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10. With respect to the first Issue, Trial Court observed that the Appellant had raised the defence of her entitlement to the benefit of protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as 'TPA'), for the first time only during the final arguments on 16.09.2019 and 21.09.2019. Appellant had nowhere pleaded in the Written Statement that she was entitled to the benefit of the said provision, as she had upon execution of the Agreement to Sell, taken possession of the premises, in part performance of the Agreement and consequently even evidence was not led to that effect. Instead, Appellant had pleaded that upon execution of the Agreement to Sell and GPA, both dated 22.11.1994, her son and the Appellant had become owners of the premises. Trial Court relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in Shyam Narayan Prasad vs. Krishna Prasad & Ors., (2018) 7 SCC 646, wherein the Supreme Court has held that wherever the Defendant intends to avail the benefit of Section 53A of TPA, he must plead that he has taken possession of the property, in part performance of the contract, since pleadings give each side intimation of the each other's case and also enables the Court to determine the real issue for determination. Therefore, in the absence of pleadings, benefit of protection under Section 53A of TPA cannot be granted to the Defendant.

28. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 had also urged that while the GPA and other documents relied upon by the Appellant do not confer Title and transfer the property, in any event the documents are forged and fabricated and in any event no Sale Deed was ever executed in favour of the Appellant. It was submitted that Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 was amended and sub-Section (1A) was inserted by Amendment Act 48 of 2001 effective from 24.09.2001. After the Amendment, the documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immoveable property, for the purpose of Section 53A of TPA, shall be registered, if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001, and if such documents are not so registered, they shall have no effect for the purposes of Section 53A of TPA. Counsel relied on the judgement of the Supreme Court in H.K. Sharma (supra) wherein according to him, the judgment of the Supreme Court in R. Kanthimathi (supra) relied upon by the Appellant has been distinguished. It was argued that in H.K. Sharma (supra), the Supreme Court, faced with an identical question, laid down the test that the Court must ascertain whether the terms of the Agreement to Sell set up by the Tenant evidence any intention to abandon the existing landlord-tenant relationship and only on being satisfied that such intention exists, the old relationship will come to an end and the Agreement to Sell would confer protection to the tenant under Section 53A of TPA.

31. It was further contended that the sole question, in fact, for consideration before this Court is the effect and/or relevance of the Agreement to Sell and GPA dated 22.11.1994, in view of the admitted position that Appellant was inducted as a tenant at least under the Agreement dated 22.11.1992 and a consequential question whether these documents entitle the Appellant to resist the suit for possession. Elaborating on the arguments, it was submitted that a defence on the basis of an Agreement to Sell and GPA can take three forms viz. (a) it could be alleged that Appellant is entitled to part performance under Section 53A of TPA i.e. a right based on part performance; (b) it could be alleged that by virtue of these documents, the Appellant has become the owner i.e. right based on ownership, and (c) it could be alleged that Appellant, though not a classical owner, has acquired some rights in the property so as to resist eviction i.e. residual rights argument. In the present case, Appellant has only pleaded ownership as is evident from the written statement filed before the Trial Court and cannot at this stage go beyond the pleadings and set up a plea of part performance under Section 53A of TPA. This is clearly held by the Supreme Court in Bachhaj Nahar vs. Nilima Mandal & Anr., (2008) 17 SCC 491. In order to set up the plea of part performance, Appellant ought to have pleaded that she had taken some steps in furtherance of the Agreement and is in possession of the premises. She also ought to have pleaded that she was ready and willing to perform her part of the Agreement in accordance with the provisions Section 53A of the TPA, which are clear and require no interpretation. Part performance argument cannot simply flow out of an ownership argument, as in the former, one concedes that he has only an Agreement to Sell in his favour and protection from dispossession is sought on the strength of the fact that he has acted in furtherance of the Agreement and remains willing to comply with the balance terms, while in the latter case, one asserts that the Agreement to Sell is by itself proof of ownership and as a corollary nothing further is required to be done. The Appellant has clearly chosen the latter course as is evident from para 4 of the written statement.

(e). Trial Court erred in not granting the protection under Section 53A of the TPA, on the erroneous ground that the Appellant had not pleaded in her defence that she was entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Section 53A of the TPA, as she had taken possession of the premises in part performance of the Agreement to Sell and instead had pleaded that upon execution of the Agreement, she and her son had become owners of the premises; (f). Trial Court erred in holding that the Appellant had not pleaded that she was ready and willing to perform her part of the Agreement to Sell in as much as the Appellant had categorically pleaded that she was in possession of the premises by virtue of the Agreement to Sell executed by the father of Respondent No.1 in her favour; (g). reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shyam Narayan Prasad (supra) by the Trial Court was erroneous as the challenge in the said case was to an unregistered Exchange Deed which was sought to be declared invalid on the ground that the property in question was ancestral property while the defence taken was that the property was not ancestral and in this context the Court held that plea of part performance was required to be taken while in the present case, a specific plea of possession was taken and the Appellant was thus entitled to defend her possession; (h). under the well settled law upon execution of an Agreement to Sell between the tenant and the landlord, the relationship becomes one of seller and purchaser by operation of law and the status of tenant-landlord ceases and even on cancellation of the Agreement to Sell, the status of tenant is not restored; (i). Trial Court had rendered a specific finding in favour of the Appellant that the Agreement to Sell and the GPA both dated 22.11.1994 were genuine documents and yet declined to grant protection to the Appellant and erroneously decreed the suit, even overlooking the fact that Respondents never challenged the said documents in terms of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act; (j). The case of the Appellant is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in Hardeep Kaur (supra) and therefore, even if the Appellant may not be a classical owner of the premises but surely had better right of possession and is entitled to protection under Section 53 A of the TPA and defend the possession, and (k). in terms of the Agreement and the GPA, Late Shri Mazumdar had given up all his rights in relation to his premises and the sale was complete insofar as he was concerned and only a formal Conveyance Deed remained to be executed by DDA in favour of the Appellant on payment of balance installments.