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Showing contexts for: character and antecedent verification in Rai Sahab vs State (Personnel) & Anr on 27 April, 2013Matching Fragments
The writ petition is contested by the respondents and reply to Show Cause Notice was submitted. While stoutly defending the impugned communication, the respondents have urged in the reply that acquittal of the petitioner for the offences under Section 323, 341 and 34 IPC was by way of compromise which means that the petitioner has admitted his guilt and as such the same cannot be construed as "honourable acquittal". Laying stress on the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Administration Vs. Sushil Kumar [(1996) 11 SCC 605], the respondents have submitted in the reply that verification of character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to the post under the State. In the return, the respondents have also referred to the judgment of Apex Court in case of R. Radhakrishnan Vs. Director General of Police [(2008) 1 SCC 660). As per the version of the respondents in the reply, the petitioner was denied appointment for the reason that he was involved in the act of violence and his acquittal was by way of compromise and it was not an honourable acquittal. Joining the issue with the petitioner on construction of Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989, the respondents have averred in the reply that the petitioner has misconstrued Rule 13 of the Rules of 1989. Emphasizing the memorandum dated 29th of April 1995 issued by the Director General of Police, the respondents have submitted in the reply that any candidate involved in violence is not eligible for appointment in the disciplined forces.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and scanned the materials on record.
Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ramandeep Singh Kharlia, has argued that the petitioner has not concealed any material information from the respondents and therefore his minor indiscretion ought to have been overlooked by the respondents before issuing the impugned communication. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that acquittal of the petitioner for the offences under Section 323, 341 and 34 IPC, may be by way of compromise, cannot be construed as an embargo for his appointment to the post of Constable in the given circumstances. The learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. Kharlia has further contended that having adjudged the suitability of the petitioner for the post, now it is not expected from the respondents to deny him appointment on the technical ground of so called character and antecedents verification, more particularly when the petitioner has been exonerated from the charges by a competent criminal court. Assailing the action of the respondents, the learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that the petitioner was not involved in any offence involving moral turpitude and after his acquittal, may it be by way of compromise, the insistence of honourable acquittal is per-se fallacious and therefore the impugned communication cannot be sustained. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also questioned the impugned communication by arguing that it is a glaring example of outcome of mechanical exercise of power and non- application of mind and consequently the same cannot be sustained. To substantiate his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the following judgments:
Per contra, learned Addl. Government Counsel Mr. I.S. Pareek has vehemently argued that there is no infirmity much less legal infirmity in the impugned communication. The learned counsel for the respondents would urge that while issuing the impugned communication, the competent authority has considered all the pros and cons and applied its mind in the light of rigor of memorandum dated 29th of April 1995 and therefore no interference with the impugned communication is warranted. The learned Addl. Govt. Counsel has contended that the petitioner was involved in the act of violence and offences involving moral turpitude, therefore, he was not eligible for appointment in police force. Mr. Pareek with full vehemence at his command has urged that acquittal of the petitioner as a consequence of compromise between the rival parties amounts to admission of guilt and the same cannot be construed as honourable acquittal within the four corners of memorandum dated 29th of April 1995. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, the competent authority has rightly pressed into service the intent of memorandum dated 29th of April 1995 while issuing the impugned communication and the same cannot be faulted in any manner whatsoever. The learned Addl. Government Counsel has contended that verification of character and antecedents of an incumbent, who is aspirant for recruitment in disciplined force, cannot be liberally construed so as to render it an empty formality. According to learned counsel for the respondents, a member of disciplined force is entrusted the duties of maintaining law and order and therefore in the matter of verification of his character and other antecedents no latitude is permissible and for achieving the said objective the memorandum dated 25th of April 1995 has been issued by the Director General of Police. The learned Addl. Government Counsel, in support of his contentions, has placed reliance on the following judgments:
3. This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi made on 6-9-1995 in OA No.1756 of 1991. The admitted position is that the respondent appeared for recruitment as a Constable in Delhi Police Services in the year 1989-90 with Roll No.65790. Though he was found physically fit through endurance test, written test and interview and was selected provisionally, his selection was subject to verification of character and antecedents by the local police. On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such that his appointment to the post of Constable was not found desirable. Accordingly, his name was rejected. Aggrieved by proceedings dated 18.12.1990 culminating in cancellation of his provisional selection, he filed OA in the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal in the impugned order allowed the application on the ground that since the respondent had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 304 IPC, under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of appointment to the post under the State. The question is whether the view taken by the Tribunal is correct in law? It is seen that verification of the character and antecedent is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though he was found physically fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected, on account of his antecedent record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable to the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Tribunal, therefore, was wholly unjustified in giving the direction for reconsideration of his case. Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service and not the actual result thereof. If the actual result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate. Appointing authority, therefore, has rightly focused this aspect and found it not desirable to appoint him to the service.