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5. It is argued that the decree in question is a bi-parte decree and it will bind both the parties and is a decree on merits. It is further argued that New Zealand is a reciprocating territory and as per Section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code, the foreign judgment would be conclusive because it has been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction on merits of the case and is founded on correct view of law and has not been obtained by fraud or on breach of any law in force in India. Therefore, the application was filed before the Family Court under Section 44A of CPC. It is further argued that a person in possession of a foreign decree of divorce can file such an 3 MP-6403-2025 application to get the foreign decree authenticated by a Court in India in terms of Section 13 of CPC and such a course of action as well as maintainability of application under Section 44A of CPC has been upheld by two different High Courts in India i.e. Madras High Court in case of August Pedre vs. Sub Registrar Pondicherry Municipality Puducherry, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Mad 9738 and in the case of Seethal Joseph vs. Marriage Officer, Kayamkulam Municipality , reported in 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 19269 . Therefore, it is prayed to set aside the impugned order of the Family Court and allow the petition or to remand the matter back to the Family Court to pass an order in accordance with Section 44A read with Section 13 CPC so that the decree may be got authenticated in India whenever the petitioner comes down to reside in Indian territorial limits.

6. Heard.

7. The present case raises a very interesting question that where marriage has been solemnised by between two Indian citizens in India and is a marriage in terms of provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and one of the parties to marriage has gone abroad and it is his case that he has gone abroad for the purpose of permanently settling in that foreign country, though he may not have been still granted citizenship of that foreign country but he is now domiciled in that foreign country, then under what circumstances, a decree of divorce granted in that foreign country, would become applicable in India.

17. The issue of recognition to divorce decree passed by the foreign court was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satya (Smt.) vs. Teja Singh (Shri) , reported in (1975) 1 SCC 120 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held the necessary ingredients to recognise the foreign divorce decree in India. In the aforesaid case, the facts were akin to the present case that the husband had proceeded to a foreign country and obtained a divorce decree in foreign country while his wife and children 9 MP-6403-2025 were residing in India. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that recognition to be accorded to a foreign decree must depend on the rules of private international law of India and it was held that there is no system of private international law which can be claimed to have universal recognition. It was held that India cannot mechanically adopt the rules of private international law evolved by other countries and are moulded by distinctive social, political and economic conditions obtaining in different countries. It was held that questions relating to personal status of a party depend in England and North America upon the law of his domicile but in many other European countries upon the law of his nationality and it is not rare that a man and woman are husband and wife in one jurisdiction but are divorced in another jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held as under:-

10. Relying on a decision of this Court in Smt Satya v. Teja Singh [(1975) 1 SCC 120 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 50 : (1975) 2 SCR 197 : AIR 1975 SC 105] it is possible for us to dispose of this case on a narrow ground, viz., that the appellant played a fraud on the foreign court representing to it incorrect jurisdictional facts. For, as held in that case, residence does not mean a temporary residence for the purpose of obtaining a divorce but habitual residence or residence which is intended to be permanent for future as well. We refrain from adopting that course in the present case because there is nothing on record to assure us that the court of St. Louis does not assume jurisdiction only on the basis of a mere temporary residence of the appellant for 90 days even if such residence is for the purpose of obtaining divorce. We would, therefore, presume that the foreign court by its own rules of jurisdiction had rightly entertained the dispute and granted a valid decree of divorce according to its law. The larger question that we would like to address ourselves to is whether even in such cases, the courts in this country should recognise the foreign divorce decrees.