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(PER ABHAY AHUJA, J.)

1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of learned counsel appearing for Petitioner and the Respondents- State and its offcials, heard fnally.

2. By this Petition, fled under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Petitioner is challenging the order of detention dated 19th January, 2021 (hereinafter called "Detention Order") issued under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers, Drug-Offenders/Dangerous Persons, Video Pirates, Sand Smugglers and Persons Engaged in Black-marketing Of Essential Commodities Act, 1981 (the "MPDA Act") by Respondent No.2-Collector & District Magistrate, Sangli (the "Detaining Authority").

16. Learned counsel for Petitioner submits that prior to his detention, Petitioner was externed. He submits that the detention is a drastic step. He submits that the detention without trial is a serious encroachment on the fundamental right of a citizen. He submits that as held in a recent decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ajay Nagesh Nagmode Vs. The State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition No.1117 of 2021), if ordinary law can take care, then there is no need to invoke a special Act like MPDA Act. He therefore submits that the Detention Order ought to be set aside.

28. The question is whether the aforesaid material i.e. the single criminal proceeding dated 23 rd August, 2020 for offences Mugdha 24 of 40 25 Judgment-WP 846-21.odt under Sections 307, 341, 323, 504, 506, 143, 147, 148, 149 of the IPC, alongwith the two in-camera statements, would be suffcient for the Detaining Authority to reach its conclusion that Petitioner is a "dangerous person" as defned under Section 2(b-1) of the MPDA Act and that it was necessary to issue the Detention Order so as to maintain public order as per Section 3(1) of the MPDA Act.

11. On applying 5-A of MPDA Act, only CR No. 91 of 2015 remains. In such case it can be held that the detention order is issued only on the basis of CR No. 91 of 2015. This solitary act would not constitute a "habit". In our view on the basis of the said solitary CR No. 91 of 2015 it cannot be said that the petitioner - detenu "habitually commits" or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences mentioned in Section 2(b-1) of the MPDA Act and since the detenu has been detained as he is a "dangerous person", the impugned detention order would not be sustainable in law." Therefore, in our view Petitioner could not be defned to be a dangerous person and detained without a trial.