors. , in which it is held:-

4. It was contended that in the year 1986 a bifurcation took place in the said families and respondent No.1-Skipper Sales Private Limited, the tenant, fell in the hands of the family of Dr.Inderjit Singh and remaining companies fell in the hands of the family of Professor Harbans Singh and it was also agreed between them that the tenancy rights of the premises in question shall vest with Skipper Towers Private Limited. It was further argued by Mr. Rawal that it was with the consent of the decree holder, who was accepting the rent for so many years, that Skipper Towers Private Limited were taken as a tenant after 1987 onwards. It was also contended that in a mala fide manner original tenant, Skipper Sales Private Limited, did not file leave to defend application within the statutory period of 15 days and, therefore, order of eviction was passed against Skipper Sales Private Limited on 10.12.1995. It was further contended that, as a matter of fact, in the year 1986-87 when the bifurcation within two groups took place, it was a case of surrender of tenancy by Skipper Sales Private Limited and acceptance of tenancy by petitioner. He has further contended that the decree holder in the eviction petition himself has joined the present respondent No.2, Skipper Towers Private Limited, as respondent No.6 apart from other respondents, so that in the event of its claiming themselves as a tenant, its claim, if any, put forth for final adjudication may be noticed at the stage of disposal of the eviction petition instead of waiting for execution and response by it. Mr.Rawal has contended that in spite of making Skipper Towers Private Limited and others as respondents the decree holder chose to drop all the respondents after the main respondent No.1-tenant, Skipper Sales Private Limited, failed to file the application for leave to defend within the statutory period of 15 days and, therefore, the whole exercise was a mala fide exercise in order to obtain possession from respondent No.1. In support of his contentions, Mr.Rawal has relied upon Smt. Vidyawanti Vs.Tokan Dass 1974 RLR 23:-

11. In view of the fact that the respondent No.1 itself has admitted that initially the property was let out to Skipper Sales Private Limited under Section 21 of the DRC Act, how in the absence of any written instrument it can be construed that mere acceptance of rent by the landlord would create relationship between respondent No.1 and petitioner of a landlord and a tenant? In view of the specific mandate of Section 14(1)b) of the DRC Act in the absence of any written consent, respondent cannot claim any independent right in the tenancy of Skipper Sales Private Limited. There is no estoppel against a statute. It does not sound to reason that it was agreed that the tenancy rights of Skipper Sales Private Limited shall vest in the hands of Skipper Towers Private Limited in the absence of any date, resolution of any of the companies and consent of the respondent. In view of the vertical split between two groups, Skipper Sales Private Limited was on one side and remaining companies were on the other, how the tenancy rights in respect of premises let out to Skipper Sales Private Limited could vest with Skipper Towers Private Limited which, according to the case of the respondent itself, was a different group. No resolution of the Board of Directors of any of the companies was brought on record by the respondent No.1 before the Additional Rent Controller. Nothing has been brought on record to show that there was any written consent for such assumption as has been pleaded by the respondent. Not even specific date has been given by the respondent with regard to alleged assignment. In spite of all these facts, the order of the Rent Control Tribunal virtually has resulted in patent illegality in law by remanding the case back to the Additional Rent Controller by mis-applying the ratio of Kailash Chand Vs. Hemvati etc.'s case (supra). In Smt. Vidyawanti Vs. Token Dass's case (supra) the Court came to the conclusion in view of the fact that Pishori Lal, riginal tenant in that case, died leaving his widow Smt.Vidyawanti and the Court held that a person who claims to be a tenant of the landlord and does not claim through the person against whom the order of eviction has been passed, is a person having an independent title to the premises as provided within the meaning of proviso of Section 25 of the Act.