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21. The Division Bench considered the decision in Y. V. Rangaiah (supra) and distinguished the same by observing that neither was the Court concerned with a case for promotion nor a case when a person has acquired a vested right to be considered for promotion. The decisions in A. A. Calton (supra) and P. Mahendran (supra) were also considered and distinguished on the ground that the fact situation of the case at hand was different.

22. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench found that the selection process was not complete by January 8, 1998 when the procedure for selection of teachers framed under the 1997 Act became effective. In paragraph 20, it ruled that :

"*****Rule 28 of the Management Rules stands substituted. A substitution may amount to an amendment but the normal rule of interpretation of substitution is that it will have effect as if the same was existing from the beginning. In the instant case, the selection process had not been completed. Had the selection process been completed, the matter might have been different keeping in view the provision of section 8 of the said Act read with the procedure for selection framed by the Governor. Furthermore, both sections 7 and 9 of the said Act contain non-obstante clauses which are of wide amplitude. Keeping in view the provisions of the said Act vis-a-vis the direction issued by the Director of School Education, there cannot be any doubt that in case of conflict the former will prevail".

25. In paragraph 20 of the decision in Snehansu Jas (supra), the Division Bench's reading of the ratio of the earlier decision in Narayan Baidya (supra) is reflected. It observed thus:

"20.***** Therefore, in this case also same view was taken that if the selection process is not complete and if the rules have been amended then in that case, the selection shall be governed by the Act of 1997 and not in terms of the earlier rules".

(underlining for emphasis by me)

31. In my humble understanding of the aforesaid decisions, the Division Benches have from time to time either laid down the law in wide terms or in a constricted manner. The decision in Bausdev Bag (supra) has been sought to be explained in Narayan Baidya (supra). Abdul Mannan Laskar (supra) has followed the latter decision. Snehansu Jas (supra) does not expressly disagree with Narayan Baidya (supra) and Abdul Mannan Laskar (supra) but answers the reference in a manner that seems to me to be inconsistent with the said decisions. Over a period of time, different tests have been applied. While Snehansu Jas (supra) lays stress on commencement of selection process for non-applicability of the amended rules, the previous two decisions considers completion of selection process to be the test. Archana Ghosh (supra), on the contrary, ruled that the rules existing at the time the concerned vacancy arose ought to be followed for filling up the same. Snehansu Jas (supra) and Abdul Mannan Laskar (supra) though have not been declared per incuriam in Archana Ghosh (supra) but the very observation therein that the same do not operate as binding precedent is sufficient to create confusion in the mind of a learned single Judge. The decision in Contai Kshetra Mohan Vidya Bhaban (supra) has again followed Archana Ghosh (supra). Apart from the decisions in Basudev Bag (supra), Abdul Mannan Laskar (supra) and Contai Kshetra Mohan Vidya Bhaban (supra), each of the Division Benches in Narayan Baidya (supra), Snehansu Jas (supra) and Archana Ghosh (supra) have taken a view which appears to me to be inconsistent with the view taken in a previous decision by a bench of coordinate jurisdiction. A single Judge would thus be hesitant in preferring one to the other, being technically bound by all the decisions of the Division Benches, particularly when it is not the law that amongst several decisions of benches of coordinate jurisdiction on a point of law, the later decision must be preferred to the former [see: Bholanath Karmakar v. Madan Mohan Karmakar, reported in 1987 (2) CLJ 332]. Since all the earlier Division Bench decisions of this Court are not consistent and the views expressed therein do not admit of any reconciliation, but each of them is binding on me, I do feel free to follow that decision which according to me is better in point of law having regard to the dicta in Bholanath Karmakar (supra). I have thus no hesitation in overruling the contention of Mr. Bari that the view expressed in Archana Ghosh (supra) [since accepted by the Division Bench in Contai Kshetra Mohan Vidya Bhaban (supra)] being the recent and later view ought to be followed.