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Showing contexts for: 482 crpc in Kulwinder Singh And Ors. vs State Of Punjab And Anr. on 8 August, 2007Matching Fragments
6. In general parlance, "compounding" is known as "compromise". The expression is used to condone any felony in exchange for reparation received by the victim-complainant from the felon.
7. "Compounding" of an offence in terms of its power under Section 320(6) Cr.P.C. by the High Court as an Appellate or Revisional Court has, thus, no similarity or relevance with its inherent and plenary jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. which cannot be limited or affected by any other provision contained in the Code. Suffice to say that the inherent jurisdiction includes the High Court's power to whittle down and also quash ongoing criminal prosecution provided that a case "to prevent abuse of the process of law" or "to advance the ends of justice" etc. is made out in unequivocal terms.
26. It is not proposed to make any comparative analysis of the powers of the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. as there can be no such interpretations of such powers which flow from different sources. It is only proposed to venture out to examine the powers of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. within the parameters of the reference delineating the controversy which has been narrowly encompassed but is much larger in perception and application. Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., which is under consideration, is reproduced below:
30. In Dharmbir v. State of Haryana (supra), V.K. Bali,J. (minority view), while dealing with the judgment in B.S. Joshi's case (supra), observed as under:
The question framed and answered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) pertinently relates to powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Article 226 of the Constitution of India in view of the bar created by Section 320(9) Cr.P.C., even though, as stated earlier, the matter pertained to matrimonial disputes. In my considered view, judgment in B.S.Joshi's case (supra), cannot be treated to be the only exception vesting the power with the High Court under Section 482 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India where FIR can be quashed relating to non-compoundable offence. In other words, it is not an exception to the power of the High Court under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure relating to matrimonial disputes. To illustrate, if it was a case under Section 304B IPC where wife had died due to torture meted to her on account of demand of dowry, could it be said to be a dispute relating to matrimonial dispute where a compromise should be permitted and FIR quashed? If it was a case of cold blooded murder of wife by the husband for nonfulfillment of his demands relating to dowry, could on compromise the High Court quash the FIR? In both the events, as mentioned above, answer to the question, to this Court, appears to be in the negative. To further illustrate by examples of disputes other than relating to marriage, like civil disputes between two brothers which had criminal overtones as well, would the decision in B.S.Joshi's case (supra) not apply? Where the property in dispute between close relatives, which is primarily of civil nature and has also genuine or belaboured dimension of criminal liability, could the decision be otherwise? If the dispute may pertain to old parents or business concerns with dealings over a long period which were predominantly civil and were given or acquired a criminal dimension but the parties were essentially seeking a redressal of their financial or commercial claims, could, the decision be otherwise. I have no doubt in my mind that in the matters related to the kind of categories mentioned above, the decision would have been the same. If that be so, B.S.Joshi's case (supra) cannot be treated an exception for permitting the parties to command non-compoundable offence by permitting the High Court to quash FIR under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
38. No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C., or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
39. The compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is "finest hour of justice". Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the Court by exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say that the power is limited to such cases. There can never be any such rigid rule to prescribe the exercise of such power, especially in the absence of any premonitions to forecast and predict eventualities which the cause of justice may throw up during the course of a litigation.