Karnataka High Court
Sri S H Ningaiah vs Smt H Anuradha on 1 October, 2024
1
R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 1ST DAY OF OCTOBER, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
RFA NO. 969 OF 2014 (DEC/INJ)
C/W
RFA NO. 912 OF 2015 (DEC/INJ)
RFA NO. 342 OF 2022 (DEC/INJ)
RFA NO. 343 OF 2022 (DEC/INJ)
RFA CROB. NO. 21 OF 2024 (DEC/POS)
IN RFA NO. 969/2014
BETWEEN:
1. SRI JAYARAMA
S/O DODDATHAMMANNA
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
R/AT NO.17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA,
11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK,
RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
SINCE DEAD BY LRS
1(A) SMT. RUKMINI
W/O LATE JAYARAMA
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS
1(B) SMT. SHASHIKALA
D/O LATE JAYARAMA
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
1(C) SRI. RAMAMURTHY
S/O LATE JAYARAMA
AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS
2
1(D) SRI. RAMACHANDRA
S/O LATE JAYARAMA
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
1(E) SRI. RAMGOPAL
S/O LATE JAYARAMA
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
1(F) SRI. SUNIL
S/O LATE JAYARAMA
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
R/AT NO.17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA,
11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
2. SRI. DODDABAYANNA
S/O LATE DODDATHAMMANNA
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/ NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA,
11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
3. SRI. CHIKKABAYANNA
S/O LATE DODDATHAMANNA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
R/NO.17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA,
11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. T.M. VENKATA REDDY, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT. MUNIRATHNAMMA
W/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 90 YEARS
3
R/A NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY
BANGALORE-560 050.
2. SMT. H. SHAKUNTHALA
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
3. SMT. H. ANURADHA
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
4. SRI. H. SATHISH
S/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
5. SMT. H. LAKSHMI
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
6. SRI. B.S. NARAYANA SHETTY
S/O LATE S.P. SUBBARAYA SHETTY
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS
7. SRI. B.N. SUBRAMANI
S/O B.S. NARAYANA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 2 TO 7 ARE
R/AT NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY
BANGALORE-560 050.
8. SRI. SHRISHA R.BHATTA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
S/O LATE VADIRAMANANDA BHATTA
R/AT HESARAGHATTA ROAD,
DASARAHALLI,
BANGALORE-560 057.
4
9. SRI. CHIKKA SIDDARAMAIAH
S/O DODDARAMAIAH
AGED: MAJOR
R/AT ANDRAHALLI,
YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI,
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK.
10 . SRI. PYGA DODDA MUNISWAMY
AGED: MAJOR
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI,
1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
11 . SRI. K.M. KRISHNAPPA
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
12 . SRI. MADHU
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
13 . SRI. MURALI
S/O LATE MUTHANNA
AGED MAJOR
RESPONDENTS NO. 10 TO 12 ARE
R/AT NO.77/1112, 13TH CROSS
1ST K BLOCK, KETHAMARANAHALLI
RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
14 . SRI.T.G. NARAYANA SWAMY
S/O GANGANNA
AGED MAJOR
R/AT THEERTHAPURA VILLAGE,
YESHWATHAPURA HOBLI,
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK.
5
15 . SRI. RAJENDRA
S/O LATE GOVINDARAJU
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
R/A NO.399, 5TH MAIN ROAD,
BEHIND VENKATESHWARA SANITARY WARE,
KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, MARIYAPPANA PALYA,
BANGALORE-560 021.
16 . SRI. SRINIVASA
S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS
17 . SRI. RAMAKRISHNA
S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 16 AND 17 ARE
R/AT MARIYAPPANA PALYA,
KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET,
BENGALURU-560 021.
18 . SRI. SADASIVAIAH
S/O PARNNA
AGED MAJOR
R/A KARIVOBANAHALLI, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK.
19 . SRI. T. RAMEGOWDA
S/O DASE GOWDA
AGED MAJOR
R/A SHIVAPURA VILLAGE, PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA,
YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI, BENGALURU NORTH TALUK,
BENGALURU-560 058.
20 . SRI. KANNIKAMBA
W/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS
6
21 . SRI. KRISHNA MURTHY
S/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 20 AND 21 ARE
R/AT NO.18, KIRSHAN KRUPA,
SHOE LAND BUILDING,
1ST FLOOR, NEAR SHIVA TEMPLE,
RAJAGOPAL NAGAR MAIN ROAD,
PEENYA 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU-560 058.
22 . SRI. MUNISWAMAIAH
S/O GARUDAPPA
AGE MAJOR
R/AT T. DASARAHALLI, BANGALORE-560 057.
23 . SRI. CHIKKAMUNISHAMA BOVI
S/O DODAMUNISWAMY BOVI
AGE MAJOR
R/O SUDDAGUNTEPALYA, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK.
24 . SRI. K.N. LAKSHMAMMA
W/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
25 . SRI. K.L. BABU
S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
26 . SRI. K.L. SATISH
S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 24 TO 26 ARE
R/AT NO.59, 10TH A CROSS,
WEST OF CHORD ROAD, 2ND STAGE,
MAHALAKSHMIPURAM, BANGALORE-560 086.
7
27 . SRI. K.N. VENKATESH
S/O NANJAPPA
AGED MAJOR
28 . SRI. K N CHOWDAPPA
S/O NANJAPPA
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 27 AND 28 ARE
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI,
1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.
29 . SRI. R.VENUGOPALA REDDY
S/O LATE N.RAMALINGA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS
R/A NO.181, LINK ROAD, MALLESWARAM,
BENGALURU-560 003.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. G.S. KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. D.P. MAHESH, SRI. HARISHITH .B.S AND
SRI. KIRAN, ADVOCATES FOR R1, R3 TO R7;
SRI. RAVI .H.K, ADVOCATE FOR R17;
SRI. SRINIVASA, ADVOCATE FOR R19;
R11, R12, R13, R15, R26 AND R27 ARE SERVED;
V/O/D 24.07.2023 APPEAL AGAINST R8, R10, R14, R20 TO
R25, R28 AND R29 ARE DISMISSED;
V/O/D 24.07.2023 APPEAL AGAINST R2, R9, R16 AND R18
STANDS ABATED)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 R/W.ORDER XLI
RULE 1 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
8.4.2014 PASSED IN O.S.NO.6045/1989 ON THE FILE OF THE
VIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BANGALORE DECREEING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND
PERMANENT INJUNCTION.
8
IN RFA NO. 912/2015
BETWEEN:
1 . SHRI. C RAMAKRISHNA
S/O CHINNAPPA MUDAILIAR
@ ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS
R/A. Q-10, MARIAPPANAPALYA,
KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, SRIRAMAPURA POST
BANGALORE-560 021.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. RAVI H.K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT. MUNIRATHNAMMA
W/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 90 YEARS
R/A NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY
BANGALORE-560 050.
2. SMT. H. SHAKUNTHALA
D/O HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
3. SMT. H. ANURADHA
D/O HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
4. SRI. H. SATHISH
S/O HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
5. SMT. H. LAKSHMI
D/O HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS
9
6. SRI. B.S. NARAYANA SHETTY
S/O LATE S.P. SUBBARAYA SHETTY
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS
7. SRI. B.N. SUBRAMANI
S/O B.S. NARAYANA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 2 TO 7 ARE
R/AT NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY
BANGALORE-560 050.
8. SRI. SHRISHA R.BHATTA
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
S/O LATE VADIRAMANANDA BHATTA
R/AT HESARAGHATTA ROAD, DASARAHALLI,
BANGALORE-560 057.
9. SRI. CHIKKA SIDDARAMAIAH
S/O DODDARAMAIAH
AGED: MAJOR
R/AT ANDRAHALLI, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI,
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK.
10 . SRI. PYGA DODDA MUNISWAMY
AGED: MAJOR
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI,
1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.
11 . SRI. K.M. KRISHNAPPA
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
12 . SRI. MADHU
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
10
13 . SRI. MURALI
S/O LATE MUTHANNA
AGED MAJOR
RESPONDENTS NO. 10 TO 12 ARE
R/AT NO.77/112, 13TH CROSS
1ST K BLOCK, KETHAMARANAHALLI
RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.
14 . SHRI. T. JAYARAM
S/O LATE DODDA THAMMANNA
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
R/AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA
11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK
RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.
15 . SHRI DODDABAYANNA
S/O DODDATHAMMANA
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA
11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR
BANGALORE-560 010.
16 . SHRI. CHIKKABAYANNA
S/O DODDATHAMMANA
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMI NILAYA
11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR
BANGALORE-560 010.
17 . SRI.T.G. NARAYANA SWAMY
S/O GANGANNA
AGED MAJOR
R/AT THEERTHAPURA VILLAGE,
YESHWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK.
18 . SRI. RAJENDRA
S/O LATE GOVINDARAJU
11
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
R/A NO.399, 5TH MAIN ROAD,
BEHIND VENKATESHWARA SANITARY WARE,
KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET, MARIYAPPANA PALYA,
BANGALORE-560 021.
19 . SRI. SRINIVASA
S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS
R/AT MARIAPPANAPALYA, KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET,
BENGALURU-560 021.
20 . SRI. SADASIVAIAH
S/O PARNNA
AGED MAJOR
R/A KARIVOBANAHALLI, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK.
21 . SRI. T. RAMEGOWDA
S/O DASE GOWDA
AGED MAJOR
R/A KARIVOBANAHALLI, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK,
BENGALURU-560 058.
22 . SRI. KANNIKAMBA
W/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS
23 . SRI. KRISHNA MURTHY
S/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 20 AND 21 ARE
R/AT NO.18, KIRSHAN KRUPA,
SHOE LAND BUILDING, 1ST FLOOR,
NEAR SHIVA TEMPLE, RAJAGOPAL NAGAR MAIN ROAD,
PEENYA 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU-560 058.
12
24 . SRI. MUNISWAMAIAH
S/O GARUDAPPA
AGE MAJOR
R/AT T. DASARAHALLI,
BANGALORE-560 057.
25 . SRI. CHIKKAMUNISHAMA BOVI
S/O DODAMUNISWAMY BOVI
AGE MAJOR
R/O SUDDAGUNTEPALYA, YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK.
26 . SRI. K.N. LAKSHMAMMA
W/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
27 . SRI. K.L. BABU
S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
28 . SRI. K.L. SATISH
S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 26 TO 28 ALL ARE
R/AT NO.59, 10TH A CROSS,
WEST OF CHORD ROAD, 2ND STAGE,
MAHALAKSHMIPURAM, BANGALORE-560 086.
29 . SRI. K.N. VENKATESH
S/O NANJAPPA
AGED MAJOR
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI,
1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
30 . SRI. K N CHOWDAPPA
S/O NANJAPPA
13
AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI,
1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
31 . SRI. R.VENUGOPALA REDDY
S/O LATE N.RAMALINGA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 82 YEARS
R/A NO.181, LINK ROAD,
MALLESWARAM,
BENGALURU-560 003.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. G.S. KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. D.P. MAHESH, SRI. HARISHITH .B.S AND
SRI. KIRAN, ADVOCATES FOR R3, R4, R5 AND R7;
SRI. T.M. VENKATA REDDY, ADVOCATE FOR R14 TO R16;
SRI. PRADEEP .J.S, ADVOCATE FOR R18;
SRI. SRINIVASA, ADVOCATE FOR R21;
SRI. T.N. VISHWANATHA, ADVOCATE FOR R24;
V/O DATED 08.09.2016 NOTICE TO R11 HELD SUFFICIENT;
R29 IS SERVED;
V/O DATED 19.10.2016 NOTICE TO R1, R2, R6, R8, R9,
R10, R12, R13, R17, R19, R20, R22, R23, R25, R26, R27,
R28, R30, R31 ARE HELD SUFFICIENT)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 R/W.ORDER 41
RULE 1 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
8.4.2014 PASSED IN O.S.NO.6045/1989 ON THE FILE OF THE
VIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BANGALORE DECREEING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND
PERMANENT INJUNCTION.
IN RFA NO. 342/2022
BETWEEN:
1 . SRI. RAJENDRA G
S/O LATE C GOVINDARAJU
14
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
R/AT NO.399, 5TH MAIN ROAD
BEHIND VENKATESWARA SANITARY
KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET
SRIRAMPUARA, MARIYAPPANA PALYA
BENGALURU-560 021
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. PRADEEP .J.S, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT. MUNIRATNAMMA
W/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 96 YEARS
R/A NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY
BANGALORE-560 050.
2. SMT. H. SHAKUNATALA
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
3. SMT. H. ANURADHA
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 28 YEARS
4. SRI. H. SATISH
S/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT YEARS
5. SMT. H. LAKSHMI
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT YEARS
6. SRI. B.S. NARAYANA SEETY
S/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT YEARS
15
7. SRI. B.N. SUBRMANI
S/O B.S. NARAYANA SETTY
AGED ABOUT YEARS
APPELLANTS NO. 2 TO 5 ARE ALSO
LRS OF DECEASED PLAINTIFF NO.1
ALL ARE R/AT NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY
BANGALORE-560 050.
8. SRI. SHRISHA R.BHATTA
AGED ABOUT YEARS
S/O LATE VADIRAMANDA BHATTA
R/AT HESARAGHATTA ROAD, DASARAHALLI,
BANGALORE-560 057.
9. SRI. CHIKKA SIDDARAMAIH
S/O DODDARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT YEARS
R/AT ANDRAHALLI, YESHWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK
BENGALURU 560091.
10 . SRI. PAYA DODDA MUNISWAMY
AGED: MAJOR
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1ST BLOCK,
RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.
11 . SRI. K.M. KRISHNAPPA
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS
12 . SRI. MADHU
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 11 TO 12 ARE
R/AT NO.77/1112, 13TH CROSS
1ST K BLOCK, KETHAMARANAHALLI
16
RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
13 . SRI. MURALI
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
14 . SHRI. JAYARAMA
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
15 . SHRI DODDABYANNA
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
16 . SHRI. CHIKKABYARANNA
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
R13 TO 15 ARE ALL
R/AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMINILAYA
11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR
BANGALORE-560 011.
17 . SRI.T.G. NARAYANASWAMY
S/O GANGANNA
AGED MAJOR
R/AT THEERATHAPURA VILLAGE,
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK
BANGALORE - 560 022.
18 . SRI. SRINIVASA
S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 85 YEARS
R/AT MARIYAPPANAPALYA,
KALMMA TEMPLE STREET, BENGALURU-560 021.
19 . SRI. RAMAKRISHNA
S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS
17
R/AT Q-10, MARIYAPPANAPLAYA
SRIRAMPURA POST, KALMMA TEMPLE STREET
BENGALURU-560 021.
20 . SRI. SADASHIVAIAH
S/O PARNNA
AGED MAJOR
R/A KARIVOBANAHALLI,
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU-560 058.
21 . SRI. T. RAMEGOWDA
S/O DASE GOWDA
AGED MAJOR
R/AT SHIVAPURA VILLAGE
PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA
YESWANTAPURA HOBLI
BENGALURU NORHT TALUK
BENGALURU-560 058.
22 . SRI. KANNIKAMBA
W/O LATE VENAKTARAMAIH
AGED ABOUT 86 YEARS
23 . SRI. KRISHNAMURTHY
S/O LATE VENAKATARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 22 AND 23 ARE
R/AT NO.18, KIRSHAN KRUPA,
SHOE LAND BUILDING,
1ST FLOOR, NEAR SHIVA TEMPLE,
RAJGOPALNAGAR MAIN ROAD,
PEENYA 2ND STAGE,
BENGALURU-560 058.
24 . SRI. MUNISWAMAIAH
S/O GARUDAPPA
18
AGE MAJOR
R/AT T. DASARAHALLI,
BANGALORE-560 057.
25 . SRI. CHIKKAMUNISHAMA BOVI
S/O DODDAMUNISWAMYA BOVI
AGE MAJOR
R/O SUDDAGUNATEPALYA VILLAGE
YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU-560 022.
26 . SMT. LAKSHMMA
W/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
27 . SRI. K.L. BABU
S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
28 . SRI. K.L. SATISH
S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 26 TO 28 ARE
R/AT NO.59, 10TH A CROSS,
WEST OF CHORD ROAD, 2ND STAGE,
MAHALAKSHMIPURAM,
BANGALORE-560 086.
29 . SRI. K.N. VENKATESH
S/O NANJAPPA
AGED MAJOR
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI, 1ST BLOCK,
RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.
30 . SRI. K N CHODAPPA
S/O NANJAPPA
AGED MAJOR
19
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI,
1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
31 . SRI. R.VENUGOPLA REDDY
S/O LATE N.RAMALINGA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
R/A NO.181, LINK ROAD,
MALLESWARAM,
BENGALURU-560 003.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. G.S. KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. D.P. MAHESH, SRI. HARISHITH .B.S AND
SRI. KIRAN, ADVOCATES FOR R3, R4, R5 AND R7;
SRI. RAVI .H.K, ADVOCATE FOR R19;
V/O/D 3.08.2022 NOTICE TO R8 TO R11 ARE
DISPENSED WITH;
V/O/D 09.09.2022 R3 TO R5 ARE LRS OF DECEASED R1-R2,
R7 IS LR OF DECEASED R6;
V/O/D 27.09.2024 NOTICE TO R12 TO R18 AND R20 TO R31
ARE DISPENSED WITH)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 R/W.ORDER 41
RULE 1 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
8.4.2014 PASSED IN O.S.NO.6045/1989 ON THE FILE OF THE
VIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BANGALORE DECREEING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND
INJUNCTION.
IN RFA NO. 343/2022
BETWEEN:
1 . SRI. D. RAMEGOWDA
AGED MAJOR
S/O LATE DASEGOWDA
RESIDING AT SHIVAPURA VILLAGE
20
PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI
BENGALURU-560 058.
PRESENTLY RESIDING AT
NO.25, AKSHAYA
GRUHALAKSHMI LAYOUT, 1ST STAGE
OPP SHAMBAVA MURTHY PARK
BASAVASHWARANAGARA
BENGALURU-560 079
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. PRADEEP .J.S, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT. H. MUNIRATNAMMA
W/O LATE SRI. HANUMANTHRAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 96 YEARS
R/A NO.214, MYSORE BANK COLONY
BANGALORE-560 050.
2. SMT. H. SHAKUNATALA
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
3. SMT. H. ANURADHA
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
4. SRI. H. SATISH
S/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
5. SMT. H. LAKSHMI
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
21
6. SRI. B.S. NARAYANA SEETY
S/O LATE S.P. SUBBARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS
7. SRI. B.N. SUBRMANI
S/O B.S. NARAYANA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
APPELLANTS NO. 2 TO 5 ARE ALSO
LRS OF DECEASED PLAINTIFF NO.1
ALL ARE R/AT NO.214,
MYSORE BANK COLONY
BANGALORE-560 050.
8. SRI. SHRISHA R.BHATTA
AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS
S/O LATE VADIRAMANDA BHATTA
R/AT HESARAGHATTA ROAD,
DASARAHALLI,
BANGALORE-560 057.
9. SRI. CHIKKA SIDDARAMAIH
S/O DODDARAMAIAH
AGED MAJOR
R/AT ANDRAHALLI,
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK
BENGALURU 560091.
10 . SRI. PYGA DODDA MUNISWAMY
AGED: MAJOR
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI,
1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
11 . SRI. K.M. KRISHNAPPA
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS
22
12 . SRI. MADHU
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
13 . SRI. MURALI
S/O LATE MUTTHANNA
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 11 TO 12 ARE
R/AT NO.77/1112, 13TH CROSS
1ST K BLOCK, KETHAMARANAHALLI
RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
14 . SHRI. JAYARAMA
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
15 . SHRI DODDABYANNA
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
16 . SHRI. CHIKKABYARANNA
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS
R13 TO 15 ARE ALL
R/AT NO. 17/1K, LAKSHMINILAYA
11TH CROSS, 1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR
BANGALORE-560 011.
17 . SRI.T.G. NARAYANASWAMY
S/O GANGANNA
AGED MAJOR
R/AT THEERATHAPURA VILLAGE,
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK
BANGALORE - 560 022.
18 . SRI. RAJENDRA .G
S/O LATE C. GOVINDARAJU
23
AGED ABOUT 59 YEARS
R/AT NO. 399, 5TH MAIN ROAD
BEHIND VENKATESWARA SANITARY
KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET
SRIRAMAPURA, MARIYAPPANA PLAYA
BENGALURU-560 021.
19 . SRI. SRINIVASA
S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 85 YEARS
R/AT MARIYAPPANAPALYA,
SRIRAMPURA
KALMMA TEMPLE STREET,
BENGALURU-560 021.
20 . SRI. RAMAKRISHNA
S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 76 YEARS
R/AT Q-10, MARIYAPPANAPLAYA
SRIRAMPURA POST,
KALMMA TEMPLE STREET
BENGALURU-560 021.
21 . SRI. SADASHIVAIAH
S/O PRANNA
AGED MAJOR
R/A KARIVOBANAHALLI,
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU-560 058.
22 . SRI. KANNIKAMBA
W/O LATE VENAKTARAMAIH
AGED ABOUT 86 YEARS
23 . SRI. KRISHNAMURTHY
S/O LATE VENAKATARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
24
RESPONDENTS NO. 22 AND 23 ARE
R/AT NO.18, KIRSHNA KRUPA,
SHOE LAND BUILDING,
1ST FLOOR, NEAR SHIVA TEMPLE,
RAJGOPALNAGAR MAIN ROAD,
PEENYA 2ND STAGE,
BENGALURU-560 058.
24 . SRI. MUNISWAMAIAH
S/O GARUDAPPA
AGE MAJOR
R/AT T. DASARAHALLI,
BANGALORE-560 057.
25 . SRI. CHIKKAMUNISHAMA BOVI
S/O DODDAMUNISWAMYA BOVI
AGE MAJOR
R/O SUDDAGUNATEPALYA VILLAGE
YESHWANTHPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU-560 022.
26 . SMT. LAKSHMMA
W/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
27 . SRI. K.L. BABU
S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
28 . SRI. K.L. SATISH
S/O LATE K.N. LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
RESPONDENTS NO. 26 TO 28 ARE
R/AT NO.59, 10TH A CROSS,
WEST OF CHORD ROAD, 2ND STAGE,
MAHALAKSHMIPURAM,
BANGALORE-560 086.
25
29 . SRI. K.N. VENKATESH
S/O NANJAPPA
AGED MAJOR
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI,
1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
30 . SRI. K N CHODAPPA
S/O NANJAPPA
AGED MAJOR
R/AT KETHAMARANAHALLI,
1ST BLOCK, RAJAJINAGAR,
BANGALORE-560 010.
31 . SRI. R.VENUGOPLA REDDY
S/O LATE N.RAMALINGA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS
R/A NO.181, LINK ROAD,
MALLESWARAM,
BENGALURU-560 003.
32. D.M. RAMAKRISHNA
S/O SRI MARIYANNA
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
R/AT DHUMMANAHALLI VILLAGE
VITTHALAPURA POST, MYSANDRA HOBLI
TURUVEKERE TALUK, TUMKUR DISTRICT.
33. B. GANESH AITHAL
S/O B. VASUDEV AITHAL
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
R/AT NO. 487/3, 5TH CROSS, 1ST MAIN
T.R. NAGAR, VIDYAPEETH LAYOUT
BENGALURU-560 028.
34. ANANTHARAM HOLLA
S/O SRI KRISHNA HOLLA
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
26
R/AT NO. 79/2 JALADEV
NEAR JAIN TEMPLE, 3RD MAIN
3RD BLOCK, T.R. NAGAR
BENGALURU-560 028.
35. SRI. VASU
S/O CHIKKAHANUMAIAH
AGED 38 YEARS
NO. 47, NEAR KG VIDYAMANDIRA SCHOOL
BALAJI NAGAR, THIGGALARAPALYA MUKYA RASTHE
PEENYA 2ND STAGE, PEENYA POST
BENGALURU-560 058.
36. SHASHIKALA
D/O LATE GOVINDAPPA
AGED 51 YEARS
R/AT NO. 1073, 4TH CROSS, 3RD MAIN
KALYAN NAGAR, T DASARAHALLI
BENGALURU-560 057.
37. AKASH PRIYADARSHI
S/O B. ASHOK PRIYADARSHI
AGED 34 YEARS
R.AT 329, 14TH MAIN,
RAJMAHAL VILAS EXTENSION
BENGALURU-560 080.
38. BHAGYALAKSHMI
W/O B. ASHOK PRIYADARSHI
AGED 62 YEARS
R/AT 329, 14TH MAIN,
RAJMAHAL VILAS EXTENDION
BENGALURU-560 080.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. G.S. KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. D.P. MAHESH, SRI. HARISHITH .B.S AND
SRI. KIRAN, ADVOCATES FOR R3, R4, R5 AND R7;
27
NOTICE TO R8 TO R31 DISPENSED WITH;
SRI. RAVI .H.K, ADVOCATE FOR R20;
SRI. M.N. UMASHANKAR, ADVOCATE FOR PROPOSED
IMPLEADING APPLICANT R32 TO R38;
SRI. PRADEEP .J.S, ADVOCATE FOR R11 TO R13, R24, R27,
R31 AND LRS OF R21(A) AND (B);
V/O DATED 06.04.2022 NOTICE TO R21 IS D/W;
V/O DATED 09.09.2022, R3 TO R5 ARE LRS OF R1 AND R2;
R6 DIED, HIS LRs ALREADY ON RECOND AS R7)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 R/W.ORDER 41
RULE 1 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
8.4.2014 PASSED IN O.S.NO.6045/1989 ON THE FILE OF THE
VIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BANGALORE DECREEING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND
INJUNCTION.
IN RFA CROB. NO. 21/2024
BETWEEN:
1 . SMT H ANURADHA
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS
2 . SRI. H. SATISH
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS
3 . SMT. H. LAKSHMI
D/O LATE HANUMANTHARAYA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
4 . SRI. B N SUBRMANI
S/O B S NARAYANA SETTY
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
THE APPELLANTS NO. 1 TO 4 ARE
LRs OF PLAINTIFF NO. 1
SMT. H. MUNIRATHNAMMA
28
AND PLAINTIFF NO.2
SMT. H. SHAKUNTHALA
ALL ARE RESIDING AT NO. 977
ITI SOCIETY LAYOUT
PAPREDDY PALYA
BENGALURU-560 072
...CROSS OBJECTORS
(BY SRI. G.S. KANNUR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. D.P. MAHESH, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SRI MUNISWAMAIAH
S/O GARUDAPPA
MAJOR IN AGE
RESIDING AT
T. DASARAHALLI
BENGALURU - 560 057
2. SRI. SHRISHA R BHATTA
MAJOR IN AGE
S/O LATE VADIRAMANDA BHATTA
RESIDING AT HESARAGHATTA,
ROAD, DASARAHALLI,
BENGALURU - 560 057
3. SRI. CHIKKA SIDDARAMAIAH
S/O LATE DODDARAMAIAH,
MAJOR IN AGE
R/O ANDRAHALLI,
YESHWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BENGLAURU NORTH TALUK,
BENGALURU - 560 091
4. SRI. PAYA DODDA MUNISWAMY
AGED MAJOR
29
R/O KETHAMARANAHALLI,
1st BLOCK, RAJAJINAGARA,
BENGALURU - 560 010
5. SRI. K M KRISHNAPPA
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 77 YEARS
6. SRI. MADHU
S/O LATE RAJANNA
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS
7. SRI. MURALI
S/O LATE MUTTHANNA
AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS
R5 TO R7 ARE R/AT NO. 126
13th CROSS, 1 K BLOCK,
KETHAMARANAHALLI,
RAJAJINAGAR,
BENGALURU 560 010
8. SRI. JAYARAMA
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
9. SRI. DODDABYANNA
AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS
10 . SRI. CHIKKABYARANNA
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS
R8 TO R10 ARE ALL
RESIDING AT NO. 17/1K,
LAKSHMINILAYA,
11th CROSS, 1st BLOCK,
RAJAJINAGARA
BENGALURU 560 011
30
11 . SRI. T G NARAYANASWAMY
AGED MAJOR
S/O GANGANNA
R/O THEERATHAPURA VILLAGE,
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK
BENGALURU - 560 022
12 . SHRI. RAJENDRA G
S/O LATE C GOVINDARAJU
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/AT 399, 5tH MAIN ROAD,
VENKATESHWARA SANITARY
KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET,
SRIRAMPURA
MARIYAPPANA PALYA
BENGLAURU - 560 021
13 . SRI. SRINIVASA
S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 86 YEARS
RESIDING AT MARIYAPPANAPALYA,
SRIRAMPURA
KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET,
BENGLAURU - 560 021
14 . SRI. RAMAKRISHNA
S/O ANNAMALAI MUDALIAR
AGED ABOUT 77 YEARS
RESIDING AT Q-10
MARIYAPPANAPLAYA,
SRIRAMPURA POST,
KALAMMA TEMPLE STREET,
BENGALURU - 560 021
15 . SRI. SADASHIVAIAH
AGED MAJOR
31
S/O PRANNA
RESIDING AT KARIVOBANAHALLI,
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU - 560 058
16 . SRI. T RAMEGOWDA
AGED MAJOR
S/O LATE DASEGOWDA
RESIDING AT SHIVAPURA VILLAGE,
PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU NORTH TALUK - 560 058
17 . SMT. KANNIKAMBA
W/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 87 YEARS
18 . SRI. KRISHNAMURTHY
S/O LATE VENKATARAMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS
R17 AND R18 ARE R/AT NO. 18
KRISHNA KRUPA
SHOE LAND BUILDING
Ist FLOOR, NEAR SHIVA TEMPLE,
RAJAGOPALANAGARA MAIN ROAD,
PEENYA 2ND STAGE,
BEGNALURU - 560 058
19 . SRI. CHIKKAMUNISHAMA BOVI
S/O DODDAMUNISWAMYA BOVI
MAJOR IN AGE
R/AT SUDDAGUNATEPALYA VILLAGE,
YESWANTHAPURA HOBLI,
BENGALURU - 560 022
32
20 . SMT. LAKSHMAMMA
W/O LATE K N LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS
21 . K.L. BABU
S/O LATE K N LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS
22 . SRI. K L SATISH
S/O LATE K N LAKSHMAIAH
AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS
R20 TO R22 ARE RESIDING AT
NO. 59, 10th A CROSS,
WEST OF CORD ROAD,
2ND STAGE
MAHALAKSHMPIPURAM,
BEGNALURU-560 086
23 . SRI. K N VENKATESH
S/O NANJAPPA
MAJOR IN AGE
R/O KETHAMARANAHALLI
Ist BLOCK,
RAJAJINAGARA
BENGALURU - 560 010
24 . SRI. K N CHOWDAPPA
S/O NANJAPPA
MAJOR IN AGE
R/O KETHAMARANAHALLI,
Ist BLOCK, RAJAJINAGARA,
BENGALURU-560 010
25 . SRI. R VENUGOPAL REDDY
S/O LATE N RAMALINGA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS
R/AT NO.181, LINK ROAD,
33
MALLESHWARAM,
BENGALURU-560 003.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRADEEP .J.S, ADVOCATE FOR R1, R8, R16)
THIS RFA.CROB. IS FILED UNDER ORDER 41 RULE 22(1)
OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
8.4.2014 PASSED IN O.S.NO.6045/1989 ON THE FILE OF THE
VIII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
BANGALORE DECREEING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION,
POSSESSION AND INJUNCTION.
THESE RFAs AND RFA.CROB HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 27.09.2024, THIS DAY
JUDGMENT WAS PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM
C.A.V. JUDGMENT
These batch of appeals are by the defendants
questioning the judgment and decree rendered in
O.S.No.6045/1989, thereby declaring plaintiffs as absolute
owners and consequently, the Court has declared that the
documents obtained by the defendants, if any, are
collusive, fraudulent, colorable and nominal documents and
they do not bind on the plaintiffs and consequently, relief of
perpetual injunction is granted.
34
2. For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred
to as per their rank before the trial Court.
3. The plaintiffs have filed suit seeking relief of
declaration and consequential relief of injunction. The
subject matter of the suit are agricultural lands bearing
Sy.No.45 measuring 11 acres 6 guntas, Sy.No.55
measuring 21 acres 7 guntas, Sy.No.56 measuring 12 acres
12 guntas and Sy.No.57 measuring 7 acres 12 guntas, all
situated at Karivobanahalli, Yeshwanthapura Hobli,
Bangalore North Taluk. Plaintiffs contend that one
S.P.Subbaraya Shetty was the original owner who was in
possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties.
The present plaintiffs claim to be the sons of Late
S.P.Subbaraya Shetty. It is the specific case of the
plaintiffs that late S.P.Subbaraya Shetty has not meddled
with the suit lands during his lifetime. Plaintiffs allege that
after death of their father S.P.Subbaraya Shetty, the lands
were not subjected to cultivation and therefore, they were
35
left fallow. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants are not having
any semblance of right and title with the suit schedule
properties. Alleging that plaintiffs learnt that defendants
have managed and fabricated the documents in their favour
and have got their names mutated to the revenue records,
suit is filed seeking relief of declaration and injunction.
4. Trial Court in absence of contest by the
defendants dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs
have failed to substantiate that they are the legal heirs of
late S.P.Subbaraya Shetty. Plaintiffs feeling aggrieved by
the judgment and decree rendered by the trial Court,
preferred appeal. This Court allowed the appeal filed and
the matter was remitted back. Even after remand, there
was no serious contest by the defendants. While some of
the defendants filed written statement and cross-examined
the plaintiffs, however, defendants did not chose to lead
any rebuttal evidence. Trial Court has decreed the suit as
prayed in the plaint.
36
5. Sri. Pradeep, learned counsel appearing for the
defendants reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal filed
in RFA.No.343/2022 c/w 342/2022 referring to the
documentary evidence placed by the plaintiffs has
vehemently argued and contended that plaintiffs maternal
uncle under compelling reasons had to sell the properties
under registered sale deed dated 17.01.1946. Though this
sale deed is not reflected in the RTC placed on record by
the plaintiffs, however, the RTCs' at Exs.P-3 to P-8 clearly
demonstrates that the property has changed hands by
passage of time and third party rights are created. The
alienations are clearly reflected in the RTCs' and in column
No.9, several purchasers names are mutated to the RTC
based on registered sale deed for valuable sale
consideration. Therefore, he would contend that the suit in
the present form seeking a declaration that the documents
obtained by the defendants are fraudulent and concocted is
not maintainable. He has further pointed out that plaintiffs
37
on account of they being minor had to return to the
maternal uncles village namely Malur and the documents
produced at Exs.P-21 to P-29 clearly demonstrates that
petitioners have done their schooling at Malur and at no
point of time, resided at Bengaluru.
6. Referring to Ex.P-32, learned counsel has
vehemently argued and contended that plaintiffs mother
Sheshamma is married to niece of Kempu Shetty and
therefore relations were cordial even upto 1961. Therefore,
he would point out that the present suit is filed with
malafide intention and by suppressing material facts. The
fact that encumbrance certificate is produced from 1937 to
1945 vide Ex.P-42 also clinches the fact that plaintiffs are
aware of the sale deed executed by plaintiffs' maternal
uncle which was in fact in the interest of the minors. At
this juncture, he would also point out that no allegations
are made against maternal uncle who have alienated the
property as plaintiffs had lost their parents. Referring to
38
the additional evidence, he has tried to impress upon this
Court that sale consideration of Rs.1,440/- was kept as
Fixed Deposit in State Bank of Mysuru.
7. Learned counsel has taken this Court through
the admissions elicited in cross-examination of PW.3
regarding plaintiffs acquaintance with the suit schedule
property. He has also cited material admissions elicited in
cross-examination of PW.3 who has admitted that
defendants are in possession and sites are formed. Citing
additional evidence produced along with the application
filed under Order 41 Rule 27, the counsel appearing for the
defendants has tried to place reliance on the registered sale
deed dated 17.01.1946. He has also brought to the notice
of this Court while referring to the additional evidence that
nearly 2000 residential houses are occupied by the
residents and they are living there for three decades and
their possessory rights is preceded by registered sale deed
obtained by them for valuable sale consideration. Referring
39
to the conduct of plaintiffs who have tried to meddle with
the property taking advantage of decree in their favour, he
has pointed out that inspite of there being status quo order
to the entire extent, plaintiff Nos.2 to 5 and 7 despite being
not in possession have entered into a registered agreement
to sell on 07.02.2022 with one Ramachandra and the
properties are agreed to be sold for a whopping sum of
Rs.16 Crores and therefore, he has brought to the notice of
this Court that contempt in that regard is pending
adjudication before this Court.
8. Learned counsel has further brought to the
notice of this Court that plaintiff No.7 has filed execution
and has sought appointment of Commissioner for
demolition of structures corresponding to 860 individual site
owners and on this ground, he would question the finding
recorded by the trial Court in regard to plaintiffs' possession
over the suit schedule property. He would vehemently
argue and contend that consequential relief of injunction
40
granted by trial Court by recording a finding that plaintiffs
have succeeded in substantiating their lawful possession as
on the date of filing of the suit stands clearly contradicted in
the light of the prayer sought in the execution proceedings
which is obviously beyond the decree.
9. Learned counsel has further brought to the
notice of this Court that plaintiff No.7 has filed an
application under Order 26 Rule 9 seeking local inspection
to ascertain the extent of vacant land available, extent of
residential properties acquired by judgment debtors, extent
of industrial establishments acquired by judgment debtors
and also mesne profits.
10. Referring to these significant details, he has
placed reliance on the following judgments:
1) Asma Lateef vs. Shabbir Ahmad - (2024) 4 SCC 696;
2) Jagdish Prasad Patel (D) Thr. Lrs. vs. Shivnath - (2019)
6 SCC 82;
41
3) Union of India & Ors. vs. Vasavi Co-Op. Housing Society
Ltd. & Ors. - (2014) 2 SCC 269;
4) Balraj Taneja & Anr. vs. Sunil Madan & Anr. - (1999) 8
SCC 369;
5) Sri Aralappa vs.Sri Jagannath - ILR 2007 Kar 339;
6) Jamila Begum (D) Thr. Lrs. vs. Shami Mohd. - (2019) 2
SCC 727;
7) Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath - (1994) 1 SCC 1;
8) Alla Baksh vs. Mohd. Hussain - ILR 1996 Kar 1340;
9) Pandurang Jivajirao Manglekar vs. The State of
Karnataka - ILR 2007 Kar 3602;
10) Gangappa Yamanappa Chalawadi vs. The State of
Karnataka - 2007 SCC Online Kar 392;
11) Shri Pratap Singh vs. Shiv Ram - (2020) 11 SCC 242.
11. Citing the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by
LRs., vs. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. and Others1, he
has contended that plaintiffs are clearly found to be
dishonest litigants and having lost their land way back in
1946, have made all efforts to reclaim the properties
without questioning the sale deeds. Citing the above said
1
(1994) 1 SCC 1
42
materials, he would point out that plaintiffs have not come
with clean hands and the judgment and decree is obtained
by the plaintiffs by playing fraud on the Court. This is a
clear case of fraud played by the plaintiffs and therefore, he
would request this Court to consider the additional evidence
cited.
12. Similarly, learned counsel appearing for co-
defendants have argued in the same vein and have cited
the following judgments:
1) Md. Noorul Hoda vs. Bibi Raifunnisa - (1996) 7 SCC
767;
2) Vishwambhar vs. Laxminarayan - AIR 2001 SCC 2607;
3) S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs., vs. Jagannath
(Dead) by LRs. and Others - (1994) 1 SCC 1.
13. Sri Giri K., learned counsel appearing for
defendant in RFA.No.1335/2023 has placed reliance on the
judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
43
Md. Noorul Hoda vs. Bibi Raifunnisa2 and also judgment
rendered in Vishwambhar vs. Laxminarayan3. Citing
these two judgments, learned counsel would point out that
immediately after death of plaintiffs father, the properties
were sold in 1946 under registered sale deed dated
17.01.1946. Though plaintiffs were minor and the
properties were conveyed to third party, they have neither
challenged the said alienation within 12 years of the deed
or within three years of attaining majority.
14. Learned counsel Sri Ravi H.K., has placed
reliance on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the
case of S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs., vs.
Jagannath (Dead) by LRs. and Others (supra). Placing
reliance on the said judgment, he would point out that non-
disclosure of relevant material documents with a view to
obtain advantage amounts to fraud.
2
(1996) 7 SCC 767
3
AIR 2001 SCC 2607
44
15. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
the plaintiffs, however, while supporting the reasons and
findings recorded by the trial Court referring to the title
deed obtained by propositus S.P.Subbaraya Shetty, he has
argued that plaintiffs father Subbaraya Shetty purchased
the suit properties under registered sale deed dated
17.06.1937. He would further point out that Subbaraya
Shetty died intestate on 02.11.1944 leaving behind the
present plaintiffs who were minors at the relevant point of
time. He would contend that defendants started interfering
with the plaintiffs possession in 1988 and therefore,
plaintiffs have rightly filed a suit seeking declaration that
they are the absolute owners and consequential declaration
sought to declare the documents set up by defendants as
sham, colourable and illegal and consequential relief are
sought. Referring to the share certificates vide Exs.P-11
and P-12, learned Senior Counsel has vehemently argued
and contended that Subbaraya Shetty and his son
45
Hanumatharaya Shetty were financially sound. To
substantiate this contention, he has placed reliance on the
share certificates evidenced at Exs.P-11 and P-12.
16. While emphasizing on the conduct of defendants
referring to the records, he would point out that except
defendant Nos.5 and 18, none of the contesting defendants
have filed written statement. He would point out that even
after remand by this Court, the defendants have not chosen
to contest the proceedings. He would also point out that
plaintiffs sought amendment of the plaint and sought relief
of possession. Referring to the averments made in the
written statement, he would contend that there is evasive
denial of plaint averments. He has further submitted that
none of the defendants have filed written statement from
1989 till 2023 except defendant Nos.5 and 18. There is a
serious contest to the applications filed by the defendants in
RFA.Nos.342/2022, 343/2022 and 14/2023. He has
contended that application seeking leave to file written
46
statement is sought virtually after 35 years. Therefore, he
would persuade this Court to dismiss these applications
seeking filing of written statement and also application
seeking production of documents. Reliance is placed on the
judgment rendered in the case of Shivshankara and
Another vs. H.P.Vedavyasa Char4.
17. While questioning the alienation made by the
plaintiffs maternal uncle, learned Senior Counsel has
questioned the validity of alienations under the Guardians
and Wards Act, 1890 and also Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956. Referring to these two Acts, he
would contend that permission to alienate minors properties
are mandatory irrespective of natural guardian or defacto
guardian. He would point out that nobody can assume the
role of guardianship in absence of permission by the Court.
He would further contend that no reasons are forthcoming
from the alienation made by the maternal uncle and
4
2023 SCC Online SC 358
47
therefore, he contends that the maternal uncle's alienations
of suit schedule properties when plaintiffs were found to be
minors also reflects that the guardian did not act prudently.
Reliance is also placed on the judgment rendered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tadavarti Bapayya and
Four Others vs. Myneni Pundarikakshayya5. Citing the
proviso to Section 8 of Hindu Minority and Guardianship
Act, he would emphasize that it is only legal guardian to
alienate the minors immovable property subject to
condition that the alienations are in the interest of the
minor.
18. While countering the defendants arguments on
Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, learned Senior Counsel
would contend that Section 31 has no application to the
present case on hand. Referring to the words 'Section 31 of
Specific Relief Act', he would point out that there is no
mandate that relief of declaration as contemplated under
5
1949 SCC FC 2
48
Section 31 needs to be asked. Referring to the words
made, he would contend that it is not imperative in every
cases to seek a declaration questioning the instrument.
19. While countering the defendants plea of
limitation, he would contend that suit filed seeking relief of
possession is based on title and the relief of possession
sought by way of amendment is well within time. While
referring to Article 44 and 59 of Limitation Act, he would
contend that the 1946 sale deed was never made known to
any party to the suit till 2022 and therefore, plea of
limitation is not available to defendants. He would also
point out that Section 3 of Limitation Act is not applicable to
the present case on hand. While questioning the conduct of
defendants, learned Senior Counsel would point out that
adverse inference has to be drawn against the defendants
who have not produced these documents. Referring to the
principles of Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, it is
vehemently argued and contended that appellants in
49
RFA.No.343/2022 has purchased a portion of the suit
schedule property from defendant No.7(a) and therefore,
his alienations are hit by principles of lis pendens.
20. Learned Senior Counsel referring to the detailed
synopsis has also contested the application filed by
defendants seeking production of additional evidence.
Reliance is placed on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Shivshankar vs.
H.P.Vedavyasa Char (supra). Learned Senior Counsel has
seriously objected the prayer of the defendants seeking
remand to enable the defendants to contest the suit. He
has also serious objections that additional evidence cannot
be looked into when exceptional circumstances provide
under Section 107(1)(d) read with Rule 27 of Order 41 are
not made out in the present case on hand. He would
contend that the defendants cannot be allowed to fill the
lacuna at this juncture and if entertained, the same would
lead to miscarriage of justice. He has further argued and
50
contended that Appellate Court should not permit a party to
fill up the lacuna who is found to be unsuccessful before the
trial Court.
21. To buttress his arguments, learned Senior
Counsel has placed reliance on the following judgments:
1) Tadavarti Bapayya and Four Others vs. Myneni
Pundarikakshayya - 1949 SCC FC;
2) Palaniyappa Goundan vs. Nallappa Goundan - (1950)
SCC Mad 103;
3) G. Annamalai Pillai vs. District Revenue Officer - (1993)
2 SCC 402;
4) Panni Lal vs. Rajindar Singh - (1993) 4 SCC 38;
5) Sirajudheen vs. Zeenath and Others - (2023) SCC
OnLine SC 196;
6) Andiswamychettiar vs. Subburaj Chettiar - (2015) 17
SCC 713;
7) K.R. Mohan Reddy vs. Net Work INC - (2007) 14 SCC
257;
8) Eastern Coal Fields Limited vs. Rabindra Kumar Bharti -
(2022) 12 SCC 390;
9) Saurav Jain and Another vs. A.B.P Design and Another
- 2021 SCC OnLine SC 552;
10) Banarsi and Others vs. Ram Pal - (2003) 9 SCC 606;
51
11) Sirajudheen vs. Zeenath and Others - 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 196;
12) Andiswamychettiar vs. Subburaj Chettiar - (2015) 17
SCC 713;
13) Shivshankara and Another vs. H.P. Vedavyasa Char -
(2023) SCC OnLine SC 358;
14) G.T. Girish vs. Y. Subbaraju - (2022) 12 SCC 321;
15) S.K. Golam Lalchand vs. Nandu Lal Shaw - (2024)
SCC OnLine SC 2456;
16) R. Dhanasundari vs. Umakanth and Others - (2020)
14 SCC 1;
15) Sayeda Akhtar vs. Abdul Ahad - (2003) 7 SCC 52;
16) Nedunuri Kameswaramma vs. Sampati Subba Rao -
1962 SCC OnLine SC 41;
17) Kunju Kesavan vs. M.M. Philip - (1963) SCC OnLine
SC 136 Para 17;
22. Heard learned counsel for the defendants and
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs. This
Court has independently examined the pleadings and oral
and documentary evidence let in by the plaintiffs. This
Court has also given anxious consideration to the written
52
statement filed by defendant Nos.5(a), 5(c) and 18. The
following points would arise for consideration:
1) Whether the finding of the trial Court that
the documents obtained by the defendants are
collusive, fraudulent, colourable and nominal
documents is perverse, palpably erroneous and
contrary to the requirement of Order 6 Rule 2 which
mandates that pleading shall contain a concise
format of all material facts on which plaintiff relies
for his claim and also falls short of the mandate
contemplated under Rule 4 of Order 6 wherein in a
suit based on fraud, allegation of fraud must be
clear, definite and specific before plaintiff is entitled
to succeed on the basis of fraud alleged in the plaint?
2) Whether the trial Court erred in declaring
the document obtained by the defendants as
collusive, fraudulent, colourable and nominal
documents in absence of there being a specific
challenge to the sale deeds obtained by the
defendants as mandated under Section 31 of the
Specific Relief Act?
3) Whether the trial Court erred in granting
perpetual injunction without examining the
53
documents relied by the plaintiff which not only
reveals that the petition lands have changed hands
but third party rights are created and the RTC's on
which plaintiff is placing reliance also prima facie
demonstrates that third parties are in possession of
the suit lands?
4) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to seek
recovery of possession?
5) Whether additional evidence produced by
the defendants before this Court can be looked into?
6) Whether the suit is ex-facie barred under
Section 3 of the Limitation Act?
Findings on point Nos.1 and 2:
23. Before this Court delves into asserting as to
whether plaintiffs claim is bonafide, this Court deems it
necessary to examine the pleadings more particularly at
paras 5 and 6 which reads as under:
"5. After the death of late S.P.Subbaraya
Setty, the plaintiffs were cultivating the suit schedule
properties for few years and for the past several
54
years, the suit schedule lands have been left follow
due to the circumstances which prevented the
plaintiff from cultivating the suit schedule lands. The
Defendants have not manner of right, title or interest
over the suit schedule properties tried to interfere
with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
suit schedule properties by the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs learn that the defendants have managed to
fabricate documents in their favour and have
managed to get their names entered in the revenue
records and on the strength of the concocted
spurious documents, the defendants have been
threatening and trying to interfere with the peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule
properties by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs with the
intervention and advice of the local elder people tried
to settle the matter by a suitably advising the
defendants to desist their illegal acts. But it was not
fruitful. Hence, the suit.
6. The plaintiffs submit that the documents
fabricated by the defendants do not in right, title and
interest any way affect the of the plaintiffs over the
suit schedule properties. The plaintiffs are also
taking necessary action for correction of the revenue
records."
55
24. The cause of action is also crucial in the case on
hand since from the pleadings and the evidence recorded
during trial points out that plaintiffs on account of death of
their father were compelled to leave Bengaluru City and
started residing with their maternal uncle at Malur. The
cause of action which is at para 8 of the plaint would be
relevant and the same is culled out which reads as under:
"8. The cause of action for the suit arose in
September, 1988, when the Defendant tried to
interfere with the plaintiffs possession of the suit
schedule properties and subsequently when the
defendants failed to mend their illegal act even after
the advice of the elders and in the third week of
October 1989, when the defendants again tried to
interfere with the possession and enjoyment of the
suit schedule properties by the plaintiffs at
Karihobanahalli Bangalore North Taluk, and within
the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court. No other suit
has been filed on the same cause of action before
this Hon'ble Court or before any other Court earlier."
56
25. Based on the pleadings where a foundation is
laid indicating that defendants have obtained documents
fraudulently, the prayer sought in the plaint are extracted
which reads as under:
"(a) declaring that the documents are the
absolute owners of the suit schedule properties;
(b) declaring that the documents that the
defendants have obtained are all collusive,
fraudulent, colorable and nominal documents and
they do not affect the rights, title and interest of the
plaintiffs over the suit schedule properties; and do
not where bind the right and do not in any way bind
the rights title and interest of the plaintiffs over the
suit schedule properties.
(c) restraining the defendants from interfering
with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the
suit schedule properties by the plaintiffs, by granting
a decree for permanent injunction against the
defendants; and
or
(cc) in the alternative, direct the defendants
handed over the possession of the portion of
schedule properties if any or more possession is
event of the court coming to the conclusion that
57
some portion are in possession of few of the
defendants herein.
(d) for costs and such other reliefs as this
Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant in the facts and
circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice
and equity."
26. On bare perusal of paras 5 and 6 of the
pleadings of the plaint which are culled out supra, the relief
sought by the plaintiffs in the instant suit is clearly on the
ground of fraud. Time and again, the Hon'ble Apex Court
and this Court have consistently held that fraud is a
material fact and must be specifically pleaded. Though in
the above said paragraphs, plaintiffs have alleged that
defendants have fabricated the documents and based on
these fabricated documents are asserting title, but these
fabricated documents will not affect plaintiffs' right, title
and interest over the suit schedule properties.
27. There is a thin line distinction between omission
of material facts and omission to give full particulars.
58
Though plaintiffs refer to the documents on which
defendants are asserting right and title, there is absolutely
no narration and no particulars are furnished in the plaint.
That facts which establish pleas must be stated specifically
in the plaint. The words "material facts" means all facts
upon which the plaintiffs' cause of auction on which
plaintiffs' case depends has to be necessarily pleaded. In
the case on hand, the material facts are consciously and
deliberately omitted. Further, plaintiffs are also found to be
guilty for not furnishing full particulars. In absence of
disclosure of material facts, this Court is called upon to
examine as to whether plaintiffs are guilty of omitting said
material facts. In absence of any foundation in the
pleading relating to a particular plea, this Court is called
upon to decide whether plaintiff can be permitted to raise a
plea on fraud and also plead that the documents obtained
by the defendants are fabricated and are sham documents.
59
28. The provisions of Rules 2 and 4 of Order 6 are
mandatory. The statement of material facts must appear in
the pleading and the particulars must be full so as to enable
the opposite party to know the case he is required to meet.
On reading the entire plaint and more particularly the culled
out paragraphs, there is clear absence of material facts and
particulars which ought to have been raised by the plaintiffs
while instituting the suit.
29. The pleadings at para 5 and 6 which are culled
out supra also do not meet the mandate of Rule 4 of Order
6. In a suit alleging fraud, the allegation of fraud must be
clear, definite and specific. Time and again, the Hon'ble
Apex Court and this Court have consistently held that
general allegations of fraud, however, strong the words in
which they are stated may be, if unaccompanied by
particulars are insufficient to amount to an averment of
fraud, but the Court is bound to take notice.
60
30. To address the issue of omission of material
facts and failure to provide full particulars, it is crucial to
adhere to the well-established principles laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. The Apex Court has
consistently held that all material facts, which form the
foundation of the plaintiff's cause of action, must be
specifically pleaded in the plaint. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable
v. Assistant Charity Commissioner6 , the Supreme Court
emphasized that "material facts" are those essential facts
that constitute the right to seek relief. The omission of
such facts would render the plaint legally defective, and a
mere reference to documents without narrating the factual
background does not suffice.
31. Further, as held in Union of India v. Ibrahim
Uddin7 (2012) 8 SCC 148, the Court stated that Rule 2 of
Order 6 CPC mandates that the pleadings must contain
material facts, and Rule 4 further imposes an obligation to
6
(2004) 3 SCC 137
7
(2012) 8 SCC 148
61
specifically plead particulars in cases involving allegations of
fraud. In fraud cases, the allegations must not be vague or
general. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bishundeo Narain
v. Seogeni Rai8, categorically held that "general
allegations, however strong, cannot amount to proof of
fraud." The Court further reiterated that specific and
definite particulars are essential for a claim of fraud,
without which the opposite party would be unable to
adequately respond.
32. In the present case, as is evident from the
plaint, there is a clear absence of such material facts and
particulars. The omission appears deliberate and conscious,
thus falling short of the mandatory requirements under
Rules 2 and 4 of Order 6 CPC.
33. In the matter concerning the omission of
material facts and failure to provide full particulars in the
pleadings, the jurisprudence laid down by the Hon'ble
8
AIR 1951 SC 280
62
Supreme Court of India is well-settled. Material facts are
the foundational elements of a cause of action, and their
omission can fundamentally undermine the integrity of the
plaint. As emphasized in Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v.
Assistant Charity Commissioner (supra), "material facts"
are not merely incidental but are essential to establish the
right of the plaintiff to claim relief. The Court in this
judgment underscored that these facts must be explicitly
stated in the plaint, and failure to do so renders the plaint
liable to challenge for not disclosing a cause of action.
34. In the present case, while the plaintiffs have
referred to certain documents on which the defendants are
asserting their right and title, there is a conspicuous
absence of any narrative that explains the factual
circumstances surrounding those documents. The mere
reference to documents without disclosing the essential
facts underpinning the plaintiffs' case is insufficient to meet
the legal standard required by law. The Hon'ble Supreme
63
Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal9 clarified that
a plaint that fails to disclose material facts is not
maintainable. The requirement is to present the full factual
scenario so that the defendants can fully understand the
case they are required to meet.
35. Moreover, the provisions of Order 6 Rule 2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, mandate that the statement
of facts in a pleading must include all material facts
necessary to formulate a complete cause of action. This
provision ensures that the defendant is not caught by
surprise and is aware of the full extent of the allegations.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim
Uddin10 further elaborated on the importance of this rule,
holding that the omission of material facts or failure to
provide sufficient particulars can severely prejudice the
opposite party and is fatal to the plaint.
9
(1977) 4 SCC 467
10
(2012) 8 SCC 148
64
36. Now let me examine the prayer sought in the
plaint which is culled out supra. The plaintiffs are seeking a
declaration that they are the absolute owners of the suit
schedule properties and they have succeeded by way of
inheritance after the death of their father S.P.Subbaraya
Setty. The prayer (b) is not only misconceived but this is a
clear case of deliberate mischief by the plaintiffs. This
Court needs to examine as to whether such a declaration
can be sought. The declaration sought at prayer (b) is as
vague as it could be.
37. On reading of the prayer at (b) coupled with the
documentary evidence placed by plaintiffs themselves,
clearly gives an indication that plaintiffs are in fact aware of
all the transactions. Plaintiffs' father purchased this suit
land under registered sale deed dated 17.06.1937.
Plaintiffs have filed the present suit on 05.11.1989. Ex.P-3
is the RTC pertaining to Sy.No.45. In column No.9 of RTC,
the following names viz., S.P.Subbaraya Shetty, C.Srinivas,
65
C.Ramakrishna, Lakshmaiah S/o Nanjappa, K.N.Chowdappa
S/o Nanjappa and Munirathna S/o Nanjappa are reflected.
The mutation is also reflected in Exs.P-3 to P-8. In column
No.12(2), possession of aforesaid owners is also reflected.
This Court deems it fit to prepare a table of Exs.P-3 to P-8
for better understanding and the same reads as under:
Exhibits Sy.No. M.R.No. Purchasers names
Ex.P-3 Sy.No.45 M.R.No.32/6263 S.P.Subbaraya Sheety,
M.R.No.5013/81- C.Srinivas, C.Ramakrishna,
82 Lakshmaiah S/o Nanjappa,
M.R.No.18/70-71 K.N.Chowdappa S/o Nanjappa,
R.R.No.667 Lakshmaiah S/o Nanjappa,
R.R.No.643 Munirathna W/o Nanjappa
M.R.No.21/5859
Ex.P-4 Sy.No.45 M.R.No.16/86-87 Lakshmaiah S/o Dodda
MPR.No.200/86- Nanjappa
87
Ex.P-5 Sy.No.45 M.R.No.16/86-87 K.N.Chowdappa S/o Dodda
MPR.No.200/86- Nanjappa
87
Ex.P-6 Sy.No.45 M.R.No.8/68-89 S.P.Subbaraya Shetty,
M.R.No.10/68 K.M.Seethappa, Munishama,
2HC 1/83-84 Chennayya Gittappa,
M.R.No.11/79-80 Nagarathnamma, Yellamma,
Sadashivaiah, Govidaraju S/o
Chinnappanna Pai,
Magalayya
Ex.P-7 Sy.No.45 M.R.No.11/79-80 S.P.Subbaraya Shetty,
K.M.Seethappa, Lakshmaiah,
Muniyabhovi Chikkamariswami,
Gurura Bhovi, Muswa Bhovi,
Siddaramaiah S/o Byrappa,
C.Govindappa S/o
Chinnappanna Malai Masali,
C.Srinivas
Ramakrishna
66
Ex.P-8 Sy.No.45 M.R.No.5/79-80 S.P.Subbaraya Shetty,
L.R.Shettaru,
Chikkasiddaramaiah, Peddakka
D/o Siddaramaiah, D.Siddappa
38. Now coming to Exs.P-21 to P-29, Ex.P-21 is the
school leaving certificate of plaintiff No.6/Narayana Shetty.
The said document clearly reveals that plaintiff No.6 who is
the son of S.P.Subbaraya Shetty has done his schooling at
Bangarapete/Malur. Ex.P-22 is the character certificate
issued by the Block Development Officer, Malur. Therefore,
on examining these documents, it can be inferred that
plaintiffs having lost their father, left Bengaluru City and
they started residing with their maternal uncle till 1980.
39. Plaintiffs have produced encumbrance certificate
which is marked at Ex.P-42. This document clearly reveals
the conduct of plaintiffs. They have deliberately secured
encumbrance certificate from 01.04.1937 to 31.03.1945.
While in the plaint, they have specifically pleaded that
defendants have created sham documents. The RTCs'
67
which are produced and marked at Exs.P-3 to P-8 also
disclose several alienations. This RTC clearly discloses the
third party rights created post 1946. There is no whisper in
the plaint relating to these transactions. Though plaintiffs
having produced these RTCs' have to be presumed that
they had clear knowledge of these transactions.
40. The plaintiffs' conduct in this case has been far
from satisfactory. Their selective production of documents,
deliberate omission of material facts, and failure to
challenge alienations raise serious questions about their
bona fides. The plaint is clearly defective, both procedurally
and substantively. The suppression of material facts,
coupled with the time-barred nature of the suit and the
plaintiffs' acquiescence to third-party rights, render the suit
untenable. Therefore, in light of the above provisions and
judgments, the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC for failure to disclose a cause of action and
being barred by limitation.
68
41. The prayer sought by the plaintiffs, declaring
that the documents obtained by the defendants are
collusive, fraudulent, and nominal, without specifically
challenging the sales themselves on the ground of fraud, is
inherently defective. This type of pleading amounts to a
clear attempt to bypass the requirement of directly
contesting the validity of the sales, thereby causing
mischief and creating ambiguity in the adjudication process.
It is well established that when the plaintiffs acknowledge
the formation of a layout and sale of portions of the suit
property during the trial, they cannot simultaneously seek
to nullify these transactions without challenging the sales
directly. In Prem Singh v. Birbal11, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that any plea seeking to invalidate a transaction
on the ground of fraud must specifically challenge the
impugned transaction and provide clear and detailed
particulars of the fraud alleged. General and vague
11
(2006) 5 SCC 353
69
allegations, as seen in the present case, are insufficient and
do not amount to a valid cause of action. Moreover, the
failure to explicitly challenge the alienations or sales
demonstrates bad faith and an intention to misuse the
process of law, which renders the prayer legally
unsustainable. The Court, in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v.
Jagannath (supra), emphasized that a party must
approach the Court with clean hands, and any suppression
or mischief intended to mislead the Court would disentitle
the plaintiffs from obtaining any relief. In this context, the
prayer in its current form is defective, as it fails to meet the
legal requirements for setting aside transactions based on
fraud.
42. The plaintiffs' prayer to declare that the
documents obtained by the defendants are collusive,
fraudulent, and nominal, without directly challenging the
sales themselves, is legally defective and strategically
flawed. The plaintiffs have admitted during the trial that a
70
layout was formed over portions of the suit land and that
sales had occurred. Despite these admissions, they have
sought a declaration that these documents do not affect
their rights, title, and interest over the suit schedule
properties. However, this approach is nothing more than an
attempt to nullify the sales indirectly, without following the
proper legal procedure for challenging such transactions.
43. In cases where fraud is alleged, the law is clear:
the specific transactions in question must be directly
challenged, and detailed particulars of the alleged fraud
must be pleaded. Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (CPC) mandates that when fraud is alleged, the
party making the claim must provide precise details about
the fraud, including the circumstances under which it
occurred. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Singh v.
Birbal (supra) unequivocally held that general allegations
of fraud, no matter how strongly they are worded, cannot
be the basis for invalidating a transaction unless those
71
allegations are substantiated with specific and clear
particulars. The prayer made by the plaintiffs in the present
case is a general assertion of fraud without sufficient
specifics or a direct challenge to the transactions
themselves, which makes the claim legally unsustainable.
44. Furthermore, by admitting that sales and layout
formations had taken place, the plaintiffs are estopped from
indirectly challenging these transactions through a vague
prayer. The doctrine of estoppel prevents a party from
asserting a position contradictory to one it has already
accepted during the course of legal proceedings. In the case
of Krishna Mohan Kul alias Nani Charan Kul v. Pratima
Maity12, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that a
plaintiff cannot approbate and reprobate--meaning, they
cannot admit to certain facts and then later deny or attempt
to nullify the legal effects of those same facts without
directly challenging the transactions in a proper manner.
12
(2004) 9 SCC 468
72
45. Moreover, the plaintiffs' prayer appears to be a
calculated mischief designed to nullify the sales without
filing a proper challenge against them. Such a course of
action is impermissible, as it circumvents the legal process
required to contest the alienations of property. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court, in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v.
Jagannath (supra), held that a litigant must come to Court
with clean hands, and any attempt to suppress material
facts or manipulate the legal process to achieve an outcome
without following the proper legal procedures is tantamount
to fraud on the Court. In this case, by failing to challenge
the sales explicitly and instead seeking a general
declaration to invalidate them, the plaintiffs have adopted a
disingenuous approach, which the Courts have consistently
disapproved.
46. The defective nature of the prayer also
undermines the rights of third-party purchasers who may
have bought portions of the suit land in good faith. By not
73
challenging these sales directly on the grounds of fraud or
otherwise, the plaintiffs are seeking a declaration that
would affect the legal rights of these third parties without
giving them a fair opportunity to defend their titles. The
Courts have consistently held that when third-party rights
are involved, particularly in cases where purchasers have
acted in good faith and have taken possession of the
property, any challenge to the sale must be specific, timely,
and supported by cogent evidence of fraud or illegality.
In Durga Prasad v. Deep Chand13 , the Hon'ble Supreme
Court laid down that a suit seeking to set aside a sale
transaction affecting third-party rights must clearly
articulate the grounds for such a challenge and give notice
to the affected parties, failing which the suit would be
deficient.
47. The plaintiffs' conduct, therefore, raises serious
concerns about their bona fides. By selectively admitting
13
(1954) SCR 360
74
certain facts while attempting to nullify the legal
consequences of those facts through an indirect and
defective prayer, the plaintiffs are abusing the judicial
process. Their failure to directly challenge the sales and to
provide specific particulars of fraud, coupled with the
indirect approach taken in the prayer, suggests an intention
to manipulate the outcome of the case without following the
due process of law. The Courts have repeatedly condemned
such conduct, as seen in T. Arivandandam v. T.V.
Satyapal14, where the Supreme Court held that Courts
must guard against allowing frivolous or vexatious suits
that are designed to harass or mislead the parties or the
Court itself.
48. In the light of these significant details, which is
evidenced from Exs.P-3 to P-8 and Exs.P-21 to P-29, let me
examine the evidence of plaintiffs in the case on hand.
14
(1977) 4 SCC 467
75
Cross-examination of PW.3 would be relevant. The relevant
portion is culled out which reads as under:
"23. The Subbarayashetty has purchased the suit schedule
properties on 17.06.1937 from Kumarashastry (Ex.P.1).
The original sale deed Ex.P.1 is missed but it is not handed
over to the defendants. I have not produced Encumbrance
certificates from the year 1939 to 1989 or till this date. I
have produced the RTCs from the year 1935 to 1989 and
also some RTC extracts pertaining to subsequent years. It
is right to suggest that, I have not produced RTC extracts
in continuous from 1935 to till the date of filing of this suit
and till this date and so also Encumbrance certificates. It is
not right to suggest that, the plaintiffs are not sons and
grandchildren of Subbarayashetty. It is not right to suggest
that, I have not produced family tree.
24. Subbarayashetty was having 2 sons namely
Hanumantharayashetty, P.S.Narayana shetty and 1
daughter by name Shanthamma. It is right to suggest that,
said the Shanthamma is not party to the case. Witness
volunteers she is died prior to filing of this suit. I have not
produced death certificate of Shanthamma d/o
Subbarayashetty but, I have produced death certificate of
Subbarayashetty and Hanumantharayashetty. It is not right
to suggest that, I have not produced any document in
proof that the plaintiffs are LRs of Subbarayashetty.
76
25. The documents in respect of schedule property are
created in the names of all the defendants i.e., Pani,
Khatha & sale deeds. I have taken certified copies of RTC
extracts created by the defendants. I have not obtained
certified copies of sale deeds. I have not taken any action
by challenging the created RTC extracts etc., and also of
mutations.
26. It is not right to suggest that, the plaintiffs No.1 to 7
are not joint family members and LRs of Subbarayashetty.
The suit properties are not sold by the Subbarayashetty or
his children or his grandchildren. The defendants are
formed layout illegally and by force and in possession of
the suit properties. I don't know whether they have sold
the sites to the respective purchasers. The constructions on
some of the sites are made. I did not obtained created sale
deeds and Khathas and I have not challenged the same.
On asking the purchasers they told that we have records
you can file a case. I don't know whether said purchasers
have taken phone connections, electricity connections,
water connections and drainage.
27. I have visited the suit properties 8 to 10 days back. I
know what are all the things are there in the suit
properties.
28. I don't know how many sale deeds are executive in
respect of entire schedule properties (51 acres 37 guntas).
77
I don't know the amount of considerations paid by
respective purchasers."
49. Para 26 which is culled out supra clearly clinches
the factual matrix on the ground. Plaintiffs have admitted
in unequivocal terms that defendants have illegally formed
a layout by force and coercion and that they are in
possession of the suit schedule properties. PW.3 has
further acknowledged and admitted in unequivocal terms
that residential houses are constructed on the sites formed
in the layout. PW.3 further admits that he has not obtained
the sale deeds and kathas and there is no challenge. He
has also admitted in unequivocal terms at para 25 of the
cross-examination that no steps are taken to change the
katha in favour of defendants.
50. In the light of several admissions elicited in
cross-examination of plaintiffs, this Court has to examine as
to whether prayer (b) in the present form can be
78
entertained in the context of Section 31 of the Specific
Relief Act. On reading relief of declaration sought at prayer
(b), the plaintiffs are alleging that defendants have
obtained forged documents. It is trite law that forged
documents so long as the forgery has not been judicially
determined clearly creates a cloud over the plaintiffs title
and therefore, plaintiffs who are intending to impeach these
sale deeds obtained by the defendants ought to have
atleast sought relief of declaration furnishing the details of
the sale deeds and then further ought to have claimed and
declared that these sale deeds are forged one. Once
plaintiffs pleads that the documents obtained by defendants
are fraudulent and forged, the burden is on the plaintiffs to
substantiate the same by producing cogent and clinching
evidence. A sham transaction can be treated as voidable
and if a party is not signatory to the said document, the
plaintiffs need not seek cancellation of the sale deeds but is
bound to seek a declaration that these sale deeds are not
79
binding on the relief of declaration in that regard aimed at
avoiding a vexatious or injuries used by the defendants
against the plaintiffs of an instrument which is voidable.
Said sale deeds remaining with documents will definitely
cast a cloud upon title of plaintiffs and the plaintiffs will be
subjected to litigation. Therefore, the test is reasonable
apprehension of serious injury and whether such injury
exists depends upon the circumstances of a particular case.
51. In the case on hand, it is not a mere speculation
or vague complication that would arise in future. Exs.P-3 to
P-8 clearly demonstrates that third party rights are created
and plaintiffs admittedly is not found to be in possession of
the suit properties. Interestingly, on reading the relief of
declaration at prayer (b), the plaintiffs are seeking a
declaration that they are the absolute owners of the suit
schedule property. By seeking such a declaration, plaintiffs
are just seeking declaration of their previous rights which is
obviously not in dispute.
80
52. In the case on hand, the plaintiffs have
consciously not sought relief of declaration questioning the
transactions of the defendants and plaintiffs also are not
found to be in possession. Same is evidenced from the
cross appeal filed by the plaintiffs in RFA.Crob.No.21/2024.
Though relief of cancellation may not arise for consideration
in the case on hand as plaintiffs have consciously
suppressed all material facts as to who meddled with the
property in 1946, they are definitely affected by the sale
transaction and therefore, plaintiffs cannot ignore these
sale deeds and therefore, they were required to file suit
seeking substantial relief which were available to them.
Plaintiffs have filed the present suit without seeking any
declaration challenging the sale deeds as either void or
voidable.
53. This Court has also noticed that though a
declaration is sought that sale deeds obtained by
defendants are forged or fictitious, these documents are not
81
referred to and no declaration is sought by furnishing
details of the sale deeds obtained by the defendants.
Unless the sale deeds are declared to be void or voidable on
the ground that these were obtained by fraud, the plaintiffs
could not have maintained the suit in the present form.
54. The plaintiffs who assert that the properties were
originally owned by their father and have purchased the
property in 1936 have deliberately furnished encumbrance
only till 1946, while suit is filed in 1990. The plaintiffs who
assert that they have got interest in the suit properties and
reasonably apprehend that defendants have set up an
adverse title based on registered sale deeds, ought to have
sought relief of declaration. These sale deeds if left
outstanding, they will definitely affect and prejudice
plaintiffs right. Unless the sale deeds are subjected to
adjudication and either declaration is void or voidable, the
present suit seeking declaration that plaintiffs are absolute
owners of the suit schedule properties will not suffice.
82
Therefore, unless the sale deeds are declared as voidable as
distinguished from void, the plaintiffs who have
alternatively sought for possession of the property are not
entitled to seek recovery of possession unless these sale
deeds are declared to be fraudulent documents. The
plaintiffs have miserably failed to substantiate the date of
discovery of fraud. Though the burden of proving that
plaintiffs had the knowledge of these transactions is always
on the defendants, the facts of these case are on a different
footing. Having examined Exs.P-3 to P-8, coupled with
admissions elicited in cross-examination of PW.3 who has
acknowledged and admitted that some portion of the land is
converted, sites are formed and they are sold to various
persons, it is clearly evident that plaintiffs had the
knowledge about the sale transactions. Therefore, in the
case on hand, the burden was never on the defendants.
55. The right to seek declaration that these sale
deeds are not binding on plaintiffs is a right to a
83
consequential relief sufficient to sustain a declaratory
decree. But when such a relief is granted in pursuance of
that right, it is the substantive relief independent of
declaration. Even if plaintiffs were to assert that they were
not parties to the sale deeds, but they have right in the
property is threatened in terms of sale deeds obtained by
third parties, he has to seek a declaration that these
instruments are not binding on them. Therefore, when an
instrument is not binding upon the plaintiff and he seeks to
establish his title over the property, which is the subject
matter of instrument, he cannot do so without having that
deed declared to be not binding. Either plaintiffs must get
it cancelled or seek a declaration that it is not binding on
them before they succeed to seek declaration of their title
over the properties covered under the instrument.
56. It is bit concerning that plaintiffs have
consciously sought a declaration seeking to declare that
these sale deeds are invalid and not binding on them.
84
Therefore, the contention of plaintiffs that Section 31 does
not obligate plaintiffs to seek cancellation of sale deeds is
misconceived and therefore, cannot be acceded to.
57. On over all assessment of the oral and
documentary evidence, this Court is of the view that the
suit in the present form is not at all maintainable. To
enable the order of declaration, plaintiffs have to establish
as to how they are entitled to a declaration of a right to a
property. They have to also substantiate and demonstrate
the infringement i.e., defendants denying their title over the
property in question and then a declaration i.e., declaration
sought indicating that plaintiffs are entitled to such legal
character or right and then consequential relief as
contemplated under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
58. Section 31 clearly contemplates that any person
against whom a written instrument is void and voidable and
has a reasonable apprehension that such instrument if left
85
outstanding may cause him serious injury has to file a suit
and seek a declaration and seek adjudication that the
document is void or voidable as the case may be.
59. Relief as to cancellation of instrument is founded
upon administration of protective justice for fear that
instrument may be vexatiously or injuriously used by
defendant against plaintiff. There is a difference between
the suit for cancellation of instrument and one for
declaration that instrument is not binding on the plaintiff.
When a plaintiff seeks to establish his title in himself and
cannot establish that title without removing the said
disputed document, provided he is a party to such
document, plaintiff has to seek cancellation of the said
document. But when he is seeking to establish title and
finds himself threatened by a registered document and
since he is not a party to the said document, though he
may not be in a position to get that document cancelled, his
86
proper remedy is to seek a declaration that such a
document is invalid and not binding on him.
60. Section 31 refers to both void and voidable
documents. It provides for discretionary relief. A person
who is not a party to the document is required to ask for a
declaration so as to see it does not affect his property
rights.
61. Principle that solemnly executed and registered
deed must stand until set aside by a competent Court is
squarely applicable to the present case on hand. The
relevant cross-examination and the documents produced by
the plaintiffs themselves clearly gives an impression that
plaintiffs are clearly aware of all the transactions. The
present suit seeking a declaration that they are the
absolute owners is not maintainable as there is no specific
prayer to declare the sale deeds obtained by the defendants
as null and void and not binding on the plaintiffs.
87
62. In the light of discussion made supra, point
Nos.1 and 2 formulated by this Court are answered in the
affirmative.
Findings on Point Nos.3 and 4:
63. In the present case, the plaintiffs are not entitled
to an injunction, as they have failed to establish their
possession of the suit property. An injunction, being an
equitable remedy, requires the plaintiffs to demonstrate not
only a prima facie case but also possession of the property.
The exhibits relied upon by the plaintiffs, such as Ex.P-3 to
Ex.P-8, clearly show that multiple sale transactions have
taken place, and third-party rights have been created over
the property. Individuals such as S.P. Subbaraya Shetty, C.
Srinivas, K.N. Chowdappa, and others have been involved
in these transactions, and several revenue records,
including M.R. Nos. 32/6263, 16/86-87, 18/70-71, and
others, further confirm the transfers of interest in the
88
property. In the light of this evidence, the plaintiffs are
clearly not in possession.
64. The trial court, in failing to critically examine
these documents, has overlooked the creation of third-party
rights, which is a significant factor in determining the
plaintiffs' entitlement to an injunction. As held by the
Supreme Court in Rame Gowda vs. M. Varadappa
Naidu15, a plaintiff seeking an injunction must prove not
only their title but also possession. Since the plaintiffs are
not in possession of the suit property, they are not entitled
to the equitable relief of an injunction. Furthermore, the
mere fact of owning the title does not automatically entitle
the plaintiffs to an injunction, especially when the property
has passed into the hands of bona fide purchasers.
65. Additionally, the plaintiffs' alternate relief of
possession after the remand by this Court cannot be
considered, as they have failed to challenge the sale deeds
15
AIR 2004 SC 4609
89
in the manner known to law. The exhibits show that several
sale deeds have been executed, transferring rights to third
parties. Under the law, if a plaintiff wishes to seek
possession in a scenario where there are subsequent
purchasers, they must challenge the validity of those sale
deeds through appropriate legal proceedings, such as
seeking cancellation or declaration of the sale deeds as
void. In this case, the plaintiffs have not undertaken such a
challenge. Without setting aside the sale deeds, the
plaintiffs cannot claim possession, as the third-party
purchasers would have acquired valid legal rights through
those transactions.
66. This principle was reinforced in Anathula
Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy16, where the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that a person who has been
dispossessed and seeks recovery of possession must
challenge the transfer deeds or other instruments that have
16
AIR 2008 SC 2033
90
affected their title or possession. The failure to challenge
the sale deeds in a legally recognized manner, such as
through a suit for cancellation, bars the plaintiffs from
claiming possession. Since they have neither challenged
these deeds nor proven that the purchasers are not bona
fide, their alternate relief of possession cannot be granted.
67. Therefore, based on the lack of possession, the
plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction, and their
alternate relief of possession, after remand, also fails due to
their failure to challenge the sale deeds in accordance with
the law. Without addressing the legal transfers of title
through valid sale deeds, the plaintiffs' claim for possession
is legally unsustainable.
68. In the present case, it is evident from the
exhibits relied upon by the plaintiffs themselves that they
are not in possession of the suit property. The trial court
has erred in failing to properly scrutinize the documents,
91
which clearly indicate the creation of third-party rights. For
instance, the documents marked as Ex.P-3 to Ex.P-8,
including M.R. Nos. 32/6263, 16/86-87, and others, reveal
multiple transactions involving various individuals such as
S.P. Subbaraya Shetty, C. Srinivas, K.N. Chowdappa,
Lakshmaiah, and others, demonstrating the transfer of
interests over the suit property. The trial court's oversight
in neglecting to assess these records has resulted in an
incomplete and flawed decision-making process.
Furthermore, the fact that close to 450 appeals have been
filed by subsequent purchasers underscores the gravity of
third-party claims over the property, which should have
been a critical consideration during the trial.
69. In light of these facts, the plaintiffs' challenge to
the finding on possession in their cross-appeal appears
contradictory to their own reliance on these documents. In
Rame Gowda v. M. Varadappa Naidu (supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court highlighted the principle that a
92
plaintiff must not only establish a superior title but also
prove that they were in possession of the property in order
to seek its restoration. In the absence of clear evidence of
possession, the plaintiffs cannot succeed in claiming
possession through their cross-appeal.
70. Similarly, in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi
Reddy (supra), the Court held that possession follows title,
but in cases where third-party rights have been created,
mere title without possession is insufficient to claim
recovery of possession. The trial court's failure to examine
whether subsequent purchasers hold legitimate third-party
rights further weakens the plaintiffs' case. Therefore, based
on the precedents and evidence, the plaintiffs' attempt to
claim possession is unjustified without addressing the third-
party rights that have been created over time.
71. Given these circumstances, the plaintiffs' cross-
appeal challenging the finding on possession should be
93
dismissed, as it lacks substantive legal standing when
examined against the backdrop of the judgments cited
above. The failure to properly examine the documents that
establish third-party interests severely undermines the
plaintiffs' case for possession.
72. Therefore, based on the lack of possession, the
plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction, and their
alternate relief of possession, after remand, also fails due to
their failure to challenge the sale deeds in accordance with
the law. Without addressing the legal transfers of title
through valid sale deeds, the plaintiffs' claim for possession
is legally unsustainable. Accordingly, point No.3 is
answered in the Affirmative and point No.4 is answered in
the Negative.
Findings on Point No.5:
73. The defendants , and subsequent transferees, by
way of additional evidence, have attempted to demonstrate
94
that the suit properties are no longer in possession of the
plaintiffs but are instead in the hands of several third-party
purchasers. This revelation according to defendants is
significant, as it highlights the extensive alienation of the
properties over the years, which further weakens the
plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs before this court disclosed
for the first time that the alienation of the suit properties
was carried out by their maternal uncle, a fact that was
conspicuously absent from the original pleadings. This
disclosure raises several critical legal issues, particularly
regarding the authority of the maternal uncle to alienate
the properties and the plaintiffs' failure to challenge this
alienation in a legally appropriate manner.
74. Interestingly, despite this disclosure in these
appeals, the plaintiffs have not made any allegations
against their maternal uncle, who was responsible for
alienating the properties. This omission is crucial because,
under law, if the plaintiffs believed that the alienation by
95
their maternal uncle was unauthorized or illegal, they were
obligated to specifically plead this in their plaint and seek
relief accordingly. However, in the absence of any pleadings
challenging the authority of their maternal uncle to execute
the sale transactions, the validity of these transactions
cannot be called into question by the Court. The well-
settled principle of law is that parties must plead all
material facts and cannot introduce new claims or
allegations during the trial without having properly pleaded
them in the plaint. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Afsar
Sheikh v. Soleman Bibi17 has consistently held that
allegations of fraud or unauthorized actions must be
specifically pleaded with full particulars, failing which the
Court cannot entertain such claims.
75. Given that the plaintiffs have failed to make any
allegations against their maternal uncle and have not
challenged the sale transactions through proper legal
17
AIR 1976 SC 163
96
channels, the alienations made by the uncle must be
presumed to be valid. The plaintiffs' silence on this issue in
their original pleadings strongly suggests that they were
either aware of or had consented to these transactions.
Therefore, their subsequent attempt to raise this issue
during the trial, without having included it in their original
claims, cannot be entertained by the Court. As a result, the
authority of the maternal uncle's alienations cannot be
questioned in the absence of specific pleadings to that
effect.
76. Moreover, the evidence led by the plaintiffs
themselves confirms that they are not in possession of the
suit properties and that the properties have been alienated
to third parties over time. This evidence effectively
undermines their own case, as they have not provided any
legal basis for challenging the authority of these alienations.
The plaintiffs, having failed to plead or prove any
irregularity in the alienation by their maternal uncle,
97
deserve to be non-suited based on the evidence presented
by them. The defendants, through the submission of
additional evidence, have sought to demonstrate that
following the alienation of the suit schedule properties, the
land has been extensively subdivided and now consists of
over 2,000 residential sites, including numerous residential
houses. This development according to defendants
highlights the significant passage of time and the number of
subsequent transactions that have taken place, further
complicating the plaintiffs' claims. A key piece of additional
evidence presented is a sale deed executed by the plaintiffs'
maternal uncle on 17.01.1946, which according to
defendants further reinforces the timeline of alienations.
The defendants therefore have contended that these
documents along with other evidence provided by the
defendants, establishes that the properties have passed
through multiple hands and are now owned by several
subsequent purchasers who have acquired these rights in
98
good faith. This court while dealing with point 1 &2 has
taken cognizance of plaintiffs' own admissions during
proceedings, unequivocally demonstrate that the suit
properties are no longer under the control of the original
parties, but have been lawfully transferred to numerous
third parties who are bona fide purchasers. The chain of
transactions and the current state of ownership make it
clear that the plaintiffs' failure to challenge these
alienations at an earlier stage, along with the multitude of
new interests created in the properties, renders their claims
legally unsustainable and inequitable to enforce against the
subsequent purchasers.
77. Therefore, there is no need for the Court to
delve further into the additional evidence submitted by the
defendants , even though these documents shed
considerable light on the current status of the properties.
The additional evidence may reinforce what the plaintiffs'
own evidence has already revealed that the properties have
99
passed into the hands of third-party purchasers, and the
plaintiffs are no longer in possession. This additional
evidence, while illuminating, is not necessary for the Court
to reach a conclusion, as the plaintiffs' case has already
collapsed under the weight of their own admissions and the
lack of proper pleadings.
78. In conclusion, the plaintiffs' failure to challenge
the alienations made by their maternal uncle in the manner
prescribed by law, coupled with their own evidence
confirming that the suit properties are no longer in their
possession, is fatal to their case. The Court need not rely on
the additional evidence, as the plaintiffs have effectively
undermined their own claims. The plaintiffs' case, lacking
both legal and factual support, should be dismissed, and
the defendants and subsequent transferees should be
protected from further legal action arising out of this flawed
litigation. The absence of proper pleadings and the
plaintiffs' failure to prove their case make it clear that they
100
are not entitled to any relief, and there is no need to admit
additional evidence.. Accordingly, point No.5 does not
survive for consideration in the light of findings recorded on
point Nos.1 and 2.
Findings on Point No.6:
79. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, imposes a
mandatory duty on Courts to dismiss a suit, appeal, or
application if it is barred by limitation, irrespective of
whether the defense of limitation has been raised by the
parties. This provision ensures that legal proceedings are
initiated within a statutorily prescribed time frame, and
prevents the revival of stale claims that could lead to
uncertainty and hardship for parties. Courts must strictly
adhere to the principle of limitation as it promotes justice
by ensuring that claims are brought to the Courts in a
timely manner, preserving the integrity of evidence and
protecting parties from being dragged into litigation over
long-forgotten disputes.
101
80. The Courts have an obligatory role under Section
3 to consider the issue of limitation suo motu (on their own
motion), even if the parties have not raised it. The
language of Section 3 is imperative: it states that a suit
filed after the prescribed period "shall be dismissed"--
making it non-negotiable. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India18 emphasized
that Courts are under a bounden duty to dismiss suits that
are barred by limitation, irrespective of whether limitation is
raised as a defense by the parties. This principle prevents
the reopening of old and settled matters, ensuring that the
legal process is not abused for reviving stale claims, which
would otherwise disturb public tranquility and create a
backlog of cases.
81. In cases where there has been a significant
delay in initiating litigation, Courts must be particularly
vigilant. Limitation laws exist to ensure that justice is
18
AIR 2011 SC 3590
102
administered efficiently and fairly. The longer a party waits
to file a suit, the more likely it is that evidence, witnesses,
and documents will become unavailable, thus impairing the
ability to conduct a fair trial. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Noharlal Verma v. Distt. Coop. Central Bank Ltd.19
(2008) reiterated that Courts must not ignore the mandate
of the Limitation Act, and any case that is clearly time-
barred should be dismissed at the earliest. The Limitation
Act is not merely procedural but substantive in nature, as it
affects the right to bring a claim.
82. Further, in Balakrishna Savalram Pujari
Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj
Sansthan20, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the
object of limitation laws is to provide certainty and finality
to litigation. Delays in initiating claims deprive the opposing
party of the peace of mind that comes with the final
19
2008 AIR SCW 7850
20
AIR 1959 SC 798
103
settlement of disputes, often leaving them in an unjust
state of perpetual uncertainty.
83. In the present case, the suit is ex-facie barred
by limitation as it involves transactions that took place
several decades ago, including alienations made by the
plaintiffs' maternal uncle in 1946. The suit, however, was
filed in 1989 more than 40 years after the cause of action
arose. As per the Limitation Act, the statutory period for
challenging property transactions, including the execution
of sale deeds, is generally 12 years under Articles 64 and
65 of the Limitation Act. The plaintiffs were required to file
their suit within 12 years from the date of dispossession or
from the date the sale transactions came to their
knowledge, but they failed to do so.
84. Despite the clear bar of limitation, the Trial Court
failed to advert to Section 3 of the Limitation Act, thereby
allowing the suit to proceed in violation of mandatory legal
104
provisions. This oversight by the Trial Court is a serious
procedural and legal lapse, as the Court had a duty to
dismiss the suit as being time-barred, even if the
defendants did not raise the issue. The Supreme Court in
Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (supra) made it
clear that Courts cannot overlook the issue of limitation
merely because it was not raised by the defendants. This
failure by the Trial Court has resulted in an unjust situation,
where a stale claim has been wrongfully entertained,
leading to a miscarriage of justice.
85. Moreover, in S.S. Gadgil v. Lal and Co.21, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that Courts must interpret
limitation statutes strictly to prevent belated and dilatory
claims from being heard. The objective is to ensure that
Courts do not allow claims to resurface after they have
become legally extinct due to the lapse of time. The trial
Court, in this case, not only overlooked the limitation aspect
21
1964 SCR (8) 72
105
but also failed to recognize that the plaintiffs, who admitted
to the alienations by their maternal uncle, delayed their
challenge for several decades, making the suit untenable in
law. The plaintiffs, for the first time, are attempting to
contend that the alienation of the suit schedule properties
by their maternal uncle in 1946 is void, citing judgments
related to the alienation of minor's property. However, the
records clearly reveal that plaintiff No.1 attained majority in
1955, while plaintiff No.6 attained majority in 1957.
According to Article 60 of the Limitation Act, 1963, a suit to
set aside a transfer of property made by a guardian on
behalf of a minor must be filed within three years from the
date on which the minor attains majority. Therefore, the
limitation period for plaintiff No.1 to challenge the alienation
expired in 1958, and for plaintiff No.6, in 1960. Since the
present suit was filed only in 1989, more than three
decades after the limitation period had lapsed, the plaintiffs'
claims are clearly barred by limitation. In T.V. Seshagiri
106
Rao vs. T.V. Shanthamma22, the Court reiterated that a
claim to set aside a transfer made during minority must
strictly comply with the limitation period prescribed under
the Limitation Act. In light of these judgments, and
considering the long delay in filing the suit without
challenging the alienation at the appropriate time, the
plaintiffs' contentions regarding the void nature of the
alienation are legally unsustainable and barred by the
statute of limitation. Accordingly, point No.6 is answered in
the affirmative.
86. In the light of the discussion made supra, this
Court arrives at the following conclusions:
(i) Upon a thorough examination of the findings, this
Court concludes that the Trial Court's judgment, declaring
the plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the suit schedule
properties, is legally flawed and unsupported by the
evidence. The plaintiffs, who sought a declaration without
22
(2004) 11 SCC 430
107
challenging the validity of sale deeds executed in favor of
the defendants, failed to meet the statutory requirements
under Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as well
as Sections 31 and 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. As
held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Afsar Sheikh v.
Soleman Bibi (supra), allegations of fraud must be
specifically pleaded with full particulars. In this case, the
plaintiffs made generalized claims of fraud, which the Trial
Court erroneously accepted without demanding adequate
particulars of alienations or proof. Therefore, the finding
that the sale deeds executed by the defendants were
fraudulent and collusive is legally unsustainable and must
be set aside. Exs.P-3 to P-8 reveal that the suit properties
were sold, and the names of subsequent transferees were
reflected based on sale deeds. The plaintiffs were aware of
these transactions, as successfully elicited during cross-
examination. As such, the plaintiffs were required to seek
further declaration and challenge the alienation. The relief
108
sought for declaration in the prayer (b) is defective and
does not satisfy the requirements under Section 31 of the
Specific Relief Act..
(ii) The Trial Court's conclusion that the plaintiffs are
in lawful possession of the suit properties is equally
erroneous. The plaintiffs themselves admitted, both in
cross-examination and through their cross-appeal, that they
are not in possession of the properties. This admission
directly contradicts the Trial Court's finding that they hold
possession.
(iii) Furthermore, the procedure adopted by the Trial
Court in arriving at its conclusion is fundamentally flawed.
In a suit for declaration of title, the burden of proof lies
squarely on the plaintiffs to prove their ownership, and they
must rely on the strength of their own case rather than the
weakness of the defendant's defense. In Anathula
Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy23, the Hon'ble Supreme
23
(2008) 4 SCC 594
109
Court reiterated that in a declaratory suit, the plaintiff must
stand on their own legs and prove their title independently
of any flaws in the defendant's case. In the present matter,
the plaintiffs failed to provide a detailed explanation as to
how the sale deeds executed in 1946 by their maternal
uncle do not bind them. The absence of this crucial
evidence undermines their claim of ownership and exposes
a significant gap in their case. The Trial Court failed to
require the plaintiffs to furnish these essential details, which
led to a legally unsound judgment.
(iv) The Trial Court's handling of the evidence is also a
matter of serious concern. While the Court reproduced the
exhibits presented by the plaintiffs, it did not critically
engage with the contents of those documents. The mere
listing of exhibits without a thorough analysis is insufficient
for drawing conclusions about title. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh24 held
24
(2000) 5 SCC 652
110
that Courts must engage in a substantive analysis of
documentary evidence to reach a well-founded conclusion.
In this case, the Trial Court's superficial treatment of the
evidence has resulted in a capricious and arbitrary finding,
particularly with respect to issue Nos. 1 to 3, which relate
directly to the question of title.
(v) Additionally, the judgment and decree of the Trial
Court suffer from significant procedural and legal
infirmities. The plaintiffs' plaint is tainted with mala fides
and is based on the suppression of material facts, a
circumstance that the Trial Court failed to properly
appreciate. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (supra), litigants
who approach the Court with unclean hands or suppress
material facts cannot claim any equitable relief. In this
case, the plaintiffs failed to disclose key facts regarding the
sale transactions, and the Trial Court erred in not
dismissing the suit for want of proper pleading. The
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plaintiffs, having admitted in various stages of the trial that
they were not in possession and that sales had taken place,
sought to suppress these admissions and pursue a
misleading narrative of ownership, which the Trial Court
wrongly accepted.
(vi) The plaintiffs have intentionally produced an
encumbrance certificate covering the period from
01.04.1937 to 31.03.1945 evidenced at Ex.P-42, despite
the fact that the suit was filed much later, on 09.11.1989.
This selective production of documents raises serious
concerns, particularly in light of the fact that numerous
transactions involving the suit properties took place after
this period. Exs.P-3 to P-8 provide clear evidence of a series
of alienations, reflecting the transfer of the suit properties
through various sale deeds. Given these circumstances, it
is reasonable to infer that the plaintiffs were aware of these
alienations and chose not to disclose them fully in their
pleadings. The relief sought by the plaintiffs to declare all
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sale deeds obtained by the defendants as invalid without
specifically challenging the individual alienations, is legally
defective. By failing to challenge the alienations directly
and by omitting relevant and material documents from the
Court's consideration, the plaintiffs have engaged in a lack
of full disclosure. This non-disclosure of critical documents
appears to be an intentional act aimed at gaining an unfair
advantage in the case. Such conduct, as observed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya
Naidu (supra), amounts to fraud. The plaintiffs, by not
challenging the alienations specifically and by concealing
relevant documents, have acted in bad faith, rendering
their claims unsustainable in law
(vii) The question of limitation is another significant
issue that the Trial Court ignored. The plaintiffs sought to
challenge transactions dating back to 1946, yet the suit was
filed in 1989 more than 40 years after the alleged sales.
This delay makes the suit clearly barred by limitation under
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Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is well-settled that
even if limitation is not raised as a defense, the court must
consider it suo motu. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Khatri
Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India25 emphasized that it is
the duty of the court to dismiss suits barred by limitation,
irrespective of whether limitation is raised as an objection.
The Trial Court's failure to apply the law of limitation further
vitiates its judgment. In light of Section 3 of the Limitation
Act and the authoritative judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, it is clear that the suit in the present case
is ex-facie barred by limitation. The Trial Court's failure to
apply Section 3 of the Limitation Act resulted in an
erroneous decision to proceed with a time-barred suit,
leading to further litigation and legal complications. Courts
are bound by law to dismiss such suits at the threshold to
prevent the revival of stale claims and ensure that legal
proceedings are conducted in a timely and fair manner.
25
(2011) 9 SCC 126
114
Therefore, in the current case, the plaintiffs' suit should
have been dismissed for being time-barred under Section 3
of the Limitation Act, and the Trial Court's failure to
recognize this has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
(viii) In urban centers like Bangalore, where real
estate disputes are highly contentious and often involve
significant financial stakes, trial Courts must exercise
heightened caution when handling such suits. The case at
hand exemplifies the potential for misuse of judicial
processes, where plaintiffs, despite not being in possession
of the suit property and having failed to challenge crucial
sale deeds in the manner known to law, sought to obtain
relief through misleading claims. Courts in such jurisdictions
must meticulously investigate the cause of action, the
nature of the relief sought, and ensure that litigants are not
abusing the system to settle personal scores or claim
properties they are not legally entitled to. The procedural
lapses in this case, where the Trial Court failed to scrutinize
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key evidence, did not apply the relevant legal provisions
under the Code of Civil Procedure and Specific Relief Act,
and overlooked the crucial issue of limitation, underscore
the necessity for judicial diligence.
(ix) In cities like Bangalore, where rapid urbanization
leads to complex property disputes involving multiple
parties and long-standing transactions, Courts must ensure
that plaintiffs are required to provide a clear and
unambiguous pleading, as well as substantiate their claims
with cogent evidence. Fraud claims must be specifically
pleaded with full particulars, as mandated under Order 6
Rule 4 of the CPC, and Courts must not accept generalized
allegations. Further, Courts must be vigilant in protecting
bonafide third party purchasers and ensuring that
declaratory suits are not used as tools to unsettle legally
executed transactions. This case is a classic example of how
the judicial process can be misused when proper scrutiny is
not applied, and it highlights the need for trial Courts to
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adopt a rigorous approach in verifying the facts, analyzing
the evidence, and applying the law meticulously to prevent
the manipulation of legal processes in property disputes.
(x) The palpably erroneous findings of the Trial Court
in this case have resulted in a significant miscarriage of
justice, particularly impacting bonafide third party
purchasers. By erroneously declaring the plaintiffs as
absolute owners of the suit properties, despite clear
evidence of third-party rights and transactions evidenced at
Exs.P-3 to P-8, the Court has indirectly enabled the
plaintiffs to create further third-party interests. Purchasers
who acquired rights through the plaintiffs are now at
serious risk, as the judgment opens the door to further
litigation between them and those who legitimately
acquired title through the defendants. This situation is
compounded by the fact that the defendants, who were
grossly negligent in defending the suit at an early stage,
failed to challenge the plaintiffs' claims with due diligence.
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As a result, the subsequent purchasers, who bought
properties in good faith, are the ones bearing the brunt of
this judicial oversight. These innocent purchasers are now
entangled in a complex legal web, facing the prospect of
protracted litigation and the potential loss of their legitimate
rights. The Trial Court's failure to critically examine the
plaintiffs' claims, coupled with the defendants' lack of timely
defense, has led to a grave miscarriage of justice, with far-
reaching consequences for innocent third parties. This case
serves as a stark reminder of the judicial responsibility to
safeguard the rights of bonafide purchasers and prevent the
manipulation of the legal process in property disputes.
(xi) The situation is further aggravated by the gross
negligence of the defendants, who failed to mount a proper
defense at the earliest stages of the litigation. Their inaction
has contributed to the current complex situation, where the
true victims are not the parties to the original dispute, but
rather the subsequent purchasers who had no involvement
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in the initial conflict. These purchasers, having acted in
reliance on what they believed were legitimate transactions,
now find themselves embroiled in a legal quagmire. The
defendants' failure to defend the suit diligently has thus
caused grave harm to third parties who had no means of
protecting themselves against the legal wrangling that has
ensued. The real injustice lies in the fact that those who are
most affected had no part in the original dispute and are
now forced to bear the heavy cost of the court's erroneous
findings.
(xii) The consequences of such flawed judicial findings
are far-reaching. When Courts do not thoroughly
investigate the cause of action and the evidence before
them, they open the door to prolonged legal battles that
impact innocent third parties. This case demonstrates how
the judicial process, if not handled with care and precision,
can be misused by litigants to create further complications
in property disputes. In this instance, the plaintiffs have
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succeeded in creating third-party rights based on a
fundamentally flawed judgment, leaving bonafide
purchasers to pay the heavy price of legal uncertainty and
potential loss of their property rights. Courts, therefore,
must be vigilant in ensuring that their judgments do not
inadvertently harm innocent third parties who act in
reliance on those decisions.
(xiii) In conclusion, this case stands as a stark
reminder of the need for judicial prudence, especially in
property disputes where third-party rights are involved. The
Trial Court's failure to properly analyze the evidence and
apply the correct legal standards has resulted in a gross
miscarriage of justice, affecting innocent purchasers who
were unaware of the underlying disputes. The negligent
defense by the defendants has further compounded this
problem, leaving subsequent purchasers in a vulnerable
position. To prevent such situations, Courts must
meticulously investigate the facts, scrutinize the cause of
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action, and consider the potential impact of their judgments
on all parties involved, particularly third-party purchasers
who rely on the integrity of the judicial process to secure
their property rights.
87. For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to
pass the following:
ORDER
(i) The appeals are allowed;
(ii) The judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in O.S.No.6045/1989 is hereby set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiffs is dismissed;
(iii) Cross objection filed by the plaintiffs in RFA.Crob.No.21/2024 is also dismissed;
(iv) No order as to costs;
(v) Draw decree accordingly;
(vi) All impleading applications and other I.As., if any, stand disposed of as suit filed by the plaintiffs is dismissed.
SD/-
(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE CA