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7. Shri Ajai Rastogi, learned Counsel appearing for, the respondents stated at the Bar that the appellant was appointed as a probationer on temporary basis and it is well settled law that the services of a probationer may be terminated without any show cause notice or providing any opportunity of hearing. It was further contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that ther is no foundation for saying that the termination order passed against the appellant is punitive, since the appellant was admittedly a probationer and was granted temporary extensions from time to time for the purpose of watching her conduct and behaviour and since the same were not found satisfactory, the respondents were absolutely justified in terminating the temporary services of the appellant. It was further contended by Shri Rastogi that the order of appointment clearly stipulates that the appellant was appointed temporary for a period of six months and the term of temporary appointment of the appellant alongwith Smt. Dropadi Parwani was extended upto 31st December, 1990 vide order, dated 13th November, 1990 and again it was extended upto 28th February, 1991 vide order, dated 11th January, 1991. The last order of extension upto 31st March, 1991 was issued on 26th March, 1991. The said order clearly implies that the services of the appellant stood automatically terminated w.e.f. 1st April, 1991, since no further extension was granted to the appellant beyond 31st March, 1991. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the respondents that the orders passed on 13th November, 1990 and 11th January, 1991 had not been assailed by the appellant, by which the term of temporary appointment of the appellant was extended upto 31st March, 1991. In the absence of challenge to these orders it must be held that the appointment of the appellant was admittedly on temporary basis, no illegality could be attributed to the respondents in not extending the term of her temporary appointment since the appellant was on probation and the last extension upto 31st March, 1991 was during the probationary period which was not extended beyond 31st March, 1991, no illegality could be attributed to the same.

11. In the matter of Hira Singh v. The Union of India and Ors. (Delhi) (supra) the petitioner who was an officer of U.P. Government was selected by the Government of India for appointment on deputation for the post of Asst. Collector in the department of Social Security, Government of India. It was mentioned in the terms of appointment that the appointment would be permanent but the petitioner would be on probation for one year which may be extended or curtailed at the discretion of the competent authority and that failure to complete probation period to the satisfaction of the competent Authority would render him liable to revertion to his substantive post. The petitioner was later on reverted to his parent office stating that his performance during the probationary period had not been found satisfactory. It is this order which was assailed by the petitioner in the writ petition before Delhi High Court. It was held in this context that the order of revertion casts a stigma on the petitioner since the order was not unexceptional in form. Since the said order reverting the petitioner to his original post which admittedly carried lesser emoluments and a lesser rank was coupled with stigma on his work during the probation and it deserved to be quashed. The said order was quashed by the High Court being violative of the principles of natural justice, since the adverse entries recorded in the A.C.Rs. were admittedly not communicated to the petitioner.

18. Applying the ratio of the aforesaid case to the case in hand, we are of the considered opinion that the aforesaid decision is fully attracted to this case as well, since by mere extension of service the petitioner who was appointed temporarily as PBX Operator on probation, could not presume her confirmation and continuance in service beyond the extended period, since there was no confirmation of her service by the High Court by passing any positive order to that effect. We are further of the view that the imcumbent who is a probationer can certainty be discharged at the expiry of probationary period if she has not made sufficient use of opportunities available to her or has not improved her conduct during the said period and it is not incumbent upon the employer to extend the terms of temporary service beyond the probationary period.

21. In the matter of M. Benugopal v. The Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh and Anr. (supra) the question which had arisen for consideration and determination of the Apex Court was regarding vires of Section 2(oo) and Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. In the above case the services of the appellant were terminated while he was on probation On the ground that he failed to achieve the target business for the Corporation. The question which arose for consideration was as to whether the termination of services of the appellant amounts to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was held by the Apex Court that even if the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act were applicable, such termination shall not be deemed to be retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was further held by the Apex Court that since the appellant had failed to achieve the fixed target in terms of the performance of the appellant during the probationary period which was extended for two consequtive years, as such the Corporation was within its right in not confirming the appellant in terms of the order of appointment and the termination of the appellant during the probationary period without any notice in terms of Regulation 14(4) was not open to challenge. It was further held that any such termination, even if the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act were applicable, shall not be deemed to be "retrenchment" within the meaning of Section 2(00) of the Act. Likewise applying the ratio of the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court to the present case, it becomes explicitely clear that this Court was fully Justified in terminating the services of the appellant, since inspite of temporary extentions given to her during the probationary period, she had failed to give better results towards her conduct and performance as PBX Operator and hence this Court was fully justified in not extending the probationary period and terminated her services as it was open to the competent Authority to terminate the services of the appellant even without giving any notice.