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(iii). Whether the present criminal proceedings have been engineered as a counterblast to wreak vengeance on account of business rivalry and therefore, the same are not only illegal and malicious but also an abuse of the process of Court?

(iv). Whether as per allegations made in the FIR, the offence under Section 384 IPC is made out against charge sheeted accused including applicant?

(v). Whether in the absence of any detail regarding the exact documents, which were entrusted to the applicant, the offence under Section 406 IPC can be said to be made out against applicant?

61. In order to find out whether the allegations made in the FIR make out an offence under Section 384 IPC, it is necessary to reproduce Sections 383 and 384 IPC as extortion is defined in Section 383 IPC. The same read as under:-

"Section 383 IPC- Extortion :-

Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, or valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits "extortion".

384. Punishment for extortion.--Whoever commits extortion shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

62. The scope of Section 384 IPC has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of R.S. Nayak Vs. A.R. Antulay and Another, (1986) 2 SCC 716, wherein following has been observed by the Bench in paragraph 60 of the report;-

"60. "Extortion" is thus defined in Section 383 IPC: ....... Before a person can be said to put any person to fear of any injury to that person, it must appear that he has held out some threat to do or omit to do what he is legally bound to do in future. If all that a man does is to promise to do a thing which he is not legally bound to do and says that if money is not paid to him he would not do that thing, such act would not amount to an offence of extortion. We agree with this view which has been indicated in Habibul Razak v. King Emperor, A.I.R. 1924 All 197. There is no evidence at all in this case that the managements of the sugar co- operatives had been put in any fear and the contributions had been paid in response to threats. Merely because the respondent was Chief Minister at the relevant time and the sugar co-operatives had some of their grievances pending consideration before the Government and pressure was brought about to make the donations promising consideration of such grievances, possibly by way of reciprocity, we do not think the appellant is justified in his contention that the ingredients of the offence of extortion have been made out. The evidence led by the prosecution falls short of the requirements of law in regard to the alleged offence of extortion. We see, therefore, no justification in the claim of Mr. Jethmalani that a charge for the offence of extortion should have been framed.

71. In view of the discussions made above, it is apparent that the submissions urged by the learned Senior counsel for applicant in support of present application are clearly borne out from the record. This Court, therefore, has no hesitation to conclude that the FIR giving rise to the present criminal proceedings is highly delayed for which, no reasonable explanation has come forward. The FIR even if not the encyclopedia of the prosecution case yet discloses the basic prosecution case. However, from perusal of the FIR, it is apparent that except for a bundle of facts, nothing substantial has been stated in the FIR. The allegations made in the FIR are neither pin pointed allegations, nor the same are definite and specific in character. All the allegations made in the FIR are devoid of material particulars inasmuch as the date of theft, the date on which, extortion was committed have not been mentioned. As such, the FIR clearly goes to show that vague and omnibus allegations have been made in the FIR. The FiR is, therefore, a bundle of facts. It is an undisputed fact that applicant was previously an employee of the informant company but he resigned from the same on 15.07.2021. Applicant subsequently formed his own company in the name and style of CAREBLEND FACILITY MANAGEMENT PRIVATE LIMITED. The maintenance contract, which was previously awarded to the informant company and was up till 21.01.2023, was subsequently awarded to the company of applicant i.e. on 19.01.2023. It is on account of above that the present criminal proceedings were engineered on account of business rivalry. The resolution dated 01.02.2023 was passed thereafter by the informant company to file criminal complaint against applicant. Thus the present criminal proceedings have been initiated only to wreak vengeance. Furthermore, as per the allegations made in the body of FIR, no offence under Section 384 IPC is made out against applicant and others, as there is nothing to show transfer of valuable security. In the absence of specific details of goods, which were entrusted to the applicant and other accused, no offence under Section 406 IPC can be said to be made out agaisnt applicant, in the FIR simply bald allegations have been made. The same are devoid of the details of documents entrusted to applicant and other accused nor the date on which, the alleged entrustment was made has been mentioned. While in the FIR, various documents have been mentioned, which are alleged to have been entrusted to the applicant and other accused, however, in the resolution dated 15.12.2022, it has been alleged that sensitive data of the company has been stolen. No details of the alleged sensitive data has come on record. As such, the first informant/prosecution is itself not very clear about the prosecution story, which it set out to prove against accused including applicant. As per the statements of the witnesses examined under Section 161 Cr.P.C., who have also been nominated as prosecution witnesses, no criminal conspiracy can be conclusively inferred against applicant and other accused.